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Failure Is Always an Option
Logic Bomb writes "The New York Times has a short but elegant op-ed regarding the different perspectives of engineers and managers and the role that plays in accidents like the space shuttle Columbia disaster. It's the sort of article you'll nod all the way through, then print and leave anonymously on your supervisor's desk. Any tech managers in the Slashdot crowd might have some interesting comments on how the right balance is struck." Henry Petroski has written several good books on engineering and failure.
In the case of my last software project, engineers who worried about bugs that the software may have suffered during design were ineffective in getting it properly inspected before launch.
"No boss, I have no idea where that article printed out 15 times and strewn across your office came from........ It looks like a good article though."
"I can not bring myself to believe that if knowledge presents danger, the solution is ignorance" - Isaac Asimov
By Homer Hickam
When I go to the Cape and watch the Shuttle being launched, I still get a lump in my throat watching it soar. Even though I no longer work for NASA, its thunder affirms my dreams for spaceflight. Still, when I put emotion aside, I can't ignore my engineering training. That training and my knowledge as a 20-year veteran of the space agency (and also a Vietnam vet) has led me to conclude that the Space Shuttle is NASA's Vietnam. A generation of engineers and managers have exhausted themselves trying to make it work and they just can't. Why not? Because the Shuttle's engineering design, just as Vietnam's political design, is inherently flawed.
Much has been made of the report produced by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). I've read newspaper articles that called it "scathing." Hardly. Its tepid recommendations probably had Shuttle managers who made poor decisions dancing with relief. It gave them a pass by proclaiming "culture" made them do it.
I don't believe there's a NASA culture. There is, however, a Shuttle cult. It is practiced like a religion by space policy makers who simply cannot imagine an American space agency without the Shuttle. Well, I can, and it's a space agency which can actually fly people and cargoes into orbit without everybody involved being terrified of imminent destruction every time there's lift-off. With some reservations, written in the politest language, the CAIB recommended to keep Shuttles flying but with more inspections, more bureaucracy (an outside safety agency), and more money. But piling on more inspections, people and dollars won't make the Shuttle safer. Neither will the safety sensitivity training that will probably be dumped on top of the overworked, disillusioned NASA engineers. My God, they've already dedicated their very souls to keep the Shuttle flying safely! The truth is, no amount of arm-waving about "culture" can fix a flawed design.
Take a look at the Shuttle stack and what do you see? A fragile spaceplane sitting on the back of a huge propellant tank between two massive solid rocket boosters. The Shuttle has to sit right in the middle of all the turmoil of launch because we once believed it would be cheaper to bring back those engines and rebuild them than to build new ones. That has not proved to be the case -- far from it -- but it has left us with a crew sitting in the most vulnerable position possible in terms of design. Simply put, had that spaceplane been on top of the stack, the destruction of Challenger and Columbia wouldn't have occurred. The CAIB ignored this flawed design and that makes their conclusions suspect: no amount of inspections or condemning another NASA generation to worry over this thing will solve it.
So let's get practical. We can't just shut the thing down. We need the Shuttle to finish the space station and also to keep the Russians and Chinese from dominating space. I'm not willing to see that occur while we dither. Human spaceflight is important to this country. But the Shuttle is as safe as you're going to get with what's in place today. Let's put some tough engineers in charge, fly it 10 more times over the next four years with hand-picked crews to finish the space station and meet our international obligations. Then close the program and replace it with expendable launchers and a shiny new spaceplane. And, this time, put it on top.
The problem is that people are afraid that if the shuttle stops flying space exploration will stop. Public support will wane and funcing will slow. I happen to disagree but there are many in the space program who do not.
"I can not bring myself to believe that if knowledge presents danger, the solution is ignorance" - Isaac Asimov
Did you read the Investigation report?
Hindsight is 20/20, but that doesn't mean that we should wear blinders when looking towards the future!
The Management team _actively_ canceled requests for information pertaining to the impact. See page 153 of the PDF.
The management team also didn't follow their own procedures, they didn't meet every day (they were supposed to).
I was impressed by the engineers at Boeing (I think that was the company) who elected to research the impact and footage of it over the weekend even when management told them not to.
Read the report. Section 6.3 (DECISION-MAKING DURING THE FLIGHT OF STS-107) is extremely interesting and points out Eight seperate missed opportunities to find out more information about the problem.
There were also some engineering related issues - the engineers using test software that wasn't designed to analize an impact nearly that large, and other issues - but it really comes down to a lack of the management team accepting that there could be a real, out-of-family problem on the mission.
Sticks and Stones may break my bones, but copyright will always protect me.
It's worth thinking about what would have happened if the damaged Shuttle had been images by USAF ground cameras, and it became clear that re-entry was going to be a disaster. The shuttle and crew would have been stuck in orbit, with worldwide publicity, while NASA tried to come up with a fix. They probably wouldn't have succeeded. On-orbit rescue using Atlantis has been discussed as marginally possible, and on-orbit patching has been suggested, but most likely, they wouldn't have worked.
Think of the PR fallout. Seven astronauts stuck in orbit for most of a month, with constant TV coverage, followed by their deaths on worldwide TV. That would have been career-ending for most of NASA's top management. Letting them crash saved the jobs of top people at NASA.
Worst case, a rushed launch of Atlantis could have resulted in losing two shuttles. That would have ended the Shuttle program.
I've been involved in engineering literally all my life. My dad was an engineer and as a small child I remember going to work with my dad and being in awe of all the stuff he had to 'play' with. I never wanted to be anything else! Unfortunately, in the scheme of things we are the workers, the ones who toil withput credit. The managers take all of that. In the 1980's as a contract engineer I built a Boston FM radio station from scratch (WFNX), yet they didn't even see fit to invite me to its sign on party! When I asked why, I was told: "You were paid well for your work, isn't that enough?". They actually believed they paid me too much to make their property worth many millions morethan it was before. Needless to say from that time forward, I did only precicely what they paid me to do (and what they asked me to do), nothing more. Part of the problem is we ALLOW ourselves to be treated in this way! The plumber, electrician or auto mechanic don't. Why do we? I think one answer is UNION. They realize there is respect and safety in numbers. Are we too good, too elite to do the same?
When engineers and managers clashed over the 1986 Challenger launch, the managers pulled rank.
What a dark, yet utterly true statement. Do the NASA and contracting company managers sleep well today knowing that in 1986 their decisions cost lives?
Edward Tufte, author of some amazing books on information display, wrote in Envisioning Information on the Challenger disaster. Looking at the materials prepared by engineers, he saw that they had correctly correlated temperature with O-ring failure. Yet their materials, hastily prepared during the 11th hour, failed to convince managers to abort the launch. Tufte shows a design of a simple graph that shows temperature on the abscissa and burn-through on the ordinate, and any manager could draw a line through the points and extrapolate out to the bitter cold Florida day that cost the shuttle.
Having my own share of bad managers, I have to wonder, would it have made any difference?