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CCIA Urges Dept. of Homeland Security to Avoid Microsoft
An anonymous reader writes "The Inquirer has posted an article reporting that the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) has urged the US Department of Homeland Security, in an open letter to Tom Ridge, secretary of the department, to avoid using Microsoft software because Microsoft's software is 'riddled with obvious and easily exploited vulnerabilities.'"
The Department of Homeland Security continues to use Microsoft products despite massive flaws, just like everyone else for whom familiarity is more important than actual security.
And what happens when the DHS begins to use Linux/Solaris/et al and the attackers focus their attention on these products and find numerous and obvious vulnerabilities?
People tend to forget that more holes are found in Microsoft products partly because more people use Microsoft products. As a result, that's where the attackers focus a great deal of their energy. Linux would have the same problem if it had Microsoft's market share.
If Slamer has taught us anything, it is that a Microsoft operating system should not even be on the same network as any critical systems. Nor should it be used for any "less critical" systems, such as fault or load monitoring systems.
So ships are not important. I see.
Favorite line: "Although Unix is more reliable, Redman said, NT may become more reliable with time"
I live in that area, and there are a LOT of Msft job openings requiring security clearance these days.
try { do() || do_not(); } catch (JediException err) { yoda(err); }
ANY software can be compromised to ANY degree. There are just as many exploits lurking in an Open Source distribution (let's face it, it's rare that someone uses ONLY the Operating System), as there are in anything.
Implementing (and adhering to) strong policy, working diligintly to keep systems updated, and keeping users informed. These are essential parts to creating (and maintaining) a "secure" infrastructure.
Granted, it's easier said than done; but it's possible. There are FAR MORE corporations/entities that DID NOT get affected by blaster/sobig/melissa/codered/etc. than there are corps/entities that did.
It would be totally inappropriate for a goverment agency to blacklist a specific vendor without going through extensive hearings. That does not mean that they should not consider the vendor's history when evaluating each purchase. For the anti-MS crowd that means that they should reject each MS product individually.
More seriously, they need to evaluate what their software requirements are. I strongly suspect that they need software which will:
If I had gone and said the north american power grid should be replaced at the wake of the outages [ . . . ], I would have been accused of countless acts of civil disobediance.
My first question is what is wrong with Slashdot? I mean someone saw fit to give the parent coward "Insightful" for what she or he wrote? Someone wind the clock back before 2000 when Slashdot wasn't frequented by Microsoft apologists.
I'm not sure what makes you think your exercising your 1st Amendment right to speak freely (assuming you're a US citizen) would be branded civil disobedince, but in case you're really worried (and not just ranting) know you're in good comapny: first, the outage of August 2003 has produced a US-Canadain task force to investigate problems with the aging power grid. In fact, the power grid is so important that it is the subject of dozens of assessments conducted by North American Electric Reliabilty Council. Let's just say that NERC is not sanguine about the reliability of the North-American power grid. The problem is so widespread that even US lawmakers anticipate a massive political dispute.
Regarding your comparison of the power grid to the Internet, network events such as MSBlaster and Sobig.F highlight the fragility of an information network built of insecure nodes. At present, the overwelming majority of the nodes of the Internet are powered by Microsoft software. For better or for worse, "press releases and open letters right at the wake [sic] of major worms" draw attention to the real effects of maintaining so insecure an information network. MSBlaster and Sobig.F are not theories but facts and so prove the unreliability of an Internet composed mainly of Microsoft-powered nodes. The timely discussion of network events such as MSBlaster, Mimda, Code Red, Sobig.X, etc. in the press should, in my opinion, be an obligation of network adminstrators.
Given your post, you'd probably have us ignore the problem in the hopes that the next worm/virus/trojan does not damage our shared information network even more spectacularly. Thanks, but I would rather disseminate information and share data about such network events rather than stop my eyes, ears, and mouth with sand.
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