Dartmouth Project Combines Linux With TCPA
SiliconEntity writes "A new project from Dartmouth College demonstrates significant advances in combining Linux with TCPA. The software turns a Linux PC into a 'virtual secure coprocessor', which is able to check that none of its software is compromised and even (in a future version) prove its integrity to a remote system. Full GPL source code is available for the 2.4 kernel.
This work is separate from the earlier IBM research which also combined Linux with TCPA, with the new project apparently more complete and with a road map towards a very functional Linux based trusted computing system. This could be an important technology for Linux to challenge Microsoft as it pushes forward with NGSCB (aka Palladium)."
The TCPA is a comitee and is not something that belongs to Microsoft, although they are part of this comitee. IBM are also working on a TCPA technology. Palladium, or whatever it is called now, is perhaps the most "famous", but definately not the only one.
We want to fight Palladium by fighting acceptance of the idea that the computer should control the user and how he can access the data on his own machine, NOT by developing something functionally equivalent that happens to run under Linux.
Building a DRM system of our own, even if it is open and standards based, just strengthens the paradigm that will leed to an Internet where no data can be accessed as plaintext, applications that are allowed read data have to be accepted and certified by the media industry, and computers exist no longer to enable, but to control, their users.
Please protest against Palladium, TCPA, and all the other DRM proposals by refusing to have anything to do with them: not by strengthening their hand.
(And before somebody replies that TCPA isn't about DRM: Bullshit! Look up what an "endorsement key" is in the TCPA vocabulary.)
Not true at all. DRM and other user control systems only need to be closed when they are software based, because otherwise people can change the programs to remove the user hostile code.
The difference between Palladium and TCPA is really that while Palladium is a whole system for a building user hostile computers, TCPA is just an enabler.
What TCPA does is sign a hash of the OS that is loaded with an "endorsement key", embedded in the TCPA by the vendor and unaccessible to the user. Thus the TCPA chip is a able to do two things: it can verify to an outside source (that trusts the vendor) that the machine is a running a specific operating system (ie one that supports DRM and thus can be "trusted"), and it can encrypt data from one operating system so that another operating system cannot decrypt it.
TCPA provides everything that is needed at the hardware level to write any user hostile system on top of it, because the successive verification of signatures prevents any tampering with the code (even if the OS is open sourced). Palladium could be implemented with TCPA as it's only hardware aspect.
Thus, the argument that is sometimes seen here that TCPA would prevent the computer from booting Linux or any other operating system is false (incorrect scare tactics against these systems are unfortunate, they do more harm then good). What TCPA will do, is enable sites on the Internet to not allow you to read the data they give out, unless you are running an operating system that is user hostile and DRM friendly (and not in the "this site doesn't support mozilla" fashion, which can always be hacked around, but in a cryptologically safe fashion).