Linux Crypto Packages Demolished
SiliconEntity writes "Cryptographer and security expert Peter Gutmann has demolished several Linux security software packages in a recent posting to the cryptography mailing list. He says, 'It's possible to create insecure 'security' products just as readily with open-source as with closed-source software. CIPE and vtun must be the OSS community's answer to Microsoft's PPTP implementation. What's even worse is that some of the flaws were pointed out nearly two years ago, but despite the hype about open-source products being quicker with security fixes, some of the protocols still haven't been fixed.'"
he points to CIPE, a tool which hasent been updated since jun 02 and Vtun since aug. 2001. he says TINC was just as bad but was fixed when users complained. I think the obvious conclusion is that if people use the software and email the person who maintains it, it will get fixed. if the project goes stagnent because the author doesnt maintain it or people dont use it then of corse it will be vunerable after time as more flaws are discovered and not patched.
All these years after Phil Zimmerman released the original PGP code, we STILL don't have anything which satisfies the need for a securing email. It would have these properties:
1. Be under a BSD-ish license, so it could be linked in to commercial and non-commercial products.
2. Be a LIBRARY, not a stand-alone executable, so it can be linked into anything at all.
Let's see, the Xiph people want their protocols to be used all over the place, so they make it a BSD-license LIBRARY that anyone can link to. Hmmm, seems to be working. The PNG backers want their format to be used all over the place, so they make it a BSD-license LIBRARY that anyone can link to. Hmm, seems to be working. The PGP/GPG people want their stuff to be used by people to send mail everywhere, so they make it either a non-Open Source license (PGP) or a GPL license (GPG) and also never ever make it a library for non-existant "security" reasons. Guess what! No one uses it!
Oh, and while I'm ranting about the horribleness of Open Source security stuff, why is it that there is STILL no well-integrated filesystem crypto in any of the Open Source operating systems, including the security-oriented OpenBSD? No, loopback crypto kludges don't count at all.
The time it takes to fix software is inversely proportional to the popularity of that software. I know 0 people that use CIPE and vtun.
I'm pretty sure there are some pretty pathetic, sad window managers out there too. Some of the text editors are rather less than impressive as well. There are all manner of dodgy MP3 managements systems. OSS creates all manner of bad software because ANYONE can code something up and release it.
The security and cryptography field just highlights the problem because there are so many opportunities to do something particularly stupid in those fields. Anyone can write a cryptosystem that they can't break themselves. Unfortunately a lot of people figure if they can't break it, then neither can anyone else...
Jedidiah
Craft Beer Programming T-shirts
Vtun is still far from being useless.
Just turn off vtun encryption and use it via a ssh tunnel. That works very well (i use it for securing wifi) and uses a proven protocol.
I also believe this is good practice and should be a widely accepted policy - re-use of good and proven software is not lame - it is crucial for easy, fun and secure software development. There really is no need for re-inventing the wheel.
Now if only ssl were so integrated into the operating system that i could use select() on a ssl-socket created with socket(), and thus making writing of ssl-enabled apps as easy as non-ssl-enabled ones, that would be great!
-- Having problems sending big files over the net? Try out Efisto (http://efisto.org)
Of course it'll have a similar number of holes. After all, there's nothing about OSS that makes the software fundamentally more secure. BUT:
1) These holes are far less likely to be in the base operating system implementation, as the OSS mantra is generally to put as much logic in user-space as possible.
2) These holes won't be covered up and released only after the vendor has decided to let us know about them.
3) These holes will be fixed up very quickly (in general, anyway), in individual patches or point releases, without onerous licenses attached to them, and without fear that the release might break the rest of my operating system.
4) Because OSS products use open standards, if one particular package is simply too insecure, at least I can change to another product and have things interoperate (eg, switching from Sendmail to Qmail/Postfix/MTA-de-jour).
Instead of making yourself look so great by "demolishing the security," why not offer the fixes?
If you read the article, his advice is almost every case is "Scrap this, go learn basic crypto, and try again." I don't know crypto at all, but I'm willing to bet that's good advice. And if so, why on earth should he take the job of re-writing CIPE? I think it's great that he's getting the word out that it's insecure. These are the things that should be public knowledge.
Open Source or Closed Source, its just as easy to write insecure software, either way.
The point is, that with open source you can see just how insecure or secure a particular product is by looking at the code.
Open source is inherently no more secure than closed source software. The difference is people like "Peter Gutmann" can see what is wrong and be at the ready with suggestions how to fix it.
Electronic Music Made Using Linux http://soundcloud.com/polyp
#1 - He's right.
#2 - So are you, or better yet consider this:
If CIPE were closed source, would he have even been able to write this article? Unless I missed something, nobody ever claimed OS was flawless, just that the flaws were open to scrutiny.
"Lawyers are for sucks."
- Doug McKenzie