Yet Another Critical Windows Flaw
Dynamoo writes "Microsoft released yesterday a whole bunch of critical security updates. Out of these, MS03-043 is a flaw in the Windows Messenger Service (not MSN Messenger) with the possibility of a remote attacker gaining complete control of a Windows NT/2000/XP/2003 based PC remotely. If this sounds like another possible vector for a worm to spread, you'd probably be right. Microsoft's recommendation is to 'disable the Messenger Service immediately and evaluate their need to deploy the patch'. Of course a firewall will offer some protection but shouldn't be relied on. At least administrators can disable the Messenger Service remotely. Of course this is another headache for admins still patching for last month's RPC flaw."
- Bad patch verification. Like WindowsUpdate, SUS relies on a registry entry to check sucessful installation of patches. As many admins have discovered over the past few months, this method of patch verification is highly flawed and results in many, many cases of false-negatives when searching for vulnerable workstations.
- OS patches only. SUS does OS patches. Great. Now what about Office, which is also installed on every desktop in our company?
- Patch reliability. Even if SUS was vastly improved, the sad fact of the matter is that MS patches are still capable of doing severe damage to the target system. It's not like there are no past examples of patches and/or service-packs f$*king up machines. Until the patching process becomes not only dead easy, but also bulletproof RELIABLE, servers (esp. critical infrastructure machines) will continue to need manual patching. Considering many larger companies can have hundreds of servers across the organisation, it becomes one hugeass timesink.
- Other pitfalls. There are many, MANY other options missing that would make life for administrators much easier - such as forcing reboots for patched machines, the ability to stagger deployement using only one SUS server (by using, say, MAC addresses or NetBT/DNS hostnames), the ability to detect mobile users (via a configurable registry setting on the client end) and *force* them to patch immediately upon connecting to the LAN based upon past percentage hit-rate for sucessful patching (i.e. machine was turned on and conneted to LAN) at the regular scheduled time
SUS is nice to have, but it's certainly not set-and-forget as it SHOULD be - at least on the client end of things. There is a long way to go with SUS before it begins to approach something that makes a significant impact on the nightmare that is Microsoft patching. But of course the problem with hoping SUS gets better is that SMS and MOM exist... and unlike SUS, neither of those are free.Janie took my gun...