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Swarthmore Students Keep Diebold Memos Online
An anonymous reader submits "Two student groups based out of Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania announced today that they are rejecting Diebold Elections Systems' cease-and-desist orders and are initiating an electronic civil disobedience campaign that will ensure permanent public access to the controversial leaked memos. You can read the memos, search the memos, or download the memos."
You can have a real effect on what is going to happen. Please take a few minutes to help us out with this action.
Here's how to help:
1) The students engaging in this civil disobedience are meeting with the Dean of their college Wednesday, October 22nd at 4pm. We need you to email *nice* and *supportive* emails to rgross1 (at) swarthmore.edu and cc them to info (at) why-war.com *before* October 22nd at 4pm EST. Please help Dean Bob Gross understand the importance of this issue!
2) Download the entire memo archive:
http://why-war.com/memos/s/lists.tgz
3) Join the disobedience by hosting the memos and posting the URL in this thread
SCDC: http://scdc.emegaweb.net/
Why War?: http://www.why-war.com/
Pleas join an existing, legitimate effort at http://verifiedvoting.org -
This site, rather than continually despairing at the fact that there are problems with electronic voting, has concrete steps that average citizens can take to make change.
Friday, 12 September 2003 (PDT)
.mdb file with MS-Access, and alter its contents. That includes the audit log. This isn't anything new. In VTS, you can open the database with progress and do the same. The same would go for anyone else's system using whatever database they are using. Hard drives are read-write entities. You can change their contents.
.mdb file. Even technical wizards at Metamor (or Ciber, or whatever) can figure that one out.
.mdb file to prevent Metamor from opening it with Access. I've threatened to put a password on the .mdb before when dealers/customers/support have done stupid things with the GEMS database structure using Access. Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I thin
By Bev Harris - blackboxvoting.org
http://www.blackboxvoting.com
If certification isn't being done properly, the whole house of cards falls. Below are actual copies of internal Diebold memos which show that uncertified software is being used in elections, and that Diebold programmers intentionally end-run the system.
Quick backgrounder first, scroll down to see the memos.
BACKGROUND
Our voting system, which is part of the public commons has recently been privatized. When this happened, the counting of the votes, which must be a public process, subjected to the scrutiny of many eyes of plain old citizens, became a secret.
The computerized systems that register voters, will soon sign voters into the polling place using a digital smart card, record the vote we cast, and tally it are now so secret they are not allowed to be examined by any citizens group, or even by academics like the computer scientists at major universities.
The corporate justification for this secrecy is that these systems adhere to a list of "standards" put out by the Federal Election Commission, and that an "ITA" (Independent Testing Authority) carefully examines the voting system, which is then provided to states for their own certification.
As it turns out, the states typically do not examine the computer code at all, relying instead on a "Logic and Accuracy" test which will not catch fraud and has frequently missed software programming errors that cause the machines to miscount.
A Diebold message board has been used since 1999 to help technicians in the field interact with programmers to solve problems. The contents of this message board were quietly sent to reporters and activists around the world, most likely by a Diebold employee. In a letter to WiredNews, Diebold has acknowledged that these memos are from its own staff message boards.
Without further commentary, judge for yourself whether Diebold has been following certification requirements:
From Nel Finberg, Technical Writer, Diebold Election Systems
(Note: Metamor/Ciber is the ITA assigned to certify the software)
alteration of Audit Log in Access
To: "support"
Subject: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Nel Finberg"
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 23:31:30 -0700
Importance: Normal
Jennifer Price at Metamor (about to be Ciber) has indicated that she can access the GEMS Access database and alter the Audit log without entering a password. What is the position of our development staff on this issue? Can we justify this? Or should this be anathema?
Nel
Reply from Ken Clark, principal engineer for Diebold Election Systems
RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
To:
Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Ken Clark"
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:55:02 -0700
Importance: Normal
In-reply-to:
Its a tough question, and it has a lot to do with perception. Of course everyone knows perception is reality.
Right now you can open GEMS'
Now, where the perception comes in is that its right now very *easy* to change the contents. Double click the
It is possible to put a secret password on the
From http://www.indymedia.nl/nl/2003/10/14569.shtml: http://www.emptylogic.com/suprnova/torrents/451/li sts.tgz.torrent
Enjoy!
Withdrawal before climax is very ineffective and those who try this are usually called "parents."