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CNN Reports on Diebold
An Anonymous Reader writes "CNN has finally picked up the story about concerns about Diebold voting machines. It's about time this made it into the mainstream media." If you're interested, here are a couple
of related
stories.
David Bear, a spokesman for Diebold Election Systems Inc., one of the larger voting machine makers, said "the fact of the matter is, there's empirical data to show that not only is electronic voting secure and accurate, but voters embrace it and enjoy the experience of voting that way."
This is the point where a bad reporter starts typing up the story, and a good reporter starts asking about smartcards reporting -16,000 votes. At least the AP is looking at the right story now, so hopefully eventually the right person will be looking at it.
The problem is that Voting is done at the local level, not the national level, so the US as a whole cannot prevent electronic voting. As such, the US government should endorse a high-quality, open solution for the benefit of all counties which wish to use electronic voting.
Yes, all those questions should be answered first, but we all know at least a couple states will go to electronic no matter what else is done.
Casting votes should be anonymous (something that is easier to verify when using paper ballots). Every single step of the tallying process should be under the direct scrutiny of multiple persons, who wtach the process and each other. (preferably a representative from each of the stakeholders in the election). Only when John Q. Public can see with his own eyes that these conditions are met, is he going to be reasonably certain that his vote will not be used against him, and that the count is accurate.
I do not see how we can ever achieve this when using only electronic voting. But technology can help in several ways:
- Producing accurate ballots. Remember the last election for the US presidency? People complained that the ballots were unclear in some way. A machine can double-check with the voter, by displaying 'You have selected Candidate X. Press the Big Red Button to cast your vote for X'. Then, when the voter presses the red button, the machine prints off an anonymous paper ballot, which the voter takes and deposits in an ordinary ballot box.
- Providing near-instant preliminary results, and serving as a double-check against the tally of the paper ballots.
So yes, I see how machines can help. But the final and binding result must be the one obtained from hand-counting the paper ballots.
If construction was anything like programming, an incorrectly fitted lock would bring down the entire building...
If everyone if so concerned about verifibility of the election results, then give them what they want. This seems so obvious to me...
Use a machine (e.g. a touchscreen based computer) to generate a paper ballot. This paper ballot should both contain a human readable printout of what you (the voter) just voted for, as well as a mag-stripe encoding of the same. Use the same basic technology as used in the airline industry - human readable on the front, machine readable on the back. These printed, mag-stripe coded ballots are then given to the kind people at the balloting place where it is deposited into a locked steel box for counting later. No electronic counting on-premesis. No "internet connections". Just consistent, countable, checkable, permanent and persistent results.
The results are electronically counted thanks to the mag-stripe encoding. If someone or some organization wishes to contest the count results, there is the printed version on the front of each card to give an actual, unmistakable account of that vote.
The ballot generating machines would be there strictly to generate a "valid" ballot. Valid in this sense meaning checking that someone isn't exceeding the number of votes per race allowed (e.g. not voting for more than 1 person for the presidential election). The machine would also generate a "review" screen before the ballot is actually printed to allow the voter to make sure that all their votes were properly tabulated.
The whole point of this mindless exercise is to produce consistent, unmistakable results, right? No more "hanging chads" or partial punch-thru's, right? No more presidential election decisions by the Supreme Court, right?
Ron Gage - Westland, MI
You hit the nail on the head. This is perhaps one of the most important aspects of elections. But consider what 'open' means in this context.
The entire process of casting and tallying votes should be open, so that every voter knows what happens in each step of the process, or that he at least can be sure that other people are keeping a proper eye on the process on his behalf. Only then will the majority of the voters have faith in the accuracy of the results of the election, even if they do not necessarily agree with the outcome. This is a key aspect in any functioning democracy.
The system of paper-based ballots is very open, in the sense that the ordinary voters can understand the process. They can also understand that the counting is fair, and that every person involved is watched by at least one other person. In most democratic countries, voting offices are staffed by representatives from every party taking part in the election.
Those who think open-source software will make electronic voting open, think again. Electronic voting is way too complicated for ordinary folks to understand. Grandma isn't going to inspect the source code. Which trustworthy person can do this for her, and inspect everything without oversights? "Of course electronic voting is safe, grandma, you can inspect the source code yourself! Oh, well you can take my word for it being safe... no... no, I have not inspected all 100.000 lines of this code, not for every single machine that was used in the election! But I am sure someone has... oh, no I can't be sure that they didn't overlook something.".
No, open-source electronic voting does not make for open elections.
If construction was anything like programming, an incorrectly fitted lock would bring down the entire building...
I mean... if you BANK online, what's so bad about voting online? Seriously.
If I bank online with a trojaned computer, and the trojan user electronically transfers money from my account, the bank has a record of where that money went which they and I can see (and investigate) at any time, and which will be investigated as soon as I notice a discrepancy in my balance or review my next bank statement.
If I vote online with a trojaned computer, then the trojan just has to get inbetween me and the voting server once, and if it does so, it's succeeded. I can't check my individual vote against the county tallies; nor will I be receiving a printed statement of my vote in the mail shortly afterward. There's no sure way to discover "Hey, someone screwed up my vote!", and no easy way to trace any discovery to the perpetrator afterward.
And needless to say, there will be lots of trojaned computers. How many internet-sweeping worms and email trojans do we get on the average year? Probably enough to throw a lot of elections.
not the story.
CNN didn't mention the leaked internal memos, the cease and desist letters, or the refusal to remove them from the internet.
Slashdot is my Mercer Box.
From the CNN article:
The complaints about lever machines in the early 1900's did not come from mechanical engineers. Instead, they came from groups of people who did not understand these "confounded contraptions". The election officials could, or could allow anyone to, examine the insides and workings of these machines. There was no secrecy about it.
Ironically, the complaints about punch cards have, in part, come true. This is why we are doing this rush to computer voting in the first place, because the punch card system in Florida (and as it turns out, elsewhere, too) showed the faults in the system. But despite the flaws in punch card systems, there was no secrecy; they could be examined and the flaws could be seen and understood.
Both systems above were not only "open systems", but also had various audit trails incorporated. While not perfect, punch cards could be manually counted if machine counts were suspect. The flaw with Diebold and other electronic voting systems isn't that they are electronic, nor is it even that they might be connect to, or through, the internet. Instead, the flaw is that unlike their predecessors, these systems are closed, and have no audit trails.
Unlike past systems, where the concerns were raised by people that didn't know much about the technology they were based on, the issues being raised about electronic voting systems are being raised by people who fully understand this technology, the flaws that are inherint in the technology itself, and the methodologies needed to compensate for such flaws, and ensure reliable and correct operation despite such flawed technology. All the voting systems have flaws, and they always will. What sets the past systems apart from what vendors are trying to push on us today is that those past systems were known to be flawed to a certain degree, and they could be examined to verify that. What vendors of electronic machines are asking us to believe is that their systems are absolutely perfect and that no one ever needs to "look inside" to verify anything, and that no audit trails, and no recounts, will be needed.
now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
Yes, but the design of those lever machines is available to election officials, and can be examined carefully prior to every election. Is Diebold willing to offer those assurances to election officians? Say, open sourcing everything and allowing officials to take it apart and reassemble it before the election?
The problems with paper ballot voting are as follows:
1) It's not sexy. High tech is sexy. Politicians want to appear "with it" and forward thinking. Continuing with paper ballots serves neither of those ends.
2) It's not lightning fast. The major news media outlets want to be able to declare a winner before most people shut off their TVs at 10PM. It gives the viewer a feeling of closure. Waiting until 3AM for the numbers from Podunk, Iowa and surrounding municipalities does absolutely nothing for ratings.
3) Paper ballots are auditable. The old joke that voting would be outlawed if it could actually make a difference is an exaggeration. The true purpose of voting is to give the American public a feeling that they chose things to be the way they are, but despite their best efforts, two percent of incumbents are still being thrown out. This represents a remote exploit in the system, which electronic voting can help close.
I hope the problems with the current system are now clear to you, and that you will write your congressperson in support of Diebold and electronic voting.
You want the truthiness? You can't handle the truthiness!
What are our other options here? If I go into my polling place on election day and see Diebold Electronic Voting Machines can I demand another voting method? Should I plan on voting absentee? Seriously, is there a way to refuse to use those damned machines and still participate in the election?
There is nothing so powerful as an idea whose time has come.