New Wireless Security Standard Has Old Problem?
eggboard writes "Wireless security expert Robert Moskowitz, who sits on IEEE and IETF committees on that subject, sent me a short paper on a glaring weakness in the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocol that's replacing the weak and broken WEP system well discussed here at Slashdot. His paper, which I've posted here, proves definitively that while WPA itself remains robust and secure, the interface for choosing consumer passwords makes it simple to snarf a tiny bit of network traffic and perform an offline dictionary attack. For Slashdot readers, this probably seems trivial, but because Linksys, Apple, and others are letting users enter My Dog Has Fleas as their passphrase, WPA might be less secure for home users than WEP."
Way to tell everybody my password.
Man, now I have to change it.
My Dog Has Fleas is a positively fantasic password compared to the usual choice of a middle name, spouse's name, child's name or birthdate.
Or, of course, the infamous "password."
If all it took were a dictionary attack to sniff a password, at least it took that much.
This isn't some simple passthrough that can be gotten through by knowing a couple backdoor passwords, it's a real live algorithm.
But in the end, it's up to the user to enter a password and as long as humans remain humans easy to remember passwords will always be chosen over #HrS2sWmNw/()LggDwMn.
It doesn't matter how easy to break a new system is, it's better than having no security.
I recently took my laptop on a trip across Toronto and in a couple of hours spotted around 60 wireless networks. Around 80% had NO encryption enabled at all. And yes, the most common SSIDs are 'default' and 'linksys'.
So make a system more complex and people won't use it - which defeats the whole object of it.
Jolyon
Please read my Canon EOS tech blog at http://www.everyothershot.com
The important thing here is that this allows for actual security for users smart enough to use good passwords. Even in hex users can enter dumb passwords ("AA AA AA AA AA...").
Only long passwords and encouraging the users to use good quality passwords/phrases really helps.
Ultimately though, these passphrases are flawed anyway- they are a form of shared password. History has shown this to be a thoroughly bad idea, one passphrase per user/machine is a far better idea; and even the user shouldn't know what it is (that way it can't get beaten out of them- black cosh crytography works pretty darn well.) These standards organisations aren't even trying.
-WolfWithoutAClause
"Gravity is only a theory, not a fact!"Hold it, someone correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't this mean that instead of collecting thousands of weak packets in RFMon you just need to collect one packet from each network and brute force it?
Which method is harder to crack? I'd take WEP. Simply because its takes longer to collect the necessary packets; especially on a smaller network. On a larger network it may work out to be better from a security standpoint for the cracker to start a brute force attack on the packet on a spare computer and let it sit for a few days instead of having him hide a pocket PC with a wifi card in range of the AP for a few days.
I've just bought my first wireless kit (DLink 802.11b wireless router plus card for $60).
I did some reading on WEP and it sounds pretty frightening. Today I'm going over to set up the same kit for a friend who's NOT a slashdot type. I'm pretty-well used to data protection issues, and I take reasonable precautions and would also not freak out if something Bad happened. But I'm wondering what I should tell my non-techie friend.
Practically speaking, just how vulnerable is WEP? If my friend has a good non-dictionary password and uses "256 bit" encryption, is he reasonably safe from casual hijacking?
That's certainly what the manufacturers would have us believe, and the low prices and ubiquitous Starbucks access points seem to be causing a lot of folks to adopt wireless, at least out here in silicon valley.
Having read up on the security problems, I'm now hoping some of you can provide or point to real-world scenarios.
Hope this isn't too off-topic...
This Like That - fun with words!
...my wireless router has a first name
it's l-i-n-k-s-y-s
my router has a SSID
it's l-i-n-k-s-y-s
RE: password security -- what about the old technique of using an acronym for something that wouldn't be hit by a dictionary attack? Um, like:
My Dog Has Fleas And Your Mom Does Too would create a password of "mdhfaymdt" ? Secure enough...and probably not in someone's best interest to share with anyone else.
The idea here (I know, I was there when we voted it into the standard) is that the PBKDF2 is computationally significant.
Thus when you perform your offline dictionary attack, for each lookup in the dictionary, you must perform 4096 HMAC_SHA1s and this might take some time if you are looking up a large number of dictionary entries.
The basic conflict is the wide disparity between the power of processors in low end 802.11 transceivers and high end computers. The time to compute the 4096 HMAC-SHA1s is significant on say a slow ARM7TDMI and the 4096 value is a compromise to limit the delay in computing this. This delay affects the time from pressing return on the keyboard, to the time the PTK can be known and communications can begin.
However the attacker can apply his cluster of 3GHz PCs, or his FPGA HMAC_SHA1 parallel processor, or his supercomputer array, and make the speed of dictionary lookups relatively insignificant compared against the strength of the passwords being used.
The wise people asked for a much higher number than 4096. Some implementation types beat it down to 4096, and here we are..
Evil people are out to get you.
I think this problem is present in *any* system that relies on user passwords. according to the article, each character in a password is equivalent to about 2.5 "bits" of encryption (since you can't use the entire ascii bitspace and some words/letters are more common, etc). this is a higher number than I saw referenced in one of bruce schneier's books (he said 1.3 bits of entropy per char I think.).
so, if your 128 bit or 256 bit or bit security system is ultimately based from a human-rememberable (and thus probably short) password, is there ANYTHING that can be done short of requiring 30 character passwords?
"Poorly choosen passwords lead to insecurity."
Well, duh. I didn't need three pages of dense, TLA-obscured claptrap to tell me that.
perform an offline dictionary attack
What, you sneak up behind the sysadmin and brain him with a copy of Webster's?
actually, your passphrase has much lower entropy than your random password. assuming there are about 10K words in common vocabulary, and you use 10 words, that's about 10,000^10. pretty large, but only about 23 bits. now consider the deterministic ordering of words in an english sentence, and you knock off a few more bits.
but your 20 character password has a huge entropy. you have 26 lowercase letters, 26 uppercase letters, 10 numbers and about 10 punctuation marks. that's 66 possibilities per character. now 72^20 is a lot. that's about 26 bits.
so it may be easier to remember, but it's not more secure.
Speaking as a cryptographer and longtime security geek, this weakness is about as damning as... using a 128 bit cipher that only gives 120 bits of protection. Look at the big picture. Most people don't even use WEP, let alone limit access by MAC address. The average user is SO oblivious to security, sharing passwords, opening .EXE attachments... I'd hate to recall how many times I found things like .rhosts files with '++' in them among career Unix programmers who must have known better. WEP was a semi-broken protocol, TACACS+ was a totally broken protocol, there was no way one could use them without compromising security. Just as nobody can use a number of commercial software products without compromising security.
WPA, on the other hand, is a very well-designed protocol. It is only as weak as its users are careless. And one need not choose "h^Ne#b8SV@,4g%yP" as a password to avoid this attack, any semi-uncommon phrase of 4 or 5 words will do.
I will deal with this problem by threatening users with a nasty note in their personnel file if they choose a sh*t passphrase -- and terminate their wireless access. And yes, I will try cracking the passwords myself, just as I have done with operating system passwords for several years.
I sure wish all my security problems were so simple! At least WPA *can* be secure, unlike the steaming heap of offal that most folks call a desktop operating system.
Boy, some peole just want to find things to complain about. I just read another "you have to protect us from ourselves" article today, perhaps this should have been included in their list. Personally, I think if people want to hurt themsleves this way they should be allowed to do so. If they do it as part of their job then better qualified technical people should take their place.
I'm an American. I love this country and the freedoms that we used to have.
Where are you getting this stuff?!?
assuming there are about 10K words in common vocabulary, and you use 10 words, that's about 10,000^10. pretty large, but only about 23 bits.
10,000^10 ~ (2^13.3)^10 = 2^133 = 133 bits of encryption.
but your 20 character password has a huge entropy. you have 26 lowercase letters, 26 uppercase letters, 10 numbers and about 10 punctuation marks. that's 66 possibilities per character. now 72^20 is a lot. that's about 26 bits.
66 possibilities * 20 chars ~ (2^6)^20 = 2^120 = 120 bits of encryption.
Many institutions unwittingly standardize on weak passwords. For example, a certain EE department at a certain university (that I might attend), has a password convention of six characters, letters and numbers, but no two letters or numbers are allowed next to each other. So all the passwords are number, letter, number, letter, etc or letter, number, letter, number. They don't even require mixed case letters.
====
Crudely Drawn Games
Why don't these companies start implementing Kerberos? Or something similar. My understanding is that no passwords are ever sent out over the network.
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
6cea e4ca 6713 721c 4cbf 71a4 e1aa 8972 0a03 f9d0 47a9 8f3c 9ead 8fb4 35d9 38c0 0406 1f02 0c46 878f 42f8 5ec1 77c5 1a99 f64b 5ad3 bb82 2c93 7870 a725 ba29 dd2b c470 0e70 3bf4 9c50 01a3 31cd c717 0b68 afe0 d479 62b2 46c0 a0c6 af61 c8e0 1915 01f4 8df8 be64 7401 4ed7 1459 766c d888 e772 f41b b310 e958 ebf6 87a1 c0e7 7a60 99d1 38ff d009 4c65 7a5f dbb0 f347 7a65 1f34 254c 8167 d103 4e34 9fc7 c97b 9ac0 0575 12a5 4f0d 9c87 5015 a647 ab9d 0ff6 f940 c1e7 1699 bfef 9827 b19f 9bc9 8391 3985 ed5e 275d f2c0 d3cd d489 13d3 6d0c 9aba 85e2 221d 1990 2fc8 1584 f2cf f7a1 98de 819d 6d2f 954e 83f0 d4a6 b854 940b 6cec a490 f7ce f556 fff2 fc53 daee 7af2
By coincidence, I do plan to name my kids in hex. Leet-speak would make them look like wimps, while 6cea would certainly make my kid the coolest throughout school.
You can't judge a book by the way it wears its hair.
You're missing the point here: you're sophisticated and understand that poor password choice produces high risk.
Since WPA is susceptible to dictionary attacks, wouldn't you build an interface that would reject poor passwords? Or would you advertise WPA as a way to enter simple passwords? You're smart: you'd build an interface that had crack behind it and a good dictionary, or at least required 20 digits and some punctuation.
Since the marketing folks and interface designers are encouraging the use of simple passwords, this dramatically increases the risk to consumers that their networks aren't truly secure.
Freelance tech journalist for the Economist, MIT Technology Review, Macworld, and others
Okay, so users might pick a password which is less than 20 characters and is dictionary based. Guess what? They always will... Security is a balancing act. If you make security too cumbersome, then users will find a shortcut and abuse it, making it worse than no security. If the spec enforced something like: "passphrases must be at least 128 hex characters" you'd end up with a bunch of passwords which were all "AAAAA..." (or something similiar)
The simple truth is people are lazy. How many passwords do you have? And how many password guarded accounts? I bet even the most diligent of us out there only have a small number of "good" passwords which we use for damn near everything and never rotate.
The problem with WEP was flawed crypto. No matter how good my password was, someone could crack it with unacceptable ease. At least with this new scheme those of us with "good" passwords have a chance.
when I read buried way down in the Solaris 9 12/02 release notes that they'd be FINALLY supporting md5 password crypts.
::eye roll::
And in typical Sun style, they created a new plugin architecture to support it. There are all of two useful plugins (the standard crypt is built into libc)...
THIS THING CAN TURN ON A DIME, MACROSSZERO STYLE ALSO FUCK BETA, ~NYORON
Home users are going to generate less traffic than businesses, and so it will take even longer to get enough traffic. Unless you happen to notice a van parked outside your house for a couple days, or find yourself staring down the barrel of a pringles can, you can relax.
- Turn off SSID broadcasting
- use a unique SSID
- For God's sake, change the admin password
- Turn on WEP
- Use MAC address filtering
Congratulations, you're now more trouble than you're worth.Guys, wifi is limited in scope to that which is not more than a few hundred yards from the access point. The password doesn't have to stop everybody, just everybody not too far away.
/.?
That limits the damage scope of a malicious party to that within a half a mile of their present location.
The *same* limitations of passwords on the public Internet, however, are much more likely to be damaging. Let me give an example...
How many people use email with pop3 over the Internet? Not only are these accounts typically set up with crummy passwords (like "Robert" - their middle name, or "120871" - their b/day) but then the passwords are sent, several times/day in plaintext!
And yet, with all of these big, huge, security no-nos, pop3 reigns supreme as the standard for email receipt on the 'net, and seldom is there actually a problem.
So, to whit, we have an issue like "A credit card can be used to bypass the locks on many doorknobs" and it makes front page at
I have no problem with your religion until you decide it's reason to deprive others of the truth.
Wait a minute. Person A has an open WAP. Person B downloads kiddie porn using person A's WAP. Assuming person A doesn't have a caching web proxy how does person A posess anything that person B downloaded? It isn't on his WAP (granted it was in his WAP's RAM for a few milliseconds), it isn't on his laptops, it isn't on his desktops, it isn't printed out in his house, it isn't hiding in his car.
Wouldn't that be like charging person A for kidnapping if person B drove across his lawn with a trussed up body in their trunk?
It doesn't pass the sniff test.
Now this being "anything to protect the children" America I can see them charging Person A with something else, some sort of aiding charge or something. (actually I guess they could charge you with anything, but getting a judge to not laugh at possesion when nothing is possesed seems like a long shot)
Yep, you'll be able to quite easily prove that the pr0n was never on your computer - the problem is that you'll have to wait until *after* the authorities have broken down your door at 6am and taken away all your computers for analysis.... And persuading your ISP to let you re-register as a customer once they've cut off your account.
Jolyon
Please read my Canon EOS tech blog at http://www.everyothershot.com