A Secure and Verifiable Voting System
meese writes "The cryptographer David Chaum, through discussion with top cryptographers such as Ron Rivest, has designed a secure and verifiable voting system. One of the goals of his design is that anyone can verify that votes were tabulated correctly. It's good to see real security/crypto people working on this problem. They also have a press release."
Closed source + Paper green = secure voting.
They've figured out already.
The fogies in Fla missed voting correctly by about a 1/4 inch. You just missed voting correctly by 24 hours.
You know what?
Like, hey, who the hell does this Rivest guy think he is, and what (apart from this stupid "Ph.D" stuff in "Computer Science" or "Mathematics" or "Cryptography", such a small title he has) makes him think he's any smarter than Penelope Bonsall, who's got a way cooler title "Director of the Office of Election Administration at the Federal Election Commission".
Rivest's system is clearly unworkable. Where's the wining and dining of sales reps? Where's the backroom deals involving hookers and cocaine? Where's the vendor-lock-in? Where are the service contracts and extra government departments required to oversee them? Oh, sure, Rivest can lay the smack down on "where's the beef" when it comes to building a secure and verifiable electronic voting system, but where's the pork?
presumably, they will be doing the voting.