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Diebold Folds In DMCA E-Voting Lawsuit
sunbird writes "Diebold has filed a responsive pleading (PDF) in the lawsuit brought by the Electronic Frontier Foundation to challenge Diebold's practice of using the DMCA to suppress discussion of the critical flaws with electronic voting. Diebold states that it has "decided to withdraw its existing DMCA notifications and not to issue any further ones . . . ." Other recent developments include: this transcript of the court hearing on EFF's application for a preliminary injunction and Dennis Kucinich's linking to Diebold memos from his webpage at the U.S. House of Representatives. Stay tuned- the judge has scheduled a status conference for this Monday in the case."
Talk about a poorly crafted piece of legislation. There are so many ways to abuse this ridiculous thing. It really needs to be amended to get rid of all of these legal like mechanisms that do not involve the courts. You should have to get a judge to issue an injunction to take material offline, not just say "You have to do it".
Diebold's defense that the plantiffs "did not suffer irreparable harm" because Diebold didn't actually sue them is outrageous. The threat to sue, especially by a party with deep pockets vs a small party definitely causes a chilling effect on free speech. If Diebold had not intention to sue, why did they ask for the material to be removed?
I just read this in conjunction with the story on Best Buy and FatWallet, and I can only hope, maybe people are finally seeing the DMCA the way we see it. Here we have two cases against major companies challenging the DMCA for its chilling effects. How long before it works its way up to the Supreme Court?
Unfortunately I have my doubts as to whether Diebold or any of the other voting-machine manufacturers would be particularly willing to go forward with such a process. As much as many of us (myself at times included) might like to believe that this is fueled by a massive right-wing conspiracy, the real fact is that it's just not their usual MO.
Prior to entry into the voting-machine market, Diebold's primary presence in computing has been in manufacturing ATMs. A brief consideration (disclaimer: I didn't research this and won't be held responsible if it turns out to be dead wrong) suggests that these are, by design, pretty much turnkey systems in which a large amount of the security is provided by an extremely limited user interface. There aren't a lot of branches in the ATM flowchart, and the necessary local configuration is probably minimal.
Now compare this to the requirements of a voting system. Because ballots vary greatly from one precinct to the next, each voting machine must store considerably more local configuration. With this comes a much more complex UI and many more opportunities for security to be compromised. If this is a first foray into a system this complex, it may be a simple underestimation of the requirements. When one considers that the operation of the Diebold voting machine as discussed in the Johns Hopkins paper is not unlike that of an ATM, it's easy to see where someone may have seen elections as just another nail to hit with their particular hammer. Little did they know that the demands are so different.
Paper ballots, which are fed into a simple optical reader at the polling station. The ballot is then dropped into a locked ballot box. The result can be counted instantly by the machines, but there is a good old-fashioned paper trail which can be hand counted should there be any doubt over the outcome.