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More Info on Debian.org Security Breach
mbanck writes "James Troup (part of the Debian System administration team) has published more information on the recent compromise of four debian.org machines. The attack vector seemed to be a sniffed password of an unprivileged account, from which the attacker somehow managed to gain root and install the suckit rootkit and crack the other machines. As the machines were fairly uptodate with respect to security, an as-of-yet unknown local root exploit might be in the wild, so keep an eye on your boxen.Note that the main ftp archive running on a sparc machine was not compromised, so the exploit might not yet be ported to non-i386 architectures."
This incident reminds us of the importance of password security. It is sad to see one weak password responsible for such a breach. I think that it would be a good idea for the future to move away from the traditional unix password. An appropriate replacement would be something similar to RSA passphrase mechanism used by secure shell. A random passphrase with a minimum lenght would be idea. The user is the greatest security hole.
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Quote from the article:
"Somehow they got root on klecker and installed
suckit."
What follows is an interesting read - but the guts are in that 'somehow'.
All vendors and site administrators should take note of the openness with which the problem was dealt.
When I go to buy a car, a computer, or a stereo, and the saleslizard is cagey about any problems that come up, my trust level goes down. If they tell me all about all the problems with the thing they're selling before I even notice them, my trust level goes up. It's like a cool drink on a hot summer day.
Contrasting with Debian, how long did it take to find out that Diebold ATMs had been hit by the Nachi worm?
I'm now more inclined to trust Debian, and less inclined to trust Diebold.
sigs, as if you care.
Off-site logging of all accesses.
One of the first things that get wiped in an intrusion are the logs. All access logs should be copied in as near real-time as possible to a remote server that is not accessible from the machine being logged, i.e. a drop-box.
Ceci n'est pas une signature
Why assume it was a cleartext password? It could of been encrypted, captured and crack via brute force or some other method.
I worked at Microsoft, so Microsoft's list is my frame of reference:
Law #1: If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your computer, it's not your computer anymore.
SELinux would likely have prevented the root exploit from allowing this individual from doing as much harm as was done.
I think that it's time for the big names like Debian, Slackware, Red Hat etc to start implementing it on their network connected machines. It's being incorporated into the stock kernel for a reason. Use it!
Quote: "All the compromised machines were running recent kernels[1] and were
up-to-date with almost all security updates[2]."
Well, it seems that 'almost' just isn't good enough. Perhaps there is more to the break in (like unknown holes)?
Sniffing passwords? They must be using 'almost patched' version of SSHd.
Huge diffrence.
You still need a local account to make use of a local root exploit.
You don't for remote root exploits.
Remote root exploits can be used in worms, local (for the most part) cannot.
Not to say that local root exploits should be overlooked, especially when they seem realtivly simple to create (e.g., bad symlinks)
Besides, this is supposedly an *UNKNOWN* local root exploit..
Browse at -1, because trolls are often the most creative part of
This is why security by patching is fundamentally ineffective against enemies, as opposed to nusances.
Slashdotters are hypocrites and hold double-standards.
You're saying slashdot posters are inconsistant, but they're just different people who all happen to read slashdot. If you want to make a real argument, pick one person and attack their inconsistancies.
Another example is the political parties. You can't say that Democrats are inconsistant because of this, that, and the other. Democrats are a varied group, and they have many different perspectives and form their arguments in different, often contradictary ways. They just see a common means to their end, and each individual may be 100% consistant. (note: I'm not a democrat, I just used them as an example. This works with any political party that I can think of.)
Ultimately what you're doing is grouping variety of people together (slashdot readers) and then attacking the group as a whole for being inconsistant with respect to a separate issue (their perspectives about computer security).
You can do that to anyone. For example: "Blondes are so inconsistant. First they complain that the environment is being damaged, then the next week they're complaining about too much government regulation." Well, being blonde obviously has nothing to do with the topic, so of course you find inconsistancies in their viewpoint.
That type of reasoning is very simple-minded. The world is a complicated place with myriad possible groupings of people. Analogies that relate nations, corporations, SIGs, etc. to people often confuse the issue beyond repair. Microsoft isn't a "bully," it's just that the shareholders elect people that are likely to use aggressive business tactics and leverage the monopoly that they have to gain shareholder value. You can't punish MS in any way analogous to punishing a bully, because the shareholders could be long gone by now (however many years it takes to settle an antitrust lawsuit), because it's simply not a person, it's a group. Same with nations, it's a group and should not be personified. Think how much time the media has wasted talking about Bush as though he "doesn't play well with others." Nations are groups, not people.
Social scientists are inspired by theories; scientists are humbled by facts.
This is really the heart of the issue: the unknown exploits. I've often been at the forefront of theorizing about possible vectors for unknown exploits. I'm usually flamed severely for it. The fact of the matter is that these unknown exploits exist and people need to be ready to deal with them.
If a "bad" hacker comes up with a new root exploit he's not going to e-mail all of the "good" hackers and let them know. He's going to make use of it mercilessly until he's noticed and caught. Microsoft ignores this issue outright and the OSS community tends to skate around it. If the computing public as a whole knew the facts about security then McAfee and Norton wouldn't even be in business. "Updating virus definitions" twice a week is still going to be ten weeks behind the hardcore caffeinated malicious hacker.
The OSS community has dealt with this issue in the most productive manner possible: complete openness and timely notice. Microsoft, on the other hand, would happily allow millions of users to remain compromised for months or years until their internal programmers manage to find the "unknown local root exploit". This could easily result in identities and credit card numbers stolen, bank accounts infiltrated, and possibly even malicious interference with real life relationships and employers just for fun.
Should the software manufacturer be liable? No. Should the user be entitled to know? Yes.
The OSS community is the only solution which addresses this situation correctly.
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