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Electronic Voting in the News
heymarcel writes "After a negative review of the Diebold voting machines by the State Gaming Control Board, it looks like Nevada has gone with a competitor for the upcoming election. And Secretary of State Dean Heller is requiring paper receipts. According to the Associated Press story, Nevada is the first state to do so." There's another story about Nevada voting machines as well. zapf writes "It appears that the major e-Voting machine vendors have banded together to form the 'Election Technology Council.'" Reader SemperUbi writes: "Demand for a voter-verified audit trail is really gaining momentum these days. The Voter Verification Act, introduced yesterday by Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida), would require a voter-verified paper audit trail, ban the use of 'undisclosed' software and wireless communications for voting machines, and require mandatory surprise recounts -- all in time for the November 2004 election. Rep. Holt's HR2239 in the House requires much the same thing. Resistance to both bills may focus on the aggressive timetable, but the effort is worth it -- as Warren Slocum once said, democracy ain't cheap. Take that, Diebold!" And finally, a Maryland newspaper dredges up an internal Diebold email that recommends gouging Maryland if the state wants paper printouts for its Diebold voting system.
What happened to the goons that were supposed to hush this under the rug? They failed?
What's so bad about being lazy? What if there was a war and nobody showed up?
"The candidate you are about to choose is not supported by us and may cause instablity in your state: Are you sure you want to continue?"
I'm amazed that companies whose sole purpose is to provide secure, reliable data management (ATMs, and now voting machines) would be so incredibly stupid regarding security and integrity of systems. Diebold's attitudes toward their voting machines make me wonder about their ATMs, and if they are as insecure and poorly implemented as the voting machines were demonstrated to be.
This is one place where we should definitely push for open source software with peer review. Otherwise we'll have elections under control of a few people without any recourse.
Do not look into laser with remaining eye.
In the US, you get the best democracy money can buy!!!
Unfortunately they used Diebold machines for the scoring system, so this came out as
Geeks: -16305
Diebold: 463563541
Not to shamelessly promote EFF or anything, but they have some really good information on e-voting on their website. Here's a pre-made letter to your senator (for those living in the US) asking him/her for support in the fight for secure elections.
People say I'm crazy, I got diamonds on the soles of my shoes...
It is reported that the American people are very happy to have receiptless electronic voting machines. No dissenting reports can be found...
A state that needs total accountability for its main industry (gambling) requires the same in the voting process. Right now, in Florida where I live, there is no accountability for fraudulent voting practices so long as you vote for the party in power. I almost want to move to Vegas now.
Karma Whoring for Fun and Profit.
For a good source on the electronic voting issue in general and the push for Rep. HR2239 in particular, see Verified Voting.
There's only one horrible horrible problem with that system:
The guy buying your vote, threatening your family, or blackmailing you can also verify your vote.
According to news reports, a hacker broke into the Ohio company's servers using an employee's ID number and copied a 1.8-gigabyte file of company announcements, software bulletins and internal e-mails dating back to January 1999.
I'm sure the subject has been discussed before, but what if the original hacker is caught? It's clear that the information "stolen" is of critical importance in the debate over the trustworthiness of Diebold, and electronic voting in general. But will that hacker be able to use the importance of his/her discovery as a mitigating factor in court?
It seems like a parallel situation would be this: My neighbor has a tall fence, topped with electrified razor wire, plastered with "NO TRESPASSING" signs, and a tiger prowling the grounds for added security. I suspect that he is planning to commit a crime on his property -- say I've heard he's planning to kill his wife for the insurance money. If I ignore the signs, scale the wall, avoid the tiger, and take pictures of his detailed murder plans (which he conveniently leaves on his dining room table), I may prevent Ms. Neighbor's untimely demise.
Am I guilty of trespassing? And even if I am, was it worth it? I'd say yes -- I'd commit a small crime to prevent a much larger one. Was the Diebold hacker thinking along those lines? Or were they just out for a walk with the tiger?
Stressed? Me? Of course not. Stress is what a rubber band feels before it breaks, silly.
Yes, sounds good. But, how about printer problems? Have you ever been to a polling place? The level of technological help is not high. Personally, I'd put any government office at a higher technological level than a polling station.
Spare printers, printer cartridges, etc, will need to be onhand. In fact, I'd make sure that the "receipt" be capable of displaying on a screen so that people could write it down with a pen and paper. People trained to print the little receipt will need to be on hand. Anything that can go wrong will.
Lastly, none of this stops voter fraud. In many states, it's very easy to vote. Show up with a Drivers' License or a neighbor to vouch, and you're in. You only need to be a resident for 30 days. If you don't have a neighbor, or a drivers' license, you can show up in Minnesota with a utility bill in your name, and that's enough to vote.
-- No sig for you!
This is a horrible idea because it destroys anonymity. Giving the voters something to take away from the polling place that identifies them with a particular vote simply paves the way to voting abuse. Think of thugs standing outside a poor district's voting place demanding to see the identifying key in your example. The people watching this may decide to cast votes according to the perceived wishes of the thugs rather than risk abuse.
Yes, this is an extreme example, but don't think it could never happen. History plainly shows that if a voting process can be corrupted in any way, it will be. Strong-arm tactics included.
A paper trail is a good idea, just not one that the voter carries away with him. Ideally, the voting machine would print out a receipt which the voter would then place into a ballot box for safe keeping in case it is needed for a recount.
No matter how many of my rights are taken away, somehow I still don't feel safe. -Frigid Monkey
for electronic voting. Sure, it's "modern" to have a computer-driven thing, but the old-fashioned way seems to have far less problems in theory. I'll grant that the implementations have sometimes been poor (I now have a new phrase 'hanging chads', which sounds rather unfortunate), but if you're going to spend this much money, why not simply make a good implementation of a normal system ?
:-)
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:-)
In the UK (about 1/6th the population stuffed into 1/50th the area, so our voter-density is far higher, and hence counts will be higher) there has never been much of a problem. Sure, it takes 12 hours or so for the tallies to come in from all around the country, but how else to deploy the 'swingometer'
Simple system. Pencil. Anonymous paper. big dirty cross in the box for the candidate you want. Big separation between the candidates. 2 crosses or ambiguity means a spoiled vote (effectively "none of the above"). Count them all (done by volunteers) and you're done.
Sure, we get some recounts, but the system is so simple it's hard to justify flipping a vote from one candidate to another.
Just seems like it's a mountain out of a molehill
Simon. (dons flameproof suit
Physicists get Hadrons!
What is the actual benefit of voting electronically? Many countries use the tried and true method of voting using paper and pen -- just mark your X in the square next to the name. Volunteers tally up the votes at the end of the voting day and, within hours of closing, you get your results.
It's something everybody understands. The paper waste is minimal compared to the paper output of election-related things -- government paperwork, campaign signs, and flyers in your mailbox and everywhere else. You absolutely don't get hanging chads, broken levers, or some other malfunctioning convoluted contraption. Recounts and verifications are simple -- get those same volunteers to count 'em again.
Geek factor aside, where's the benefit of going electronic?
Want to improve your Karma? Instead of "Post Anonymously", try the "Post Humously" option.
Let's remember something else.. the state puts out the contract for these, and ACCEPTED them.. they were the ones responsible for spending the money wisely, NOT Diebold.
If the state failed to insist on a paper trail, how can you scream at Diebold for not providing one?
I'm surprised that the response has been so tame, actually. Given what is in the leaked email, I would think that the jurisdictions that had dealt with Diebold would be suing for breach of contract, demanding their money back and terminating existing contracts. And I wonder if some of the activity disclosed doesn't warrant criminal charges. Isn't screwing around with what is supposed to be a frozen, certified system election fraud?
In a similar vein, is Maryland really locked in to its deal with Diebold the way the Diebold people seem to think it is? If the system was secured as advertised and if Diebold screwed around with it in Maryland as they apparently did in some places, I would think that Maryland could easily void the contract.
For the last decade, when I vote, I fill in circles on a sheet - sort of like filling out the SATs. When I am done, I feed my ballot into some box/machine.
I don't know where or when the ballots are counted, but we have long had machines which could read these ballots. There is a paper trail. Every time an idiot plays the lottery, he also practices filling out a ballot (as the lottery tickets use a similar method).
Obviously, this must spend lots of money getting fancier systems which are no more acurate, and for now leave no paper trail.
Where law ends, tyranny begins -- William Pitt
If people got to keep their receipt, it would do away with the secret ballot system that American democracy is founded on. Others posters have mentioned the practical consequences of eliminating the secret ballot system.
Especially since I haven't heard one remotely reasonable explanation why companies (like Diebold) that make a large number of electronic transaction devices (ATMs, food/entry access, etc.) all of which have/require paper trails and full auditability suddenly found themselves incapable of providing paper trails and auditability to something as important and potentially controversial as elections.
When this is actually fixed, maybe I'll be less cynical. Maybe.
You make a very valid point here. Robert Cringely makes this same point another way in I, Cringely:
I, Cringely linkage...
Seeing the story of Diebold wanting to gouge Maryland for adding printers & an audit trail to their voting systems makes me think that Diebold did not just forget to put in a printed audit trail, but they deliberately do not want one.
I'm all for your suggestion. REQUIRED open source software in voting machines, with an extensive audit trail, not just of the machines, but the servers, protocols, etc. Competent crypto should be used extensively to protect the systems' integrity.
Meldroc, Waster of Electrons
I mean, seriously, with everything that has happened it is about time hackers not only whine about it, but actually steps up and creates a system that does it right. There's nobody more qualified to do it than a bunch of hackers anyway, and it should be an ideal field to show what can be created, and it should be a rock-solid business plan: You sell hardware and open code.
Start with a prototype that does what the proposed bills say, based on a free OS. Then move up to implement the best things out there (there was this crypto proposal here a couple of weeks ago), and then strip down the OS to the bare essentials needed for the operation. That way, conducting an exhaustive review of the complete source becomes managable.
Really, hackers should see this as a great business opportunity!
Employee of Inrupt, Project Release Manager and Community Manager for Solid
A receipt would prevent anonymous voting; it's what you'd provide to -- oh, Enron -- to prove that you voted for the "right" candidate. Then they pay you. (Maybe a meal, or by not firing you, or whatever.)
An audit trail is what's needed. And a paper, voter-verifiable copy of the ballot you just filled out is exactly the right thing there. But it must never leave the polling place,
Let's stop having slashdot advocate that the world make it even easier to sell out to corporations and other organizations that are corrupting the political process. Stop calling them "receipts" in the stories, and get editors who stop making such mistakes. Let's try to be up-level from the Faux News Network.
"I'm not a voter but I play one on slashdot."