Pentagon Cancels Internet Voting System

Ben B writes "The Pentagon won't use an Internet voting system for overseas U.S. citizens this fall because of concerns about its security, an official said Thursday. The official, who requested anonymity, said Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz made the decision to scrap the system because Pentagon officials were not certain they could 'assure the legitimacy of votes that would be cast.' Computer security experts who last month reviewed the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment, or SERVE, had urged the Pentagon to scrap the system, saying it was too vulnerable."

Comments

I really have to question

[barenaked]

I question the whole premise of using the internet in the voting process. The flaws are unsolvable because they are fundamental to the architecture of the internet. Using a voting system based upon the internet poses a serious and unacceptable risk for election fraud. It is simply not secure enough for something as serious as the election of a government official. The report recommends that the Serve project be shut down and nothing like it be tried until "both the internet and the world's home computer infrastructure have been fundamentally redesigned, or some other unforeseen security breakthroughs appear." With which I wholeheartedly agree

Re:I really have to question

[Rotten168]

Well, the Pentagon considered the implication that worldwide "hackers" could alter the outcome of the election. And seeing as how popular GWB is worldwide, their decision was wise.

Re:I really have to question

[sholden]

People vote differently in secret ballots than they do in public ballots. That's a pretty significant reason to keep them.

Secret ballots prevent many problems associated with elections (breaking the legs of those who don't vote how you told them, for example). Of course with non-compulsary voting you can perform similar attacks anyway - prevent a bunch of people who will cast more votes for your opposition than for you from voting at all.

The UK has a system in which votes are tagged with unique identifiers that match a voter to a ballot - but the link is locked away somewhere "safe" and legally can't be accessed except on a court order and are destroyed after a year. That provides most of the benefits of a secret ballot, but still allows the votes to be checked if the election is suspect. See here for a short blurb on the system.

Now whether than system is good or bad is another matter, but it shows you can have some of the benefits of a secret ballot and also the main benefit of a non-secret ballot.

Re:I really have to question

[MuParadigm]

"...George W. won all of the recounts, including ones done by the independent press..."

Actually, not to get into the argument of whether there was a fix or not, but the independent press tally came up with different winners, depending on how the vote was counted.

Ironically, using the counting method that the Democrats recommended would have resulted in a Bush victory, and using the counting method advocated by the Republicans would have resulted in a Gore victory.

But then the Supreme Court stepped in at the Republicans request, called off the recounts, and gave the victory to Bush. So the proper counting method for the recounts became a moot issue.

Re:I really have to question

[Free_Meson]

But then the Supreme Court stepped in at the Republicans request

Yeah... after the Democrats took it to the courts to begin with.

Neither party's hands are clean in the whole fiasco.

I hope you aren't saying that it was somehow wrong to take that election to court. That's the reason we have courts -- when everything else breaks down, they are the final arbiters of right and wrong. They are the referees that determine which rules are just and how they should be interpreted and enforced. You can't have a truly democratic system without a powerful court because those abused by the tyranny of the majority have no recourse. As for the case of Gore v. Bush, it looks like the court failed. It didn't fail because Bush won (though I would have prefered Gore), it failed because in a situation that needed a conclusive end it rendered the worst possible verdict for the sanctity of democracy in the United States. They said that a recount should happen, but becuase of an artificial deadline ~50 days before the winner would take office and less than a day after the decision, a full recount requiring less than a week would just be too inconvenient to endure. The case should have been about how to count the votes, with the democrats arguing one way and the republicans arguing another. Instead, the republican council argued that there should be no recount at all... As a litigation tactic, this was good -- if you won the first count, argue against any subsequent recounts. As it concerns the country, though, this was a horrible argument, and a less radical court would have seen the importance of deciding the election with a universal standard of fairness rather than doing what it did. The Gore v. Bush decision may have been the single worst supreme court decision since the Dred Scott v. Sanford decision, but at least in Scott the court had a sound legal principle to support its decision.

Anyway, I can't believe you're claiming the democrats should somehow be blamed or tarnished for seeking a recount in an election where equal protection had obviously been violated. The fact that such a request even made it into a court should tell you that the republican party, at least at the time, cared more about being in power than it cared about the democratic nature of the united states or its constitution.

That's nice. Does it finally kill the idea?

[ObviousGuy]

It's bad enough that the internet was going to be used to count votes outside the country. How much worse would it be with all those illegals voting online here inside the U.S. borders?

Why trust internet banking then?

[MrRTFM]

If this 'internet' is so insecure , why are the big corps. trusting it to transfer billions of dollars around.

I must be missing something - this is technically feasible, they are just doing it the wrong way.

Re:Why trust internet banking then?

[Rufus88]

Because they have a way of verifying after the fact that their transactions occurred as they should, in case they suspect fraud. With internet voting, you can't. In fact, regardless of the voting mechanism, it's important that you not be able to verify that your individual vote was recorded properly, because that would imply being able to prove who you voted for, which would permit vote-selling and make people susceptable to vote-extortion.

Re:Why trust internet banking then?

[zeugma-amp]

Yes. You are missing something. The fundamental problem with internet voting is that it needs to be able to assure three things:

First, that the person voting is eligible to vote. This is not too hard to do. We know how to verify identity, though there are a few issues with this that are not present in a financial relationship.

Second, that the person's vote is anonymous. Anonymous voting is trivially implmented. There is a problem when you combine the above verification requirement with the need to keep a given person's vote secret.

Third, that the election be auditable. THere was yeling and finger-pointing in the last American presidential election. Could you imagine what it would be like if votes just suddenly marterialized out of the ether with no way to audit them?

Combine all three of the above requirements and you have a very tough problem at hand. We don't want to be able to have some political hack analyze the raw vote data and b able to say "Joe Blow voted for candidate X, as this could, for various reasons result in repercussions of one kind or another on Joe, thus allowing others to intimidate his vote.

This is one reason why I really dislike mail-in ballots. Mail ballots allow an agent of Party y to hand an absentee ballot to Joe, make sure he marks for the 'correct' candidate, and then mail it in, assured of the vote rendered. It is a also a sitation custom made for fraud on a massive scale. With in-person voting, party X can pay Joe $5 dollars to vote, but when Joe deposits the ballot in the box, there is no way to guarantee that Joe voted "correctly".

Now, there some bright fellows have proposed cryptographic protocols that solve the problems mentioned above. Unfortunately, you are dealing with an electorate too stupid to figure out how to punch holes in a ballot reliably. The Protocols for secure, anonymous internet voting are far too complex to ever be used in the real world.

This issue doesn't apper to be closed after all

[Flexagon]

This more complete article has a quote that suggests this issue really isn't closed after all:

Wolfowitz's memo, written to David Chu, under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, allows the Pentagon to continue work already in progress to look into "other technical applications for voting on the Internet or electronically," the defense official said.

"The door is still open to other methods. It's just that the SERVE we have decided not to use," he said.

Admit it

[ObviousGuy]

Aren't you just the tiniest bit curious to see how cool a Sharpton presidency would be?

Just imagine all the quotes he'll leave for posterior.

Big problem

[Mieckowski]

The projects home page states that it "will let eligible U.S. citizens vote from any Windows-based computer with Internet access" WHAT? Making it harder for linux users to vote? (and as a result having less of them represented) Supporting Microsoft?

I don't see how this got so far already.

E-voting sucks. What we have today sucks more

[fnord123]

I look forward to the day that electronic voting comes in as long as it provides a some means of of doing verification, because I do not trust my goverment (that includes both the Demopublicans and the Republicrats) enough to trust their vote counting today even without electronic voting coming into it.

Today I drop my ballot in the mailbox (I live in a mail-in ballot state) and just have to trust everything is on the up and up from there.

What I would like instead is to have every voter to get a receipt when they vote, that uniquely identifies their precinct and vote, and shows a unique number for that vote/voter combo. Something like:

Vote #: 54353654354 Precinct: 58 Voted for: Mickey Mouse (or whoever)

Then I'd like those all those numbers published somewhere after every election so that anybody can download it. Note that my vote is still anonymous, nobody knows who vote 54353654354 is because of the nature of one way functions.

Any voter could go look at the published list to see that their vote was counted correctly. If it was counted incorrectly (I.e. the count showed my vote to be for Dopey instead of Mickey Mouse), then I could step forward with my biometric data to prove it. If enough people step forward, the election was clearly bogus and needs to be redone.

Any voter could download the entire list and count the votes for themselves, at least minimizing the chances of large #s of votes appearing out of thin air in any particular precinct, and making counting of votes very clear and open to all to verify.

Is it foolproof? Nope, but it is a lot more transparent process than we have today, where I have no visibility whatsoever into my vote being counted, what the real totals where, etc.

Re:Can't this be fixed?

[El]

Actually, I do have a partial solution to spam, but in involves changing the email protocol to require the SENDER to store the email, rather than the receiver. The current protocol was devised in uucp days, when it was common to store-and-forward email over several dial-up hops to it's destination. These days, everybody that has an email server also has a web server. If you sent only a URL and (optional) encryption/access key via the old protcol, then retrieved the rest of the message from the URL, this would elimate spoofing and put more of the burden on the sender and less on the receiver. It would also be more efficient -- currently, if I send the exact same message to 100 people, it uses up 100 times the size of the message in disk space on the receiver's servers. But if was stored on the sender's server, it could use the same copy for everybody! Yes, there is some additional overhead to track whether specific addressees have downloaded the message and determine when to delete it, but I think with some work it could be turned into a useful system -- certainly an improvement over the current system.

Re:The pentagon counts votes??? You must be kiding

[caudron]

the idea to let the armed forces have anything to do with overseeing voting seems both ridiculous and dangerous.

The Pentagon has an interest in this because these votes are the overseas ballots for the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. The Pentagon's job is to make sure there is a reasonable way for their people to get a say in the government back home. They are not involved in the vote tally itself. This is just the Pentagon saying that this method is not acceptable to them. A legitimate and sane response, given the known security risks.