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Is Open Source Fertile Ground for Foul Play?
jsrjsr writes "In an article DevX.com entitled Open Source Is Fertile Ground for Foul Play, W. Russell Jones argues that open source software is bad stuff. He argues that open source software, because of its very openness, will inevitably lead to security concerns. He says that this makes adoption of open source software by governments particularly worrisome. In his words: 'An old adage that governments would be well-served to heed is: You get what you pay for. When you rely on free or low-cost products, you often get the shaft, and that, in my opinion, is exactly what governments are on track to get.'"
All these great reply's, these reasons why Russell is wrong, will never be read by the public because they're stuck in /.
Take a cue from devX: "Editor's Note: DevX is pleased to consider rebuttals and related commentaries in response to any published opinion. Publication is considered on a case-by-case basis. Please email the editor at lpiquet@devx.com for more information."
Do it doug.
Open Source Is Fertile Ground for Foul Play
The nature of open source makes security problems an inevitable concern. There are a handful of ways that malicious code can make its way into open source and avoid detection during security testing, making government adoption of open source particularly worrisome.
by A. Russell Jones February 11, 2004
An old adage that governments would be well-served to heed is: You get what you pay for. When you rely on free or low-cost products, you often get the shaft, and that, in my opinion, is exactly what governments are on track to get. Perhaps not today, nor even tomorrow, and not because open source products are less capable or less efficient than commercial products, but because sooner or later, governments that rely on free open source software will put their country's and their citizens' data in harm's way. Eventually--and inevitably--an open source product will be found to contain a security breach--not one discovered by hackers, security personnel, or a CS student or professor. Instead, the security breach will be placed into the open source software from inside, by someone working on the project.
This will happen because the open source model, which lets anyone modify source code and sell or distribute the results, virtually guarantees that someone, somewhere, will insert malicious code into the source. Malevolent code can enter open source software at several levels. First, and least worrisome, is that the core project code could be compromised by inclusion of source contributed as a fix or extension. As the core Linux code is carefully scrutinized, that's not terribly likely. Much more likely is that distributions will be created and advertised for free, or created with the express purpose of marketing them to governments at cut-rate pricing. As anyone can create and market a distribution, it's not far-fetched to imagine a version subsidized and supported by organizations that may not have U.S. or other government interests at heart.
Third, an individual or group of IT insiders could target a single organization by obtaining a good copy of Linux, and then customizing it for an organization, including malevolent code as they do so. That version would then become the standard version for the organization. Given the prevalence of inter-corporation and inter-governmental spying, and the relatively large numbers of people in a position to accomplish such subterfuge, this last scenario is virtually certain to occur. Worse, these probabilities aren't limited to Linux itself, the same possibilities (and probabilities) exist for every open source software package installed and used on the machines.
How Can This Happen?
The products of the open source software development model have become increasingly entrenched in large organizations and governments, primarily in the form of Linux, a free open-source operating system, the free open-source Apache Web server, and open source office suites. There are several reasons that open source software--and Linux in particular--are seeing such a dramatic uptick in use, including IBM's extensive Linux support effort over the past several years, and the widespread perception that Linux is more secure than Windows, despite the fact that both products are riddled with software security holes. (Use this menu to see the number of vulnerabilities reported by security watchdog group Secunia for an OS-by-OS comparison.)
So far, major Linux distributions such as Debian and others have been able to discover and remedy attacks on their core source-code servers. The distributions point to the fact that they discovered and openly discussed these breaches as evidence that their security measures work. Call me paranoid, but such attacks, however well handled, serve to raise the question of whether other such attacks have been more successful (in other words, undiscovered). Because anyone can create and market--or give away--a Linux distribution, there's also a reasonably hi
Quality, performance, value; you get only two, and you don't always get to pick.
I believe every word of this article because A Russell Jones certainly has no vested interest in Microsoft based web solutions.
Athletic Scholarships to universities make as much sense as academic scholarships to sports teams.
In addition, it looks like this fellow's got a seriously vested interest in the spread of MS's closed source products.
r l/index=books&field-author=A.%20Russell%20Jones/10 3-4406437-9264652
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-u
'I don't recall any follow up determining, "Hey this happened X_TIME ago, therefore clean programs should be reinstalled on your machine."'
That's because the relevant teams _checked_ the code against known good code to see if there had been anything planted. If there were problems, you would have heard about them.
Engineering and the Ultimate
Email the author. I just did, rebutting two of his "points". rjones@devx.com
... did they get it all? Only
Hey Russel,
Just two obvious points of rebuttal.
1. Your question:
Who's Watching the Watchers?
Makes a cold chill run down my spine, when I think of closed source
software. In fact, many of your statements, such as the rogue coder,
holds just as true, for CSS. The difference? You (as a consumer)
cannot see the code. At atmosphere, which breeds closedness, and
non-disclosure of hacker attacks, is far more scary, then one (such
as Debian), which openly announces, that it has been hacked. Imagine
a hacker gaining access to Microsoft code. Imagine MS catching him,
and removing the malicious code. But
the hacker will ever know.
Your statement, that "core" members, will port the code, just doesn't
make sense. Assuming we're not into the old chicken and egg problem,
with the bootstrapping compiler, an Open Source project, is defined
as having the source open. If you compile a program, and it ends up
different, then the one you downloaded, then something is very
wrong indeed.
2. In academia, and security circles, full disclosure, to be able to
repeat trials, and be able to uncover weaknesses in software, is the
norm. Hiding behind binary code, does not a very powerfull brickwall
make. Hiding behind a wellthought out design, which is not open to
attacks (confirmed by peerreview), and relies on algoritmic
defences, makes a strong brick wall.
I am sorry, but all in all, a very poor article.
Regards,
Svend
> So? If they don't get publicity, they're not worth fixing?
This attitude is EXACTLY what is making OS so popular and attractive. Even a small bug can drive someone out there eventually crazy enough to pick up the code and fix it. There's a famous feature in Word that pushes footnotes to subsequent pages if line spacing is anything other than single spacing. Only the footnote, mind you, not the anchor and the surrounding text. As it so happens, double-spaced text with footnotes is extremely prevalent in academia and other formal environments, making this feature very well known amongst grad students and such. But again, since this feature hasn't brought down entire computer networks and hasn't been mentioned by Tom Brokaw on the six-o-clock news, it's not worth Microsoft's time to fix. Even though it significantly impedes Word's primary purpose, that of creating documents.
I think you're right. Here's the link.
"It was introduced by maintainers of the code within Borland."
So that just leaves the Sendmail trojan, which lasted how long? 8 days?
The attempts failed because of the meticulous grooming given by the "many eyes" watching each open source release.
Any one can write a new kernel patch. But getting these patches accepted is a whole different story.
Conversely, years after the commercial, closed-source program Borland Interbase was released and used worldwide, it was found that it contained a back-door.
So recent history proves the article is wrong. Facts demonstrate exactly the opposite of what the article rants about.
Conclusion: the article is an unsubstantiated troll written by a Microsoftie eager to fart FUD at the Penguin. Ignore.
--
Mad science! Robots! Underwear! Cute girls! Full comic online! http://www.girlgeniusonline.com/
This will happen because the open source model, which lets anyone modify source code and sell or distribute the results, virtually guarantees that someone, somewhere, will insert malicious code into the source.
Of course you can get the source code and modify it. However, 99.9% of the time you cannot commit it back to the tree without first getting to know the guys running the project. And what usually comes first is submitting patches to the project via a project member (uaully a high-level member since some level of oversight and accountability is needed).
Once that 'trial period' has passed, then a coder can usually check into the repository head. However, I don't see any major difference in that respect to someone working at [insert super software company here] and someone coming in and being a good person for a bit and then adding back doors to code.
The author assumes that as soon as you get the repository login set up on yr machine, then you're just able to start fucking things up. This is highly unlikely and since that, in my view, is the most fundamental piece of team programming, I find his argument to be dead right there.
As for distributing the results, that is also flawed but not by logic, but by market forces. Even if someone got a hold of the entire RedHat repository or Evolution for that matter, I don't think people would be using that product for a few reasons.
1. Lacks credibility. Forks have enough time gaining intrest from the project they forked off. So why would someone want to fork something just to insert back doors and take over the world. Seems like an awful waste of time and effort. And just because you fork it, doesn't mean they'll come.
2. Even if a 'malware' fork happened, it wouldn't stay afloat long. It would probably take less than a day for someone to figure out something was going down and to spread the word. Again, the OS community is the key here. You wouldn't see this happen behind closed doors.
This guy lives in the fairytale land of spooks and secrets and bad guys around every corner. While I'm sure there's plenty of falling outs of people in various projects and groups, it's highly unlikely that any of these scenerios the author plays out will ever come true. In any ecosystem, only the strong will survive. And I just can't seem some 'malware' being released and taking over everything. In fact, all the worst case infections and money losers to date have all happened in the ActiveX/DevX/.NET/M$ propreitary, closed door, secret world. Of course this guy has this opinion. He exists in a world where everone is paranoid and everything not yours is evil or doomed to failure or ripe for punishing.
Free your mind..