Slashdot Mirror
Interesting Uses for Trusted Computing
An anonymous reader writes "The Unlimited Freedom blog has published a new article describing 'interesting' uses of Trusted Computing. (Google cache here). Trusted Computing, as implemented in Microsoft's NGSCB (Palladium) or the Trusted Computing Group (TCPA), has been one of the most controversial technology proposals of recent years, to put it mildly. But the article on Unlimited Freedom offers a new perspective. The author examines 12 different applications which could benefit from access to Trusted Computing technology. And most of them are uncontroversial or would actually improve privacy and anonymity. Among the examples listed are multi-player games, online casinos, P2P networks, anonymous remailers, distributed computing and mobile agents. The analysis provides an interesting contrast to the usual focus on Trusted Computing's impact on control over digital content."
Hmmm, it seems that another approach might also provide these desirable side benefits but also work to secure the Internet as a whole, and not have to use "Trusted" architectures. Although, there are new controversies from the following approach, in short, from my journal: "an emerging Internet security company, Symbiot is taking an entirely new, albeit controversial approach to Internet defense and cyberwarfare that should appeal to cyberpunks everywhere. Rather than the traditional passive response that has been used by sysadmins and CTO's worldwide, Symbiot is taking a more "active" defense approach by implementing a common subscription based access to a "threat database" that will allow participating networks to determine the degree of threat and respond democratically (by using the shared resources of other participating networks) and proportionally to the attack by allowing for a graduated response to cyber attacks. The potential of an asymmetrical response to a threat is also not out of the question.... Links for additional information are here and here."
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Just like Sauron's ring, DRM cannot be used for good.
I dont think so. Trusted computing is based in principal on evil. It should not be legitimized by finding ways to use it that were unintended. Endorsing something rooted in evil does not change the morality of the base. I don't care how shiny you giftwrap bullshit, it's still bullshit.
Think of it this way, Germany and Japan conducted much in the way of medical research in WWII, but since they conducted experiments that were inhumane, tortorous, and used unwilling subjects. The medical community wont touch their research, not because it is fundamentaly flawed, but because their research was fundamentaly evil.
Stand up for your morals here and fight trusted computing.
...I'm cool with Trusted Computing.
As long as my computer is being told what it can or cannot do by someone other than me, I DON'T WANT IT.
Applications like online casinos would also benefit from a magical honesty pill which users could take to prevent them from cheating - but it's not going to happen. The idea of trusted computing is to require a specially restricted client machine, but there's no way this could work and be secure enough for something like online gambling. An important rule of online security is *you cannot trust the client*, and even if the standard Dell PC that grandma buys is locked down with all sorts of nastyware, this will do nothing against a determined attacker who is able to program a computer to do what its he, its owner, wants.
Although trusted computing could never provide real security, it can give a lot of inconvenience to 90% of the population to stop them doing things with their computer that Microsoft would prefer them not to do. Just like other copy-protection measures over the years, its purpose is to keep the majority of users under control, not to stop the real criminals.
-- Ed Avis ed@membled.com
I understand all of the benefits of trusted computing, but still find it hard to accept for two reasons.
First, I don't beleive that any system that is physically in the users hand is secure. Given enough time and motivation crafty end users will crack the system. For an example we need look no further than mod-chips and video game systems.
Second, I'm a tinkerer. I love to play around with new technology and software. Ultimately this technology would be in everything from your computer to your dishwasher. I'd hate to lose that ability to dig around the machine and software myself or have to pay extra to modify my computer and devices to gain that back.
As long as there are multiple competing trust providers, and administrators can choose which ones to certify for interoperability with their systems, I don't see much of a problem.
Of course, the problem is that right now there is essentially only one trust provider, and its previous behavior doesn't incline me toward trusting it.
The benefit of using multiple trust certifications is that OSS could get in on the game... if someone wanted to set up a way to submit source and receive signed compiled binaries for a small fee. A bit of a hassle and in effective in the event a licensee wants to modify the code, but then again the licensee could pay the original OSS coders or submit the modified source for signing themselves.
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According to the latest ruleset, this post should be modded as Vorpal Flamebait +5.
I got yer trusted computing right here, pal.
I also reply below your current threshold.
I've read about half of it. So far, the gist is that Trusted Computing will require digital certificates for all executables, documents, emails, and web pages (along with images). He claims that since a repository system of certificates will need to be formed (much like we have SSL certs like Thawte now), the power to deny publishing will be concentrated in the hands of the certificate repositories, which presumably will be large corps and governments. He claims this is the "Good Old Days" of producer/consumer media that the entrenched powers prefer, unlike the supposed new era of peer-to-peer internet publishing, whereby anyone can create their own web pages.
Actually, having signed certificates on documents and email is not a bad thing. I've wondered for years why the US Postal service hasn't created a trusted email system for a small postage fee. I use PGP signatures all the time to verify downloads from the Internet. A certificate/signature repository is just a convenience so I don't have to constantly email or call people asking for their public keys. In all likelyhood these repositories will be competitive-but-cooperative databases like DNS, so there will probably always be alternative or bargain signature repositories.
Yes, things will likely get buckled down as the Internet gets more mainstream and govts get their heads around it, but I don't see the gloomy future he does. Maybe he just had too idealistic dreams of the future. The bottom line is that most people don't want to publish their own content, and wouldn't even if they knew how. Blocking inbound port 80 to consumers is not the equivalent of book-burning or censorship, especially if port 80 is largely unused by consumers except as a vector for worms. If you want to publish, you'll just have to find a plan that allows you to do so. The fact the the large ISPs are figuring out that they can charge an extra $10-20/month for this is not the end of world, so long as more than one competing ISP exists.
Also, no matter how much the Internet falls under control of central authorities, new technologies will arise for the tech elite to go about their business as always. After all, we somehow managed to build the Internet and BBS's in spite of the fact that publishers and the media had total control of print and the airwaves. History will repeat.
--- I'll finish this after my cig. break
Among the examples listed are multi-player games, online casinos, P2P networks, anonymous remailers, distributed computing and mobile agents.
The problem with the typical Slashdot users' attitudes to Trusted Computing is that these obvious benefits get ignored while they harp on all the negatives. That's why articles like this get written. There's good reason to point out the problems with Trusted Computing. For example, a multi-player game success story would be the XBOX Live system. By ensuring the games are signed copies and blacklisting modchipped XBOXes, they've effectively eliminated cheating and helped prevent piracy. The problem is that they also prevent third party development for a machine that customers want apps to be developed for. The Xbox Media Center is an incredible accomplishment that's stymied by the tight control Microsoft has over this particular form of Trusted Computing.
If our opinions were more balanced, perhaps the inevibility of Trusted Computing would be more favorable to consumers and developers.
If the DRM catches on and it gets legitimized, we'll soon have closed and regulated hardware like network cards, audio and graphics card that won't transfer data, play music or show graphics unless the mandatory DRM chip gives the permission to do so.
Whilst people seem to have a knee-jerk reaction against "Trusted Computing", I think there is one crucial issue that actually determines wether or not it's a Good Idea(tm). And that is: Who holds the master keys to my computer?
Point being that hardware level security features can be a great boon, as long as I decide what to trust and what not to trust.
Ofcourse, that's pretty guaranteed not what MS wants to push, but still - when discussing "Trusted" architectures in general, I think it's a valid point. It could for instance enable me to say that I trust the FSF's list of trustworthy applications - and viruses and other malware would actually be physically unable to run on my workbox. How could that be wrong?
Another issue I've thought about is - how can anyone be so sure it won't be cracked? People seem to be tinking that hardware enabled "security" (DRM, whatever) will finally give watertight security. Yet, to my knowledge, both PlayStations and XBOX'es has tried that trick - to no avail. (In the sense that those wanting to subvert the protection mechanisms seems perfectly able to do so).
Ohwell, just my thoughts atleast. If I have misunderstood anything, feel free to correct me :)
A lot of these examples are really creepy, and one point keeps coming up: making sure someone on the other side is running "legitimate" versions of software that are known to be unmodified. I just don't think that's a legitimate thing to care about. Specific software fingerprints shouldn't matter; interfaces should. Insisting on specific software instead of standardized interfaces, holds back innovation and flexibility. It's almost like the very point of "trusted computing" is to help create and sustain software monoculture. I think that's disgusting, and I know it's destructive to progress.
As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
I would say relax. TC(Trusted Computing) will actually be a great thing for open source. When people start paying full price for all their "warez", they will start to find that the wish list is bigger than the piggy bank. This technology will enable a great many things, and it does not have to be used (AFAIK). It will also be great for OSS development. It helps to know that the correct TC is being used to submit the code. It will make John Q Public feel safer.
I am no expert on the ramifications of TC, but I do *much* work with companies that want to use the online world, and most of them limit their services due to the issues that TC will solve. Even in OSS, we have to make money. It is how the world goes 'round, puts food on the table. TC will make it easier in some ways to make money. It will also make it easier for the small guy to make money.
That said, there are serious potential abuses of this technology, and I am still hesitant to boldly go forward. It will probably go forward without me if I do not though, so, all things being as they are, I need to learn how to use it and give it to my clients. They will want it. They have been wanting something like it for a while now.
InnerWeb
Freud might say that Intelligent Design is religion's ID.
Oh, so that's what "trust" is all about? It's all about being able to trust ME?
So my PC needs to be locked so I don't cheat in multiplayer games, steal from banks online, or modify my programs...? But why would I do that in the first place? Next thing they'll do is take away the knives from my kitchen to make sure I don't kill anyone?
"Trusted computing" is all about remote hosts trusting YOU. The only way in which this can happen is by making sure YOU won't be able to behave as you want. Those who are pushing this initiative forward are doing so because they want to control what you do, they want to be able to certify what you can do with your PC. While it may be a good thing to try to make online games, online gambling, online banking and others as secure as possible, personal freedom shouldn't be limited in such ways!
It's all a big paradox, because on one hand you get Microsoft releasing an OS that no-one trusts on a security level, while on the other hand they (and others) want to tell you how to use your computer to make sure you can be trusted?
I don't know if you feel the same way, but those examples that would make "trusted computing" such an interesting idea make me feel like a cybercriminal of some sort.
Diego Rey
diegoT
If trusted computing depends on authentication via hardware, won't this function become less and less useful as computing becomes distributed across more devices and individuals are less tethered to specific machines? Or would we all carry a little TC device that plugs in to various 'toolbox' hardware? Any thougts?
Parent post stolen from here.
The fallacy in this article is the assumption that NGSCB is perfectly secure and unbeatable. This isn't the case, and in fact there are reasons to believe that at least some of its functions are theoretically impossible.
NGSCB can be broken; you'll just have to go through a lot of trouble to do so (scrape off chip packaging and decode its internals without triggering intrusion detectors, etc.). This is sufficient to stop casual copyright infringement, or to keep your workers at check. But one ought to doubt if the expense of breaking NGSCB isn't worthwhile for online gambling, elections or other applications where the incentives are very high.