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State of Secure Wireless Networking?
Mr. Sketch asks: "At my office, they want me to add a wireless network and it seems like it could be possible to do it in a secure way, but I'm not 100% confident. The setup I was thinking of was 802.11g only (no backward 802.11b compatibility), WPA-PSK with AES encryption with a 15 character password consisting of upper and lower case letters and numbers and special characters, MAC filtering, no ssid broadcast, and no default anything (ssid, passwords, etc). How secure would this network be? What type of attacks would it be vulnerable to? I haven't found any tools to crack AES, only WEP, does that mean it's secure or I just that I haven't looked hard enough? I want the wireless computers to still be able to access the computers on our network, in fact ideally, I just want it to be a wireless extension of our wired network, but only if it's secure enough. I'm sure there are plenty of other companies who want to add wireless to their network, but want to be reasonably confident that it will be secure and are unsure of the current state of wireless security."
and address. I will tell you if its secure ;)
How secure would this network be? What type of attacks would it be vulnerable to? I haven't found any tools to crack AES, only WEP, does that mean it's secure or I just that I haven't looked hard enough?
AES itself is considered a strong encryption technology. How secure it will be for a WiFi connection is anyone's bet. It is the approved NIST standard. (US centric) see http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes for more information.
You could enhance it by putting in an SSH VPN to a seprate box on your network.
Connect your AP to the network through a firewall that only allows the SSH tunnel to communicate with the tunnel server, and drops all other traffic. The ap would provide it's own DHCP server to eliminate unnecessary load on the firewall.
Then again, I work in an environment where we do not allow any wireless networking.
-Rusty
You never know...
Don't forget Ars Technica's finding that if you turn off SSID, Windows Wireless Zero Configuration may connect your to other networks that you don't want to connect to.
I do some wardriving and I can tell you that I wouldn't even attempt to break into what you just described wirelessly. If I did want in, it would be much easier to walk in the front door and socially engineer the secretary. WEP has been broken, I seem to thing one form of WAP has been, not sure which, but it is so difficult that a physical attack would be much more likely. Is your wired network that secure or can anyone plug into an open port and have full access?
You should map the network, understand where the signal reaches and try to tune the power to only go where you want it.
If you are paranoid enough to want to try all of the layers of encryption, and you should be, its fun to do. Then go with the setup you have and put IPSEC on top, that will make it at least as secure as your wired side. Be aware that you won't get anywhere near 54MBs with all of the encryption loading down the system, so it will be slow.
I am not aware of any attacks that could brute force this setup, but it would be easier for someone to socially engineer it, MAC addresses can be cloned, VPN logins stolen, so some form of automated monitoring would be nice, checking for duplicate logins, unauthorized times. Why is Bob trying to authenticate at 3AM? That kind of stuff.
If there is any weakness in this setup, it's probably in WPA-PSK. It's intended more for home use than for corporate WLANs. If the PSK password gets compromised, you could be in for trouble. Of course if the password is strong, the only attack I know of is to get physical access to one of the wireless nodes. I'm not all that familiar with the new protocals; the attacker may still have to find a way past AES to make use of the compromised PSK.
One of the most difficult problems is that since linksys boxes are so cheap these days, it's not unusual for a misguided employee to just bring his old one from home and plug it into the corporate network. Hey the super-secure ultra-locked down DMZ'd VPN one you provided didn't even show up in the pop-up menu so obviously it was his right to just get something working.
Some really high-end wifi equipment will scan the airwaves for unauthorized signals, plus scan the wired network for IP addresses that are act like access points and then notify you or even attempt to shut them down.
Yeah, something like a Linux or FreeBSD machine with two NICs, one to your AP(s) and the other to your network. Set up PoPToP or IPSec on the machine, and have all clients use a username and password to connect to the VPN server. If you use PPTP (PoPToP) or IPSEC, virtually every client will be able to connect without additional software. If you do use PPTP though, and intend to use it for Windows clients, be sure to disable MSCHAPv1, and use only MSCHAPv2, since v1 is actually less secure than WEP. With the gateway server installed, you could even allow NATed connections to the internet (for clients in the board room, visiting, etc...), but deny access to the internal network to anyone not on the VPN. FreeBSD and Linux are both ideally suited to this sort of thing (I have a similar solution to this on a FreeBSD box at work).
Whatever you do, don't use hardware solutions. Ever had a flash update fail on a router? Try explaining why nobody can connect because the APs ROM is toasted, and that it will be three days before a new ROM comes in. Hardware security solutions have just as many errors (if not more) as software ones, but they are a hell of a lot worse to update. Don't trust them, and you likely won't have to deal with them. Also, sometimes it's best to go with a product that less well-known (i.e. NOT Cisco, Linksys, RealSecure (laughs), Internet Security Solutions (laughs again), Microsoft, Microsoft, Microsoft....), since you won't see an exploit that has 500,000 machines attacking your network within two hours of the release of the patch (or before). I have had to fix two security issues with my FreeBSD box since it went in, and only one required a 2 minute service outage (reboot).
--That's the point of being root, you can do anything you want, even if it's stupid.
I would recommend that you implement (now) WPA with TKIP encryption. If you're a MS shop, and have an Active Directory infrastructure, adding MS IAS (internet authentication server) to that is very easy, and you're probably already licensed. Then you get to choose between authentication methods, and MS supports (and integrates into XP) EAP-MS-CHAP and EAP-TLS, basically login/passwd and digital certs, respectively. I would avoid Preshared Secret Keys (PSKs) due to their vulnerability to off-line dictionary attacks, unless you're willing to generate the PSKs in a cryptographically sound manner and push the length out quite a bit.
Likewise, I would counsel caution about using the AES encryption. If you purchase all of your gear from one vendor, you'll probably be OK, but there are a couple of gotcha's that you need to know about. First, the IEEE 802.11i standard which specifies CCMP (the AES crypto) is not yet final. It's extremely unlikely, but it _could_ change (we meet next week). Any vendor you choose today would likely provide updates in the event of a change, but who knows. More importantly, because the 11i is not final, the Wi-Fi Alliance has not yet integrated CCMP into their testing. So not only do you have absolutely no guarantee of interoperability, no one other than the vendor has tested the crypto implementation. Most crypto folks have a good feeling about AES, but no sane cryptographer trusts an implementation that hasn't been 3d party tested.
Unfortunately, if you need to support Linux, you're in for a hard time. I am not aware of a complete working set of client-side "stuff" to integrate into this lashup, although I did notice the beginnings of some support in the recent 2.6.5 kernel. Do NOT assume that you will be able to get linux working in this environment right now. It's comming..... but it's ain't there yet.
Now, on the subject of some of the other "advice" offered here....
There is a book out from Microsoft Press that gives a lot of background, and takes you step-by-step through getting all of this crap up and running in their environment. I have met the author, and know a number of the contributors from the committee. I highly recommend it, available here. I sincerely hope all of this helps....