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Can Mozilla-Based Browsers be Hijacked?

Chibi Merrow asks: "Matt Hartley in his latest GnomeReport speaks of supposed browser hijacker programs that are now targeting Mozilla FireFox instead of IE. While this is in a way cool (since that means the browser's now considered mainstream), it's also hard to believe. It doesn't help that his article is very light on details. Now there have been some discussion about spyware masquerading as valid extensions; but they require user intervention to install. Most people think of a browser hijack as something that automatically installs itself. Has anyone ever encountered an actual self installing browser hijacker/spyware program that has targeted Mozilla Firefox, or is this a bunch of FUD?"

20 of 102 comments (clear)

  1. No ActiveX by colinramsay · · Score: 2, Insightful

    One of the reasons that IE is so susceptible to this sort of thing is because of ActiveX - an inherent security hole. While xpinstall is similar, it will always require clear user input to get the extension installed.

    And lets not forget the obvious - IE6 is always going to be bad for this. Mozilla gets updated each and every day and has a regular release schedule.

    I know who I'd rely on for the latest and greatest security tech.

    1. Re:No ActiveX by obeythefist · · Score: 3, Insightful

      There's always a risk that any application that's handling data, especially unclean internet data, can be the victim of a buffer overflow. Here's where the open source nature of Mozilla beats MSIE hands down, the code is open to scrutiny which means that someone somewhere has probably already looked after most of the exploits already. That's the theory, anyway.

      --
      I am government man, come from the government. The government has sent me. -- G.I.R.
    2. Re:No ActiveX by cookd · · Score: 5, Insightful

      That means nothing. In any computer product that is intended for use by non-computer-experts, the developer needs to keep this in mind: You cannot trust the end user to make good decisions regarding computer security.

      Here is what I mean. My dad clicks on a link. The front page says "Click here to install the software necessary to view this web site." So he clicks. He gets a scary message, warning about potential viruses and trusting and digital signatures and stuff. None of it makes sense. Essentially, it gets translated into the following question:

      Do you want to visit the web site? OK / Cancel.

      XpInstall is just as vulnerable as ActiveX in this regard. People are dumb. Just like you don't care enough to read the full EULAs with all their legal mumbo-jumbo, most computer users won't really consider the warning.

      And, by the way, ActiveX also requires an OK before installing, just like XPI. There are buffer overflows or cross-site scripting attacks that can bootstrap an attack without ActiveX (and to which Mozilla is just as vulnerable), but ActiveX itself doesn't offer any way to auto-install software without the user's agreement, unless the user changes the Internet Security settings.

      ActiveX == Browser Plugins. Mozilla allows plugins, so there is NO difference.

      IE gets updated whenever a security flaw is found. And the user is prompted to download the update. I don't get alerts when FireFox needs an update -- I go to the website once in a while. You tell me which method is more likely to keep my dad's computer secure.

      --
      Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana.
    3. Re:No ActiveX by WIAKywbfatw · · Score: 4, Insightful

      And lets not forget the obvious - IE6 is always going to be bad for this. Mozilla gets updated each and every day and has a regular release schedule.

      Let's get one thing straight: this sort of browser hijacking isn't aimed at defeating technically-minded people like you or I, it's aimed at non-technical users, such as friends and relatives we might have encouraged to switch away from Microsoft Internet Explorer, or people who've installed Mozilla Firefox from a magazine cover disc, etc.

      For the most part, these non-technical users aren't going to be actively updating their software on a regular basis. They're not going to be looking out for potential security risks and their solutions because they thought that they were leaving all that behind when they switched over from MSIE. In all probability, many if not most of these users won't even know that they've been hijacked if and when that happens.

      To suggest that browser hijacking doesn't have the potential to be a major problem for Mozilla users is rather short-sighted. Being dismissive about it is like adopting a "head in the sand" security policy, and no better than a "security through obscurity" one.

      --

      "Accept that some days you are the pigeon, and some days you are the statue." - David Brent, Wernham Hogg
    4. Re:No ActiveX by 4of12 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      You cannot trust the end user to make good decisions regarding computer security.

      You are so right.

      It makes me think the better overall policy is to make flexible easy upgrades scarier.

      But make the initial installation as capable as possible so most users won't ever feel a need to do an insecure upgrade.

      In the Mozilla and FOSS world things are still not much better than in the Windows world as far as security is concerned. A lot of the current problems with Linux security policies are masked by a 1337 userbase, but widespread deployment could lead to problems like this.

      --
      "Provided by the management for your protection."
    5. Re:No ActiveX by mhesseltine · · Score: 3, Insightful
      There's always a risk that any application that's handling data, especially unclean internet data, can be the victim of a buffer overflow. Here's where the open source nature of Mozilla beats MSIE hands down, the code is open to scrutiny which means that someone somewhere has probably already looked after most of the exploits already. That's the theory, anyway.

      That's the theory. In practice, however, that still doesn't necessarily work. Look, for example, at the recent buffer overflow found in CVS, software that's been open since its inception and been around for a long time. Also, look at the latest problems with OpenSSH, again a package that has been around for quite a while, and one that people should be *very* security concious about.

      While the idea that the code being open forces the bugs to be found and removed, that only works if someone with the skill to find the bug, and the willingness and skill to fix the bug does so.

      --
      Overrated / Underrated : Moderation :: Anonymous Coward : Posting
    6. Re:No ActiveX by llefler · · Score: 2, Insightful

      There's always a risk that any application that's handling data, especially unclean internet data, can be the victim of a buffer overflow.

      Insightful? Not even close. Buffer overflows aren't a given. They aren't a fact of life. Quite simply, all you have to do is simple bounds checking. If you allocate a 4k buffer, don't try to copy 6k to it. Buffer overflows are a 'feature' of C/C++. There are plenty of other languages that don't have that problem.

      Unchecked buffers are the result of poor program design. No programmer, or company, should say that they are security conscious if they haven't done a code review and fixed them.

      --
      It is amazing what you can accomplish if you do not care who gets the credit. -- Harry Truman
    7. Re:No ActiveX by rthille · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Your post made me think that the user prompt really needs to be: "Do you trust this website with full control over your computer?"
      But the problem is with the browser. If the browser were designed to be able to per-domain sandbox even plugins (a shit load of work I know, and it would limit their functionality), then a user could install a plugin downloaded from a site, view that site, and all the plugin could do would be screw with the data from that site. I guess what I'm advocating is that plugins be written in java, or at least execute in a java-sandbox like environment.

      --
      Awesome furniture, accessories and cabinetry in Santa Rosa, CA: http://humanity-home.com/
  2. Semi-OT: Why are extensions not signed ? by Wudbaer · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I love Firefox and Thunderbird. But everytime I install an extension I really wonder: Why does noone bother to sign their extensions ? As the browser complains that the extension is not signed a mechanism to do that must be there.

    1. Re:Semi-OT: Why are extensions not signed ? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Signing extensions doesn't really help unless you have hierarchical or p2p trust relationships. Even then someone would have to identify bad code and revoke the trust relationship with the author.

      Let's say I sign my extension with a private key named "George.Brampton@yahoo.com". How does that make you more confident that the extension is legit?

      The only thing which signing would accomplish is making redistribution safer for people who actually check the signatures against the public keys on the authors website.

    2. Re:Semi-OT: Why are extensions not signed ? by ManxStef · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Surely you could get MozDev to be (one of) the top level Certificate Authority(s) though, seeing as it's already the main repository for plugins. Maybe XULPlanet and a few others too, along the same lines as the SSL cert. verification model. Establish some trusted bodies and give them the issuing responsibilities.

      Get these bodies to issue a cert. to each project and provide a mechanism for signing code, then plug the above CA servers into Mozilla, Firefox, etc., write some checking code (displaying warnings for unsigned code, for example) then you're done :)
      Not quite that easy in practice though, I guess?

  3. Re:not enough users... by Gary+Destruction · · Score: 2, Insightful

    IIS has a lower market share that Apache, yet it's attacked all the time. I think someone's trying to prove a point with the firefox extension malware.

  4. Re:IE is part of Windows by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Integration into the OS makes the scope of IE vulnerabilites larger, but it doesn't necessarily make IE less safe. Microsofts neglect towards known vulnerabilities is a problem, but a similar attitude would hit Mozilla just as hard.

    An example: For a short time, several themers chose to distribute Mozilla skins in XPI form, because that allowed users to install them without additional files. The now preferred way of installing skins requires the help of a script, either in the browser (theme installer extension) or on a webpage. The latter method does not give skins access to JavaScript and is considered safe. XPIs can do a lot more: The installation process can run arbitrary code on the target system and even skins which are installed this way can later on access browser resources and relay them to an external attacker.

  5. Not Just Windows anymore.... by keoghp · · Score: 2, Insightful

    It's interesting to note that these security hacks and loop holes are not just restricted to "windows".

    As other OS's and app's become more popular we will see a rise in breaches and attempted breaches of these systems.

    No matter if your an Admin of a "microsoft", "Sun", "Linux" system. Security should still be on your agenda regardless of system.

    --
    For problems, seek only the simplest solution, complexity brings with it more problems.
  6. Not necessarily by nes11 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    "While this is in a way cool (since that means the browser's now considered mainstream)"

    actually it just means that hackers are finally starting to realize that people using IE rarely have data worth accessing. If someone's using FireFox, chances are they're bright enough to have some cool data.

    On our webserver, we're only getting about 1.5% of 50,000 hits per day that our Firebird/Firefox, so it's still far from mainstream.

  7. If it has user input and output ... by Jahf · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Any program that is complex enough to have user input and system/user output is going to be possibly exploitable.

    So yes, I believe it may be possible to exploit Mozilla.

    But I also believe that the exploit will be known almost as soon as it hits the streets rather than being kept quiet until the devs get around to fixing it.

    And if the devs don't quickly fix it I trust that the community will, because it is in their own interests.

    The last 2 paragraphs are because Mozilla is open, IE is closed, plain and simple.

    Not to mention that I don't believe that Mozilla is -as- vulnerable to exploits as IE nor will such exploits be as serious due to purposeful lack of OS integration.

    --
    It is more productive to voice thoughtful opinions (reply) than to judge (moderate) others.
  8. Re:IE is part of Windows by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    > It's Unix philosphy

    And "Windows Philosphy" would be to use the built-in HTTPS libs. The idea of shared code isn't exclusive to Unix.

    The fact is that Netscape^WMozilla has always seeen themeselves as their own 'operating system' layer. Remember Andreeson and his quip about "reducing Windows to a bunch of poorly debugged device drivers" -- well, the same attitute lives on today at mozilla.org.

  9. Re:Only thing I've seen... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    It's a good point that the current dialog box looks too much like a javascript "confirm()" prompt. Which probably make it too easy to just click OK without reading it.

    One smart thing Microsoft did was make the ActiveX install dialog look unique and a little scary -- it says "Security Warning" and has it's own graphic.

  10. Re:Please learn how to make links. by John+Harrison · · Score: 2, Insightful

    The problem is that /. mangles URLs by randomly inserting spaces, so it is considered good etiquette to input links as HTML.

  11. Re: E gets updated whenever a security flaw is fou by cookd · · Score: 2, Insightful

    So what you're saying is:

    Check all of these 3rd-party sites that I have chosen which list a bunch of security holes for Explorer. How evil! Now check a specific query that I have chosen. See! No bugs!

    Well, duh. If you get to pick the evidence, you can prove whatever you want. I'll try my hand at this game. Try this page. 9 serious security issues in the November 2003 update. And I was even nice and kept it on Mozilla's own site. These are the vulnerabilities that were fixed in the last release. Good job, but that isn't any better than the IE story.

    BTW, I wasn't very impressed with the vulnerabilities on the pages you linked to. Some of them are "vulnerabilities that must be executed in the My Computer domain" (um, the My Computer domain means you are a program on the local computer, so how is that a vulnerability?), others that exploit holes in 3rd party plugins, and others that require the user to click OK a couple of times. I'm really not sure how you can consider any of those as real problems with IE. Sure, they're opportunities for social engineering, but those aren't security flaws any more than any other program that allows you to download code from the Internet. Yep -- FTP is an insecure program, because if you type "GET program.exe", then double click on program.exe, it runs code on your computer!

    The ones that actually seem to be dangerous and due to actual problems with Explorer and not false alarms or 3rd-party issues, well they don't seemt to work very well. Perhaps they've been patched?

    Honestly, I use both IE and FireFox. They both have pros and cons. They both have security issues. But neither one has a clear advantage in terms of security. Hackers are creative, and they come up with new attacks every day. No code is perfect, but it seems that everybody is doing the best they can do.

    --
    Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana.