SPF To Be Integrated With MS 'Caller ID' System
An anonymous reader submits "CNET's news.com is reporting 'An ongoing effort to consolidate antispam authentication schemes took a big step forward with the merging of Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Microsoft's Caller ID for E-mail.' This is potentially good news." For more background, here are three previous mentions of Microsoft's proposed Caller ID-style system.
I have yet to see a good reason why XML is the choice for the payload. I'm not really buying the argument that it's easier to shoehorn XML into TXT fields rather than have another tag. Either way, in order to implement the proposal the MTA authors will have to do some work, and I don't think there's much to choose between the two...
I still can't really rid myself of the nagging suspicion that the extensibility of an XML-driven anti-spam system plays into the hands of 'embrace and extend' that MS has used successfully since time began...
On the other hand, getting some authentication that it really came from where it says it came from will be very useful. The corollory is that 'owning' a mail server will become a higher priority for the hacker/spammer coalitions. Look for more attacks on MX machines if this becomes widespread...
Next on the agenda - get everyone to use digitally-signed certificates
Simon
Physicists get Hadrons!
Why on earth are they integrating SPF into technology? I mean, it's not like Slashdotians ever go out into the sun or anything...
Laugh! It was a joke!
Because, since XML is not a format (but rather a standardized way of creating one's own formats) the issue of "creating a format" is not solved by the decision to use XML.
What XML "wins" is off-the-shelf parsers; one still needs to write some amount of code to convert dumb XML (elements and attributes and all that crud) into something with semantic meaning to your application.
For a simple application like this it's not clear that the overheads of XML (both in terms of size, computational complexity, and programmer overhead to make the aforementioned conversion) are at all worthwhile.
If spammers have to buy new domains for every couple of thousand spams they face a big problem.
Spam would very quickly cease being a problem if mail clients were configured to start using PGP (GPG) keys and signatures by default. There is no need to re-invent or even change the e-mail RFC's.
Very simply, people can choose whether they want to receive unsigned e-mail, or accept sinatures from unkown keys. We'll eventually start building a web of turst (mistrust), such as, being able to automatically accept a key signed by some people or orgs, and similarly, blacklisting keys.
I could very easily, for example, instruct unknown senders (people who aren't in my contact list yet) to download my public key from a specified location to encryp a message that would bypass my filtes. Only a person who followed the instructions would be able to send me an unsolicited message.
The problem is this. Suppose AOL start adding SPF records to their DNS, saying effectively 'only the following IP addresses are authorized to send @aol.com emails. Suppose also that Hotmail start rejecting emails from SPF domains where the IP addresses don't match. Now suppose that joe@small.biz is going to be away from the office for a couple of weeks, so he gets the small.biz mail server to forward his emails to his hotmail account. At this point anyone from AOL who emails him will find the emails bouncing (although if they're from AOL, this may not be such a bad thing...)
> SPF doesn't block spam unless the mail system makes it mandatory, after all, so until 100% compliance is reached, non-SPF mail will still have to be accepted
This is false. There is no requirement for every domain on the internet to adopt SPF before it becomes useful.
Instead each domain owner decides when to flip the switch on for SPF enforcement for their individual domains. Since 14,000 domain already have valid SPF records and many of them have enabled enforcement, SPF is useful for not accepting worthless spoofed emails TODAY. Not in some far off future.
Prevent email address forgery. Publish SPF records for y
In theory, SPF should make it easier for these people to send E-mail. They can publish a valid SPF record for their domain, which should make mail from their system more trustworthy than mail from dynamic IP space is generally. Ie, the reason people block mail from dynamic IP space is because of the incredible amount of crud coming from trojanned Windows machines in that space.
If a real sender can somehow distinguish themselves via a valid SPF record, they might actually have better luck sending mail than they do now.
The MicroSoft Caller-ID/SPF merger proposals say that SPF records will be honored, so you can publish them without fear of losing support.
So, go ahead and publish SPF records.
MicroSoft supporting SPF records is a really smart move. Last week, I posted results of a survey of 1.3 million email domain names to the IETF MARID mailing list. Now that I'm back from the MARID meeting, I just finished a survey of Caller-ID records. There appears to be about a factor of 500-1000 more domains that have published SPF exclusively than Caller-ID exclusively and only a tiny fraction of the 1.3 million domains have published Caller-ID records. In short, MicroSoft isn't changing to support SPF records because they are better (I think they are), but because it is an acknowledgement that MicroSoft's Caller-ID hasn't caught on.
Meng Weng Wong (the SPF author) and MicroSoft are still discussing how exactly this merger will work on. I personally don't see any reason to support XML right away. MicroSoft has not come out with a single concrete extention that can't be done with SPF already.
I also think that there are alternatives to the complex Caller-ID algorithm and that doesn't require every Ezmlm and other mailing lists to upgrade their software. From the research that I've done (and yes, this is something I have really researched), there appears to be far more mailing lists broken by MS's Caller-ID system than email forwarders broken by SPF.
(I'm the author of libspf-alt and the maintainer of the trusted-forwarder global whitelist. So, now you know why I have researched this stuff so much.)
SPF support for most open source mail servers can be found at libspf2.