Who's Blocking Verified E-Voting?

ClarkEvans writes "The NY Times has a great editorial today calling out the League of Women Voters for their counter-productive lobbying against verified voting. The article states that Diebold voting systems has given lots of dough to these opposition groups." There's an AP story about the issue as well.

Comments

As Joe Stalin said

[Anonymous Coward]

It's not the votes that count, but who counts the votes.

Re:As Joe Stalin said

[jb.hl.com]

Now that's irony: a dictator in a system diametrically opposed to democracy offering a truly insightful comment on how we've fucked up, and being correct about it.

If Communists commenting on democracy are making sense, you know something's screwed up.

Re:As Joe Stalin said

[0x20]

The fact that Stalin was a communist doesn't preclude him from being able to point out the built-in structural faults of capitalist democracies. In fact, he thought enough about their inherent problems that he rejected the system entirely. I'm not defending Stalin, just pointing out that he was not at all ignorant of politics. He was certainly much less so, in fact, than the average U.S. citizen.

Women voters?

[Anonymous Coward]

Since women have gained suffrage in the US, we've seen:

- Prohibition
- The Great Depression
- Nuclear weapons
- The Cuban Missile Crisis
- The assassination of JFK
- The Vietnam War

It's time to stop the madness! Repeal womens' suffrage now!

reminds me...

[flynt]

This reminds me of a group I heard about who set up a booth and handed out stickers encouring and "end to women's suffrage". Apparently plenty of females were in support of this, not knowing what the word meant.

Re:reminds me...

[Throtex]

They did this on The Man Show. Sounds a lot more formal when you just call it "a group" though. :)

Re:reminds me...

[riptide_dot]

It was on the Man Show on Comedy Central. Some of the women who came up to the booth were REALLY outraged too. It was hilarious. Only one of them (that made the edit) actually said "you're trying to end women's rights to vote?!?"

What??

[Anonymous Coward]

"But simply printing out a piece of paper will not, in our opinion, address all the security concerns. People are talking about a simple solution to a complicated issue."

Who says we can't have a simple solution? Printing out a piece of paper most certainly WILL address all of the security concerns. At a stroke it allows voter verification, recounts, and auditing to find both corruption and machine errors.

She's obviously not an engineer. Often, the simplest solutions are best.

Re:What??

[Yaa 101]

the simplest solutions are always the best because the best solutions are always the most simple.

Re:What??

[FirstTimeCaller]

The argument seems to be that the disabled will be unable to verify that their printed receipt will match the intended ballot. This may be true. It may also be true that a certain percentage of (non-disabled) voters will be too lazy to double check their printed receipt. But this is fine.

No one says that each vote must be verified - it is simply sufficient that each vote be verifiable. Since no one knows who will verify their vote and who won't, they can't afford to try and cheat the system. So, unless the implementors of the voting systems know who the disabled voters are (and therefore who's vote they might get away with changing), it's not really a problem.

In my opinion democracy is too precious to trust to an unverifiable voting system.

Re:What??

[crimethinker]

Printing out a piece of paper most certainly WILL address all of the security concerns. At a stroke it allows voter verification, recounts, and auditing to find both corruption and machine errors.

I've hammered on this in several other posts - a receipt which the voter can take out of the polling area opens many doors to new abuses. Imagine the scenario of "show your voting receipt to your union foreman if you ever want another raise in your career." It would never be that obvious, but word would get around. Once there are verifiable voting receipts, your vote can be coerced after the fact.

Voting must be anonymous, even from the voter himself (once he leaves the voting booth). For that reason, no completely electronic solution will ever be acceptable to me, and that's saying something for someone who has more PC's than children (5 vs. 4). I like machines to count the paper ballots, and it would be nice to have a "ballot verifier" in a private booth just before the ballot box, but I want the option to have humans re-count, and if we're only talking about bits, then that option is lost. Think of it as an "off site" backup.

-paul

Re:What??

[TMLink]

What about a printout that you don't keep? The printout happens on a piece of paper that's behind a window where you can see your vote and verify it before leaving the booth.

If there's any questions about the authenticy of the electric versions of the votes coming out, go to the paper trail (that supposedly everyone that used the booth verified by looking at). Or heck, just use the paper version as the official version. It aliviates the hanging chad issue without worrying about any kind of vote verification problems like you mention.

Re:What??

[MenTaLguY]

I think the OP was thinking of receipts that would _not_ be taken from the polling place by voters.

(after all, if they were, wouldn't they be kind of useless for a recount?)

Re:What??

[yakovlev]

You're misuderstanding what the verifiedvoting people seem to advocate. They advocate a piece of paper that the voter verifies BEFORE putting it in the ballot box. The idea is that we have decades of experience securing paper ballots in ballot boxes, so if the voter can verify that their paper ballot is correct, they've verified that their vote is correct.

This is not the same as advocating a receipt that the voter takes home with them and later uses to verify their vote was counted correctly. As you correctly realized, this makes vote coersion possible, and was already realized to be a BAD IDEA. That doesn't keep some people from advocating it anyway.

Re:What??

[chmilar]

It's very simple:

The machine prints a paper receipt.

The machine shows a summary of your vote on its screen, which you can check against your receipt.

You put the receipt into a locked ballot box.

You do not leave with the receipt! In fact, it is illegal to take the receipt away from the polling station. What would be the point of letting you leave with it, anyhow?

In case of a recount, the paper receipts are counted by hand, as the final arbiter.

Random voting stations will count the paper receipts to verify that the electronic counts are accurate.

Re:What??

[JonMartin]

Who says we can't have a simple solution? Printing out a piece of paper most certainly WILL address all of the security concerns. At a stroke it allows voter verification, recounts, and auditing to find both corruption and machine errors.

It can address the concerns, but not necessarily.

First, a quick clarification for a lot of posters: voters will not leave the polling station with their receipt. They are supposed to check it for accuracy and then drop it into a secured box so it is available for recounts and verification of the electronic results.

But when should polling stations do a paper recount? At random, say 1% of stations? Whenever a race is tight? How do they know the thresholds they are setting are sufficient to stop cheating? In an electoral system where a few dozen votes could determine the presidency there are simply too many ways things could go wrong. What guarantee is there that voters will correctly verify their ballots? Remember that the reason people love electronic voting is because paper ballots are "too hard". I see too many ways Diebold could be extremely clever by just flipping a few votes in certain situations to swing things. Think about it. Really thing about it. If you had access to these machines, what are the strategies you might use to influence the results? If you aren't terrified you aren't thinking hard enough (or just plain aren't devious enough).

The fundamental problem is that the votes are obfuscated from the voters. All the paper receipts in the world will not change this. What you type into the machine does not count. What is on the paper does not count. The only thing that counts is the number the box spits out.

The true solution is the simplest. Go back to paper ballots. What is your vote? Whatever you marked on the paper with a pen. No chance of anything changing your vote. Count the ballots by hand, with an observer from each party watching every vote get counted. No chance to drop any votes to swing a close result. Isn't this the true geek way? Ultimate transparency? Many eyeballs making the problem shallow?

This is how we do it in Canada. It's not sexy, it's not instantaneous (takes a few hours after polls close) but it works.

Re:What??

[ChrisMaple]

But when should polling stations do a paper recount?

1. When a legally set threshold is met.

2. At random to keep the system honest.

3. When there is suspicion of fraud and the challenger can convince a court to order a recount.

4. Whenever the results are challenged, provided the challenger pays expenses if he still loses.

I am amazed at the apparent bias of this article.

[Microsift]

The submitter appears to have some issue with the League of Women's Voters, an organization whose only crime is buying the arguments of the groups who have been tainted by Diebold money. If I didn't read the editorial, I would have been under the wrong impression that The League had taken money from Diebold.

What needs to happen...

[Anonymous Coward]

is for some white-hat slashdot reader to go and actually steal an election as proof of concept and then publicize it. Sure he'll probably go to prison for the rest of his life, but he'll become a legend among techies...

take one for the team!

Re:What needs to happen...

[OldAndSlow]

You don't even have to publicize the theft. It can be obvious, like Kerry gets 100% of the vote in GA.

GA is, you will recall, 100% Diebold voting machines. Which is why the loss of Max Cleland is suspecious. Leading in the immediate pre-election polls, but lost the electronic vote.

Interesting Article

[bogie]

Just goes to show that almost no group is above being bribed.

"What's even more troubling is that the group has accepted a $1 million gift for a new training institute from Diebold, the machines' manufacturer, which put the testimonial on its Web site."

The author is right there is no need to choose between "accessible voting and verifiable voting".
Without paper verification evoting has no future here.

Re:I am amazed at the apparent bias of this articl

[ClarkEvans]

I've written the League several times over the last few months. Their stance is not only wrong-headed, but they refuse to listen to their constituency. The NY Times article refers to a group of disabled people, ones who happen to have a great deal of influence with the LWV, who were given foundation monies from Diabold. You cannot pretend that politics is not involved here.

Well...

[TWX]

... if the League of Women Voters is friggin' stupid enough to support a cause that breaks elections, they're working quite well to make people regret granting women suffrage in the first place...

Re:Well...

[thisissilly]

the 130,000 members (less than the number of /. members)...
Good point.
Where is the League of Slashdot Voters? Sure, I contribute to the EFF, but if you could go to your local political candidate and say "I represent 10,000 voters in this state, and over 250,000 nation wide, and we want you to fix the DMCA" or what ever, they might actually take notice.

Re:I am amazed at the apparent bias of this articl

[Politicus]

Agree. This issue does not appear on the LWV's top five voting problems statemnt.

My favorite argument against paper trails is how insanely expensive these machines would become. Really? I didn't know that the corner Kwik-e-Mart had one of these "expensive" machines to print a receipt for my $0.50 pack of gum. As far as I know, all ATM's have paper trails. How is it feasible to record a $20 ATM withdrawal but not a vote for supreme emperor of the earth for 4 years?

unplublished letters to NY Times Editor

[ClarkEvans]

-----
Date: Fri, 7 May 2004 19:41:29 -0400
To: letters@nytimes.com
Subject: Secure Voting Techology

May 3rd's article "Who Hacked the Voting System?" begs the question:
why must these complicated voting systems be all encompassing?

Imagine a process where selecting candidates and tallying choices is
distinct. The voter enters a booth, uses a complicated touch-screen
machine, and emerges with a human-readable card clearly stating
their candidate. Then, the voter walks over to a brightly lit
election desk, feeds this card into the tallying machine, and
deposits their card into the ballot box.

Security is straight-forward. Voters will tell you when a
touch-screen system make an error. This leaves the tallying machine
to secure. Luckily, it is in plain sight and its operation is
simple. Further, if the tally is questioned, some or all of the
ballots can be reviewed by human eyes.

Candidate selecting technology is complicated. Card tallying ain't.
Let's keep them separate.

-----
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 11:19:17 -0400
To: letters@nytimes.com
Subject: Demand Grows to Require Paper Trails for Electronic Votes

In the article Demand Grows to Require Paper Trails for Electronic
Voting, published May 23, 2004, Doug Chapin from the Pew Charitable
Trust said: "You can either build a fence around a cliff or put an
ambulance in the valley ... The paper trail is the ambulance in the
valley. Certifying the machines and testing them in the first place to
make sure they are secure is the fence around the cliff."

I think Mr. Chapin's analogy is poor, it is not an either/or, one would
properly do both. However, if he insists with this analogy, I suggest
Verified Voting is more analogous with the ability to ensure that the
fence around the cliff is actually working. The only way to detect that
a voting technology reflects voter intent is to complement touch screens
with a simple print-out listing the canidates the voter has chosen. Then
the voter can review their choices and stuff this print-out into the
ballot box so random or challenge recounts can happen. Lacking this
ability to verify voter intent, we are left with only one way to ensure
that our democracy is working -- trust a for-profit corporation.

-------
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2004 10:09:04 -0400
To: letters@nytimes.com
Subject: The Disability Lobby and Voting

I am so happy to see the NY Times call-out the League of Weoman Voters
for their counter-productive stand; also, I can't believe that despite
my calls, Senator Dodd has joined this nonsense.

An optical scan solution can offer the best of both worlds. A
disabled-persons friendly touch screen or audio-system can be used to
generate the ballot; while the actual counting of the optical ballots
can be done with a much simpler optical reader.

By breaking the problem of filling-out and counting ballots, we get the
best of both worlds; the intermediate ballot provides the paper trail.
It is also easier to test optical scanners for compliance -- there is
less code to review, and deterministic inputs/outputs allow testing to
be automated. Further, since only one optical scanner is needed per
district, and can be closely monitored. Let user-friendly voting
machines thrive, but make sure they don't do the counting.

Re:Reality check

[srleffler]

You've missed the point. Even if the machine displayed your vote on the screen to "verify" which candidate you voted for, how do you know that the vote it records on its hard drive is the same? More importantly, how do the elections officials verify that the votes they receive electronically haven't been tampered with? There is no permanent audit trail of any kind (AFAIK) with many of the new voting machines.

The nice thing with a paper ballot or vote record is that the voter can verify that their vote has been recorded correctly and we know how to secure those ballots to prevent tampering so that if there is a need for a recount it can be done.

Unfair election aspect #3 - Equal coverage

[Seth Cohn]

Two obvious requirements for a fair election are that voters should have complete confidence about their ballots' being counted accurately and that everyone, including the disabled, should have access to the polls.

There is a third requirement for fair elections, and that is balanced coverage. Forget the liberal bias, or the conservative bias, the truth in the US is that there is a 2 party bias. 3rd parties are ignored, and given short coverage in the guide of 'to be fair'.... In Europe, 3rd parties quickly gain recognition due to the mix of ballot variety (lots of parties to consider), election style (more representive focused) and the coverage they get. Here in the US, if you aren't a Republicrat, or a Demopublican, you have to fight for coverage. People with a true shot, ie enough ballots that they could win, or will likely affect the course of the election should be coveraged with EQUAL access .(No nonsense like 5% of a poll, because without coverage in the first place, you can't get 5% of a poll... and if they did cover you, odds are you WOULD get 5% or more.)

I'm voting for Michael Badnarik Libertarian, who is also on almost all of the ballots
and so should you, if you think Government is out of control. Kush and Berry won't change that, and you're just voting for the lesser of 2 evils.

Vote for Good, vote Badnarik!

The real problem with Diebold

[SteroidMan]

The real problem with Diebold isn't the lack of a paper trail. It's that the machines can and are being changed after being certified as reliable. A machine that gives you a paper receipt of your vote isn't worth a damn if someone can hack the smartcard that records the votes to log something else after the certification is complete.

Why, exactly?

[randyest]

Two obvious requirements for a fair election are that voters should have complete confidence about their ballots' being counted accurately and that everyone, including the disabled, should have access to the polls. It is hard to imagine advocates for those two goals fighting, but lately that seems to be what's happening.

Yes, indeed. And even after reading every linked article I still don't understand how, exactly, that requiring paper trails for electronic voting machines could in any way impede equal access to polls (for the disabled or anyone.) A little help here -- please?

The issue is whether electronic voting machines should provide a "paper trail" -- receipts that could be checked by voters and used in recounts. There has been a rising demand around the country for this critical safeguard, but the move to provide paper trails is being fought by a handful of influential advocates for the disabled, who complain that requiring verifiable paper records will slow the adoption of accessible electronic voting machines.

OK, here's a stab at it -- "requiring verifiable paper records will slow the adoption of accessible electronic voting machines." But, er, why would it slow anything? And, if it does, can't we just use the "old way" (traditional polls) until the "new way" (electronic polls) is made more reliable and secure? I'll try again:

Leaders said paperless terminals, which about 30 percent of the electorate will use in the November election, were reliable.

Er, OK, but this is both tangential and arguable. I still don't see how requiring verifyable paper trails impedes anyone's access to the polls.

They had "no reason to believe" computer terminals would "steal your vote," the league said officially.

Well, there is some reason to believe that they'll make a mistake or be susceptible to fraud. See linked articles. Again, why do paper trails impede the disabled from voting? I'f I'm in the League of Women voters, it seems that, not only am I not going to get a straight answer to that, but I must support the position publicly (or at least not oppose it) -- yikes!:

League bylaws stipulate that local chapters must act "in conformity" with the national organization's stances. Individuals who take contrary positions cannot identify themselves publicly as league members.

League president Kay Maxwell says paperless computers, which can be equipped with headsets and programmed in multiple languages, make voting easier for the blind and illiterate, and for people who don't speak English.

OK, most computers are "paperless." Generally, it's the printers that have the paper in them. And, in my experience, most (all?) computers may have a printer connected without much trouble. Kay seems to imply that connecting a printer will break headset or multilanguage support -- wha? I'm still confused.

Furthermore, she said, demanding a paper trail so close to the presidential election would require hundreds of counties that have installed electronic systems to spend millions of dollars on printers, paper and technical upgrades at the last minute.

Well, I guess they should have done a little more due dilligence before sinking time and money into an insecure voting system. Why should we all have to pay for that stupidity?

For current members, Maxwell said, voter registration problems and dismal turnout -- particularly among minorities -- should be bigger worries than potential hackers.

These aims are not opposing -- it's possible to address security without impeding the ability of minorities to vote. I can't even see how the issues are related. Sounds like smoke and mirrors to misdirect attention away from the payola they're taking in from Diebold. Sad, really.

"From a voting rights perspective, we care a great deal about the openness of the system and access to the system, tha

Point by Point Rebuttal -- No Response

[ClarkEvans]

I'm a software developer with close to 20
years of experience. I was pointed to your position paper on VVPT.
Please accept my comments on your position paper.


Electronic Voting Machines and Voter-Verified Paper Trails (VVPT)
League of Women Voters
http://www.lwv.org/join/electionshava_dre- vvpt.htm l
The League of Women Voters strongly supports full and equal
voting rights for all eligible Americans, including persons with disabilities. The League also supports voter verification of ballots, including the requirement in the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) whereby the voter verifies the ballot before it is cast and counted. However, the League does not support proposals for a new requirement for paper-based voter verification - the voter-verified paper trail (VVPT) system that would require Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines to provide an individual paper confirmation for each ballot for each voter to verify.

A VVPT requirement undermines voting access for people with disabilities or limited English proficiency, raises costs, fails to guarantee security, unnecessarily complicates the voting process, undermines federal certification standards, and slows the replacement of outdated voting machines.


To be clear, VVPT would require DRE equipment to print out a physical paper receipt that the voter could review and then stuff in the ballot box. These printed ballots would then be the official record of the election.

These printed ballots would:

- be printed out when the user has completed selecting all
of their choices via the DRE's touch screen interface

- would only print out the individuals selected, and thus
is very simple to understand and uncluttered

- would be printed in the language used by the DRM machine,
cross-language support on paper is quite easy

- be in large font for reading impaired and could be handed
to an election worker to read for those who are blind

- would have an encoded version of the votes via a bar-code to
make scanning in the votes for semi-automated recounts easy

- would be printed on card stock using your average laser
or inket printer; thermal paper does not last long enough

To be more concrete about this, and to make it absolutely clear what
we are discussing, there is an open source application [1] with an
on-line demo [2] that produces this sort of printed receipt [3]. Be
advised that the user interface for making the selections is not
important to this discussion, the only thing that is salient is the
final receipt printed.

[1] http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/
[2] http://gyaku.pair.com/~vote/ballot2.html
[3] http://clarkevans.com/tmp/ballot-receipt.pdf

With this background, let me address your specific concerns. Before
you continue with this statements, I ask you to download the
referenced PDF file above and print this so that you can see exactly
what is being requested by the VVPT community.

* The voter-verified paper trail requirement undermines voting access. DREs make it possible, for the first time, for persons with visual disabilities or limited manual dexterity to cast secret and independent ballots.


The VVPT does not replace DREs. People would still use touch screens
to make their choices. The printed 'receipt' would be in the
individual's language and printed in a large enough font so that it is
absolutely clear.

Because DREs can be programmed in multiple languages, voters with limited English proficiency can participate fully and equally. The millions of Americans who face literacy challenges also can take advantage of the audio features of DREs to cast independent votes without embarrassment.


There is no reason why the printed receipt cannot print out results in
the voter's choice of language. During an official manual recount, it
wou

Re:womEn?

[Anonymous Coward]

The League took a vote to make the change you suggested. Unfortunately, they used a Diebold voting machine, and the results were:

153% Nay
-12% Yea

VOTE WITH PAPER

[brunes69]

I honestly don't understand the concept behind this e-voting. Why do Americans think that voting constantly needs to be mechanized? First, the goofy mechanical lever system. Then the goofy punch cards. now the goofy computers. And all in all none of it ends up ever being any cheaper or faster than just filling out paper ballots by marking an X.

Now everyone is talking about printing out a paper receipt for recounts etc. So now we are using at least as much paper as paper votes.

You *know* the first time these machines are used in any contested election, one of the parties will cry foul. And there will be a recount. Which will take just as much time with paper votes.

So why the *hell* not just use paper votes in the first place? Empty boxes, you mark an X. We have been doing this in Canada forever, and we are still doing it this year. Why? Cause it is cheap, and it works. There's no hanging chaffes, no computer error, no security issues, it's totally transparent to the public.

Computers untrustworthy?

[Anonymous Coward]

All of our money, nuclear power, nuclear weapons monitoring and management, life support systems, transport systems, airliners etc are managed by computers, yet apparently they are not up to the task of incrementing a counter for a name.

we're screwed

[mabu]

If Diebold machines get in the 2004 primary election, we're all screwed if we're not voting for Bush. Think about it.

If by some chance, Kerry wins the election, I predict all our critiques and cynacism will end up being used against us, as the mainstream media will suddenly ressurrect the Diebold story and use it as fodder to throw the whole election process into question, and likely land it back on the steps of the supreme court. I know that sounds like a ridulous assertion, but so was what happened last election.

With no paper trail to verify, and the media going apeshit because Bush has been dethroned, it wouldn't be unrealistic to have yet another major election up in the air.

I don't understand why ppl oppose a paper trail

[Anonymous Coward]

The first thing I can think of, is if for example, they did away with providing a receipt for credit card transactions. Maybe a lot of companies would only deduct the correct amount but what would you do if someone over charged your account and pocketed the difference? You would probably not realize the error until after you received your bank statement and then disputing the issue would be more difficult without you being able to produce documentation to support your claim that there is an error.

It's so boneheaded and stupid I can't believe it is a subject to be argued over. Unbelievable.

I did that last time, but not this time...

[raehl]

Last time I voted for Nader. Not because I really wanted to vote for Nader, but because I wanted to vote for the viability of a third party.

But, now I know just how evil Bush is, so voting for a third party will just have to wait until 2008. Right now it's more important to make sure we're not down to one party by the time 2008 rolls around.

Re:saves time and effort; should be more accurate

[JonMartin]

With electronic voting, you should (in theory) get more accurate results, in less time, using fewer people. The paper verification means that if there is a dispute and a recount is called for, the option is available. However, you don't have to front that level of expenditure everywhere. It's much more efficient.

Why is it so damn important that results be known RIGHT NOW? Less than half the people in your country vote, and therefore don't care. For those that do your TV networks are projecting winners the second polls close. Up here we know the results before we go to bed. By morning most of the counts are official. Within days MPs are being sworn in.

Why is efficiency even an issue? I care about efficiency when I order a pizza. I care about efficiency when I buy a car. For one night every four years (or so) efficiency can go to hell. When deciding who will be governing me and my country I want accuracy.

It's worth noting that in their national elections in 2000, Canada had 21 million voters and the US had 105 million. You can see why the US might be a little more obsessed with the cost and speed elements.

Ah yes, the old "That won't work here, we're special" argument.

Yes, you have an order of magnitude more voters. But that also means that you have an order of magnitude more polling stations and volunteers to count votes. In terms of voting there is no fundamental difference between a Canadian city of 1 million people and an American city of 1 million people. The fact that you have 10 times as many of those cities is irrelevant to this problem.

Re:Jeez.

[Dr. Spork]

Yeah, I agree. This is ugly. I just wrote the following angry message in the feedback box on their contacts form. I hope they write back.

I thought I was someone who would automatically support your causes you champion until I read the NYTimes editorial about your inexplicable support for paperless Diebold voting machines, and your willingness to take bribes for the disenfranchisement of women.

Surely you are aware that you are in the pocket of a sleazy company which is itself in the pocket of the Bush administration, and both will do their best to see to it that women die rather than receive an abortion or govenment support in raising children.

To lobby for a fundamentally corrupt and opaque voting system puts you at odds with those who spent their lives fighting to give women political representation. You are voluntarily laying it down.

If you have abandoned your fight for the fairness of our democracy, there is no need for your organization to continue. And if the soulless corpse of your PAC attaches like a leech to the belly of Diebold, you owe it to women to change your name to something which better describes your current motivations, something with the word "WHORES".

E-voting for the public

[quantaman]

This just seems to be part of a larger problem of people unfamiliar with computers just not getting the issue so I've constructed what I think is a pretty good metaphor of the problem.

There's this company, called Diebold, and their employees are fast counters, really fast, so fast they can count all the votes in an election almost instantaneously. The problem is they need a warehouse to do the counting in.

So at all the voting stations they build themselves a warehouse. An election official come in a few months before the election and look around, lots of boxes are around, a whole bunch of different gadgets, the officials can't look over everything but it seems alright. The official remindes Diebold it's against the law to touch anything or let anyone inside before election time for security reasons. A couple days later the Diebold employee in charge goes back inside, he moves some things around and is seen driving up in moving trucks and taking boxes in and out but the election official doesn't see. One day when the Diebold employee isn't at the warehouse a guy is walking down the street and notices a door wide open, he wanders in and finds himself in the warehouse. He decides to take some pictures, windows are left open, most of the doors are unlocked or just have a piece of rope to tie them shut and their security alarm is a mute poodle. This guy shows the pictures around, security companies everywhere are just appaled, they can't believe how bad security is and are screaming it's way too unsecure to hold votes in but the government and Diebold ignore them.

So election time comes around and you have to vote. You go to the lobby at the front of the warehouse and go into your booth. There you mark your ballot as usual (except they have really nice ballots and pencils). Then instead of putting it in a box you go and give it to a person standing behnid the counter, it's supposed to be an elections official but it could also be a guy who snuck in off the street. Your ballot is out of sight for a minute as he carries it over and hands it to the Diebold employee, the Diebold employee then tells you he'll put the ballot in a box and he'll count it at the end with the others. He then goes into the warehouse and that's the last you, or anybody else but the Diebold employee, see of your ballot. After the election the Diebold employee comes out and tells everyone what he counted and who won the election, it not who most people expected and a couple people ask for a recount but the Diebold employee says that he threw out the ballots as he counted them so you just have to take his word for it. A couple of people ask why they didn't just put a photocopier and a traditional ballot box in the lobby where everyone could see it and no one could tamper with it. After marking your first ballot you would be be able to make exactly one copy of it, you could then put the second ballot in that ballot box and at the end if they wanted a recount they could just count the ballots in the traditional box. The Diebold employee (who lost a bunch of the ballots before counting them) says that his counting is good enough and that the old ballot box couldn't be trusted. Oh yeah, that Diebold employee was also campaigning for the guy who won.

Please feel free to redistribute this or give me any suggestions you might have on how to make it better. I've tried to be as factual as possible (not sure about leaving the upset in there).

I hesitate to be so sexist...

[localman]

...but nearly every guy I know would ask "what the hell does that mean" before getting too worried about it. However I've noted that a fair number of my intelligent female friends are quicker to act like they know what something means when they don't.

It's not that women are less knowledgable, but they're less likely to admit it, and risk looking stupid. Sad thing is that it usually backfires as there's few things stupider looking than being highly confident in one's ignorance.

I figure women do this is because of all the pressure for an intelligent woman to prove she's not ignorant. But really the smartest people are quick to ask questions and admit when they don't know something. How else would they learn so much?

Kinda sad that it works out that way.

Cheers.

What makes electronic voting less secure??

[Quantum Jim]

People act as if this issue (and, for that matter every other issue) has a clear solution. As if any reasonable or intelligent person can't debate the causes of the problem and the proposed solution! This is kinda arrogant. Most issues in politics are very complicated; simplifying them usually only helps the politicians and does not make a simple solution more desirable.

For instance, I wonder how many of those paper receipts could be dusted for fingerprints. Wouldn't that make it easier to figure out who voted for whom? Is it easier or harder to backtrack the voters than traditional paper ballots? And what about all those methods for electronic security. What makes a computerized voting system easier to fraud? If I wanted to fix a traditional election, all I'd do is replace ballot box with an identical one with my votes. Digital results can be harder to fake (md5 sums, multiple copies transported, and even quantum encryption could identify interception of the results by a third party).

Really, what's the difference between not knowing how a computer stores its information verses ignorance of how a box of ballots are handled? They both are vulnerable.