IIALP - Abuse Logging Protocol
George Davey sent us a press release about abuselog.org, a site for the development of a generalized protocol for logging internet annoyances and abuses to a set of central servers, which could then be queried to find out which IPs are luserish.
There's some form of verification.
In and of itself, this could be very easily abused by, say, people with a grudge who want to essentially get someone else an internet death penalty.
By summer it was all gone...now shesmovedon. --
so what about all the people out there who get their ip from a DHCP server. Someone can be abusive and then within a given time have a new ip and some poor old grandma is now with this lusers old ip is flagged as an internet mischief.
There are too many 'incidents exchange', 'intrusion detection', 'log', 'firewall log' standards to count. Many of them IETF drafts. IDMF has a little bit of traction. There is one format the music industry came out with to ease notifications of ISPs....
/dev/null.
Do we need yet another "standard", or do we just need ISPs that are actually reading/handling any kind of abuse notice. Some are great about this, but others just route them to
---- join dshield.org Distributed Intrusion Detec
I'm browsing the RFC, and it sounds like they're planning on having people's firewalls spit out IIALP messages in response to port scans, etc. In my opinion, this is a really bad idea! Worm activity, someone running a stupid automated scan against an entire class A (whoooops!) by mistake, or a port scan trying to locate a particular machine whose ip has changed (which I have had to do), etc need to be differentiated from actual malicious activities. I can see this being used by overzealous admins to try to drop ALL traffic at the firewall level from anyone *ever* who gets a complaint propagated to them via this. Also, does anyone really expect their STUPID!@!!@ .log TLD proposal to be accepted?!??!! Jeez, everyone knows that this will never go through. Why do people insist on changing DNS, creating namespace pollution or breaking some other protocol (SMTP for a lot of spam "spolutins") for every problem facing the net!
Having just skimmed the draft, there's a fatal flaw with this solution. To quote:
However, they don't seem to address the idea that one person controlling a million drones that send spam today... can control a million drones that submit IIALP reports about, say, cnn.com tomorrow, resulting in an DOS from all the sites that block based on the IIALP lists. They rely upon the reports of end-users, but do not take into account the fact that massive volumes of "end-user" machines are compromised and usable as drones for whatever nefarious uses their 0wner wants.
In short, their anti-spoof assumes individual malicious user endpoint hosts. If the malicious users on the Internet were limited to individual endpoint hosts, we wouldn't need solutions like IIALP!