Joseph_Daniel_Zukige writes
"I'm still trying to figure out who is doing what here. It looks like the typical bureaucratic mess, but it looks like NIST, operating under the Help America Vote Act has set up a Technical Guidelines Development Committee to advise the 'independent bipartisan' United States Election Assistance Commission. So, the TGDC is going to hold some public hearings, and they've invited members of the public to help them out: 'One hour will be reserved at the conclusion of each day for members of the public to provide up to five minutes of testimony.'" Read more below, including how to register (today is the deadline) for the meetings, which will take place in central Maryland later this month.
Update: 09/15 18:04 GMT by
T : Irvu writes
"You can submit online comments to NIST's Technical Guidelines process. The link is here. Just click on the link marked 'Submit Comments or Position Statements.' Alternately you can e-mail your comments to vote@nist.gov."
Joseph_Daniel_Zukige continues "I can't make it. (Very long drive across a very deep ocean, or plane tickets I can't afford.) Twelve people per session is not going to allow a lot of people to testify. I'm sure Microsoft has someone going to sell a MSWxx based voting machine. I hope somebody from the EFF is going. Think it would be possible to pack this thing with enough Slashdot geeks to convince the government at least that electronic voting absolutely requires a human-readable ballot to be produced?" The meetings are taking place on the 20th through 22nd of this month; you have only until 5 p.m. today to register, though.
From the linked PDF: "The meetings will be held at the National Institute of Standards and Technology North Campus, 820 West Diamond Avenue, Room 152, Gaithersburg, MD."
then yes, usability and human factor issues are paramount, if a colour of an alert box can sway the vote by a percent, then we need to be careful.
#hostfile 0.0.0.0 primidi.com 0.0.0.0 www.primidi.com 0.0.0.0 radio.weblogs.com
The only election equipment I want to see are the sheet of paper theballot is printed on and a pen.
Canada gets it's paper ballots counted extremely fast. They need to hire some election consulatants from Canada and find out how they process paper ballots so quickly, and follow their recommendations.
I think that this box should accept the ballot kinda like a vending machine accepts a dollar bill. This way both the touchscreen system and the ballot box will keep a tally, if the results are different then the poll workers will 'flag' those results and note the difference for that race. If a recount is done then what's in the hopper of the ballot box would be considered offical.
The grass is only greener, if you don't take care of your own lawn.
Really folks, this isn't so hard.
All you need to do is have the voter machine print the voter's response on a cash-register-type tape roll that is visible under glass (but not accessable - so as to prevent the kind of dirty tricks that Bejing is putting on Hong Kong's pro-democracy advocates). That way you have a hard, difficult to falsify record of every voter's preference.
The software to do this is almost immaterial, but the source code needs to be accessable to anyone for review.
Yes, I think a voting recipt that the voter leaves with is a silly idea. However, I would be in favor of some kind of window that lets the voter see the paper copy as it's printed out. I mean, what if someone tampered with the code in such a way that you could vote for candidate A, it would get counted for candidate B, and the printout said you voted for candidate B?
So, not only should there be a paper trail, but the voters should be able to visually confirm that the printout was correct.
Why would the paper ballots be destroyed? Isn't that a risk in all elections up until recently?
How is printing a paper ballot a risk to the secrecy of the vote, any moreso than it is now?
How is printing a receipt with a checksum of some random token (user-generated passphrase, some unique identifier of the user, etc.) + their vote choices, and allowing the user to keep that receipt a vulnerability? By "checksum" I mean a cryptographically secure hash like SHA1. Maybe you could reverse it with NSA hardware, but doing it for any reasonably large set of data would take billions of years.
However, I digress.
Electronic voting does not encourage more people to vote, they still have to get off their backsides and go to a polling station regardless of whether they are greeted by a CRT or a pencil and paper. This idea that electronic voting is better for democracy is nothing but a myth.
Drill baby drill - on Mars