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California Bans Paperless Voting -- For 2006
bizpile writes "Gov. Schwarzenegger signed a law requiring that all electronic voting machines produce paper records of every ballot cast. Under the bill, signed Monday, voters will not be able to touch or keep the records. Instead, election officials will put them in locked boxes if a recount is needed. Legislators in nearly two dozen states have introduced similar bills and New Hampshire, Illinois and Oregon already have laws requiring paper backups. However, those states have few, if any, touch-screen voting terminals. The law goes into effect in 2006. Now if they could just figure what to do this election."
The complete bill text is available at: http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb _1438_bill_20040827_enrolled.html
Before going into the effects, let's talk about how recounts work:
There is already a California law mandating a 1% random "spot check" manual recount post-election. So that's one way.
Two, elections officials can do more recounting at their own discretion if they "smell a rat". It's not very common.
Three, the loser of a race can ask for a manual recount. If they STILL lose, they pay the cost of the recount.
There are reform proposals out there to increase the amount of post-election recount to somewhere between 3% and 5% and second, rather than random recounts, let party officials or candidates each offer "recount THESE precincts!" suggestions. They're more likely to know "where the bodies might be buried" if there's been cheating.
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The voter can't be allowed to prove later how they voted. That'll lead to threats if they "don't vote right" from union bosses, corporate bosses or whatever, or vote selling. Most proposals call for printing "under glass" so you can see the paper, you can hit a "cancel button" if it's not right, or you can approve it.
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Existing law says that the "will of the voter" is what really matters, and must be what post-election recounts are looking for. Therefore, while this bill (SB1438) doesn't specifically say that the paper trail is the "final ballot of record", that IS how they'll be treated if there's a discrepancy between the paper record and the electronic record.
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What this REALLY produces is a "voter verified paper trail" (VVPT). The bill uses the term "voter verified paper audit trail", but then *defines* that term explicitly:
"19251(c) "Voter verified paper audit trail" means a component of a direct recording electronic voting system that prints a contemporaneous paper record copy of each electronic ballot and allows each voter to confirm his or her selections before the voter casts his or her ballot."
It works as written, but we dodged a bullet here.
"Voter verified paper audit trail" is a term used by proponents of a "crypto audit trail" that does NOT allow the voter to confirm each individual selection at the polling place. Votehere and others have been promoting these "all crypto solutions" where the voter gets a "number" and can then confirm that their vote was recorded, but not what they voted for. Votehere is saying that the "background crypto" would form "proof" that the vote was recorded properly, and Diebold has been quietly promoting this as an alternative to a true VVPT.
Crypto is fine, but only if the basic code around it is "known honest". Diebold for one is doing "known DIShonest" code.
So thank the diety of your choice that the phrase "allows each voter to confirm his or her selections" is present in SB1438. We can do crypto ON TOP of a VVPT system but under SB1438, NOT in place of a VVPT.
Jim March
Member, Board of Directors, Black Box Voting (www.blackboxvoting.org)
The complete bill text is available at:
/ sb _1438_bill_20040827_enrolled.html
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450
Before going into the effects, let's talk about how recounts work:
There is already a California law mandating a 1% random "spot check" manual recount post-election. So that's one way.
Two, elections officials can do more recounting at their own discretion if they "smell a rat". It's not very common.
Three, the loser of a race can ask for a manual recount. If they STILL lose, they pay the cost of the recount.
There are reform proposals out there to increase the amount of post-election recount to somewhere between 3% and 5% and second, rather than random recounts, let party officials or candidates each offer "recount THESE precincts!" suggestions. They're more likely to know "where the bodies might be buried" if there's been cheating.
-------------
The voter can't be allowed to prove later how they voted. That'll lead to threats if they "don't vote right" from union bosses, corporate bosses or whatever, or vote selling. Most proposals call for printing "under glass" so you can see the paper, you can hit a "cancel button" if it's not right, or you can approve it.
------------
Existing law says that the "will of the voter" is what really matters, and must be what post-election recounts are looking for. Therefore, while this bill (SB1438) doesn't specifically say that the paper trail is the "final ballot of record", that IS how they'll be treated if there's a discrepancy between the paper record and the electronic record.
------------
What this REALLY produces is a "voter verified paper trail" (VVPT). The bill uses the term "voter verified paper audit trail", but then *defines* that term explicitly:
"19251(c) "Voter verified paper audit trail" means a component of a direct recording electronic voting system that prints a contemporaneous paper record copy of each electronic ballot and allows each voter to confirm his or her selections before the voter casts his or her ballot."
It works as written, but we dodged a bullet here.
"Voter verified paper audit trail" is a term used by proponents of a "crypto audit trail" that does NOT allow the voter to confirm each individual selection at the polling place. Votehere and others have been promoting these "all crypto solutions" where the voter gets a "number" and can then confirm that their vote was recorded, but not what they voted for. Votehere is saying that the "background crypto" would form "proof" that the vote was recorded properly, and Diebold has been quietly promoting this as an alternative to a true VVPT.
Crypto is fine, but only if the basic code around it is "known honest". Diebold for one is doing "known DIShonest" code.
So thank the diety of your choice that the phrase "allows each voter to confirm his or her selections" is present in SB1438. We can do crypto ON TOP of a VVPT system but under SB1438, NOT in place of a VVPT.
Jim March
Member, Board of Directors, Black Box Voting (www.blackboxvoting.org)
Because Oregon only does vote-by-mail. It's all 'fill-in-the-bubble' optically read forms, mailed in to the elections office. There are *NO* traditional polling places in Oregon any more. Since all the ballots have to be mailed in (or, for those who want to save on postage, dropped off at the elections offices or at special 'drop boxes' placed around towns in the week leading up to election day,) there is obviously a paper trail. There is always the paper receipt of every vote.
Another non-functioning site was "uncertainty.microsoft.com."
The purpose of that site was not known.
No, Oregon doesn't.
All voting in Oregon is via mail. There are no voting booths or voting machines of any kind.
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Sorry, I believe your information on NH is incorrect also. What goes on in NH with electronic voting machines (they print a filled-out ballot which is then optical-scanned like any other ballot) is policy due to the intervention of the Asst Secretary of State, not law.
I'm running for State Representative in NH and safe electronic voting is one of my core issues. See www.ThatTallGuy.net.
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ThatTallGuy