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Researchers And Registrars Debate E-Voting
Paper Trail writes "There's a fascinating discussion going on right now over at SiliconValley.com.
A group of computer scientists, journalists, voting activists, and county registrars are discussing the e-voting mess in an online forum that runs all this week. The panel is a who's who of e-voting: Avi Rubin, David Dill, David Jefferson, and registrars from San Bernadino and Riverside, CA. They've even got Scott Ritchie from the Open Vote Foundation. The question they're hoping to answer: "What's your assessment of the risks related to the use of electronic voting machines -- in the areas of verifiable voting, errors, recounts and manipulation -- not in the computer lab, but in a real-world setting? And how do those risks compare with current voting systems and other low-tech options?""
Would somebody please tell me what exactly is wrong with the lever operated mechanical machines still largely used in my state (New York)? The machines are sealed and verified by comparing counter numbers that are tamper-obvious. At the end of the voting day the machine is sealed by the poll workers who write the numbers down and send them to the Board of Elections, who later collects the machine itself.
They are next to impossible to tamper with (it would be glaringly obvious), they work if the electric fails (try that with your touch screen), they keep voters from overvoting just as effectively as a touchscreen does and at the end of the day they can be tallied in a few minutes. What is so wrong with the concept behind these machines that we need to all rush out and buy touchscreen systems? What advantage does a touchscreen offer? It is a closed-source solution that's infinitely easier to rig then a mechanical counting system.
Isn't this one case where we don't need to reinvent the wheel people?
I want peace on earth and goodwill toward man.
We are the United States Government! We don't do that sort of thing.
Has anyone forgotten what happened in Florida? Granted that recount was a great big cluster, but what happens if the data is lost? No paper copy means no recount...everyone would have to vote again, and that could mean changed votes, fewer votes, etc. If it ain't broke......
Yes, let's replace something that's comparitively cheap and simple with something that's expensive and complex.
That's always a recipe for success.
Flamebait?! Holy crap, who is modding this? While his comment may be a bit frothing, the link is frigging amazing.
Voting from a PC at home is a bad idea because it unfairly gives people with money a chance to vote easier than without.
I guess this is obvious, but had to be said.
Even if the worst FUD claims of the anti electronic voting crowd are true electronic voting is no more vulnerable to tampering than paper ballot voting.
Wrong. In most states there are multiple eyes on every ballot from the moment they're taken out of the box until they're counted and sealed. An all-electronic vote is not usually reviewed by multiple people. That's why in test runs thousands of fake extra votes are able to be counted. If every electronic vote was scrutinized the same as paper then they'd be roughly equally vulnerable, but they're not and probably never will be.
Developers: We can use your help.
Any layman can look over the shoulder of anybody doing anything with the current system, and know at a glance whether the work is being performed correctly.
I have a degree in computer science, and I can't look at an electronic voting system and see that it is working in the correct manner.
This is why I don't think electronic voting systems can ever replace a manual system.
Our county uses optical scan ballots, and they work fine. They are fast to count. There is a physical backup that can be hand counted if need be. They require no fancy equipment and the polling place. And, if you can't figure out how to mark them correctly, you really are too stupid to have your vote counted.
I am totally at a loss to understand this rush to some sort of electronic voting. I regard voting as the one, true sacrament of citizenship. I have no problem with it taking a little bit of time. After lying to pollsters for months, the ritual of going into the booth and casting my secret ballot is very satisfying.
Remember, voters are citizens; all others are residents.
Some mornings it's hardly worth chewing through the restraints to get out of bed.
Even if the worst FUD claims of the anti electronic voting crowd are true electronic voting is no more vulnerable to tampering than paper ballot voting.
That is simply not true. With paper ballot voting the only people who can tamper with the ballots are the election officials, and members of all interested parties, observe the voting and tallying process. With some of these poorly implemented systems, anyone with internet access or access to the voting machine (any voter) could potentially hack and tamper with the voting results. This is not a theoretical concern either - there are proven vulnerabilities with these systems.
The lesser reason why your statement is incorrect is that with paper ballots, if fraud is suspected, you can at least go back and do some post mortem analysis of the election - recount the existing ballots, make sure that the number of people who signed in at a voting location is consistent with the number of existing ballots. With most of these electronic voting systems this is currently not an option (although it could be).
These complaints are not FUD, by any stretch of the imagination.
How is providing a list of stories concerning voter registration fraud moderated as flamebait? Moderation is screwed.
"I've voted touchscreen twice and it was great, "
:)
Playing devils advocate: I could write an easter egg into the software, so that when I come along to the voting booth, I tap my finger on the screen in a few special unmarked places, and that machine then favours my chosen candidate.
Tell a few of my friends and we could easily do that with all the machines in a swing state.
The pre-checks wouldn't pick it up, the random machines taken out for testing wouldn't show the problem (because I wouldn't be activating my easter egg on those machines).
Whoever writes the voting software controls the election without the paper trail.
Its fine to make unauditable voting machines, just as long as I'm writing the software.
It's not frothing. These are people actively trying to stop democracy.
It's a very selective list. That might be grounds for considering it to be flamebait.
Mea navis aericumbens anguillis abundat
electronic voting is no more vulnerable to tampering than paper ballot voting
Please explain to me in detail how one person, exerting no more effort than is necessary to write a line or two of code, could alter several thousand (or million!) paper ballots at once.
The correlation between ignorance of statistics and using "correlation is not causation" as an argument is close to 1.
I think the best solution to the electronic trail is to simply have your e-voting machines two things:
When you're done voting, the record is added to the database. And the computer spits out two copies of the voting record:
One copy goes to the voter, with an outline of how he/she voted.
Another stays with the computer and is used to verify the e-voting tallies if neccessary.
Both printouts are bar coded and have a user/id pin combo that the voter can, after the election verify that his/her vote has been tallied as intended.
This way you get both a paper and electronic audit, and the voter is assured his/vote is counted as intended.