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Gmail Begins Signing Email with DomainKeys

NW writes "According to a post at IETF's MAIL-SIG list, Google has begun to sign outgoing email from Gmail with Yahoo's DomainKeys signatures. This is the first large provider of email that is actually doing so (not even Yahoo has started that yet)."

8 of 416 comments (clear)

  1. Header Example by trawg · · Score: 5, Informative

    For those (like me) that have no idea what this would actually look like, here's the DomainKey header from an email I just sent myself from GMail:

    DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws;
    s=beta; d=gmail.com; h=received:message-id:date:from:reply-to:to:subjec t:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encod ing; b=ONG9HfGg74ZbrOOI8IwjwhGUX+PlGp1+clGIyvWriiltDmXE xdmdDWoblELIrVMw3yex7xRyib6m4Q5pInSfi2mr1IQRZINzf2 qTI/9QtFMkpwJUcWJeBt8VPzdxpNCdItxyNnALLIXjrsBAcYsY 8Gv7C6HJR0E6OFZCM0qWrCo

    1. Re:Header Example by FunkyMarcus · · Score: 5, Informative

      Who do they think they are, not prepending "X-" to their weird headers?

      You're kidding, right?

      The DomainKeys proposal has been submitted as an Internet-Draft. In other words, the DomainKeys-Signature header field is on the best possible track to becoming a recognized field. The only thing that recognition would mean that the DomainKeys-Signature field could not be used for other purposes.

      Even so, RFC 822 does not require private header fields (what it calls "user-defined fields") to begin with X-; it is merely offered as good advice to those who never intend to seek official recognition for their fields.

      Of course, the extension field name registry endorsed by RFC 822 does not exist, and in fact, no extension field name registry for 822-format messages exists. (It seems like IANA should maintain one, but they don't. RFC 2076 is a good start.) The best guidance is to treat de facto usage as the standard, and allow for expansion through the formal RFC procedures, of which publication as an Internet-Draft is an element.

      And remember, it's already an Internet-Draft.

      Mark

  2. Re:Continue the trend by femto · · Score: 5, Informative

    It's not really free, as the yahoo license is for a very narrow field of use. If the DomainKeys is implemented as free software, it doesn't seem possible (by my reading) to use the software outside the narrow area defined by yahoo ("the sole purpose of a sender verification solution in connection with e-mail.") Hence the software isn't really free (and neither is DomainKeys).

  3. Re:domainkeys, SPF by wayne · · Score: 5, Informative
    I'm on the (not yet IETF) MASS mailing list, the DomainKeys mailing list, and I've read the DomainKey's spec a couple of months ago, but I can't say I'm an expert on all things domainkeys.

    SPF verifies that the IP address of the mail server sending you the email is authorized by the domain to do so. This causes problems when email is forwarded, such as via pobox.com. It requires all email to be sent through "authorized" servers, which can cause problems when people are working from home and want to send email, or when you are in a cyber cafe. It also causes problems when email is generated on greeting-card/news-story websites.

    DomainKeys creates a hash of the email body and some of the headers and uses public key technology to sign it. This causes problems when email is sent to a mailing list and the mailing list mangles it or when it is sent through things like MS Exchange servers. There are also problems with being able to replay the message. Like SPF, there are problems people are working from home and want to send email, or when you are in a cyber cafe. Also like SPF, also causes problems when email is generated on greeting-card/news-story websites.

    Using DomainKeys, a spammer can send an email from a throw-away gmail account to another email account, pick up a copy of the spam with the correct domainkeys signatures, and then blast it out to everyone. I can't see any way to prevent this with domainkeys.

    Many mailing lists add stuff at the end, either unsubscribe/archive info, or outright ads. In order to make DomainKey signatures survive being sent through mailing lists, the email body is converted to a "canonical form", which allows this extra text to be ignored.

    The problem is that a spammer can subscribe to a mailing list, watch for emails without much text, then add their own ads (spam) onto the end and send it out.

    I think domainkeys is an interesting idea, but as of right now, I can't see how it is ever going to work or be useful.

    --
    SPF support for most open source mail servers can be found at libspf2.
  4. Re:Domain Keys question by Russ+Nelson · · Score: 5, Informative

    This is a good question; somebody mod it up (obviously *I* can't).

    If your ISP supports domain-keys, they won't sign your outgoing mail, because they don't have a private key and selector/public-key combination for your from:. If they trust that you are you (e.g. because they used smtp-auth with reasonably secure passwords), then they might insert a Sender: header with your authentication information in it.

    The alternative is for you to sign your outgoing email, or deal with people's reaction to the reception of unsigned email.
    -russ

    --
    Don't piss off The Angry Economist
  5. Re:Continue the trend by miley · · Score: 5, Informative

    >According to the article, sendmail is working on an implementation of it, for which I rejoice. Its been available for several months http://sendmail.net/dk-milter/

  6. Re:how to verify? no txt record for beta.gmail.com by miley · · Score: 5, Informative

    you need a _domainkey in there:
    $ host -t TXT beta._domainkey.gmail.com
    beta._domainkey.gmail.c om text "t=y\; k=rsa\; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC69TURXN3o Nfz+G/m3g5rt4P6nsKmVgU1D6cw2X6BnxKJNlQKm10f8tMx6P6 bN7juTR1BeD8ubaGqtzm2rWK4LiMJqhoQcwQziGbK1zp/MkdXZ EWMCflLY6oUITrivK7JNOLXtZbdxJG2y/RAHGswKKyVhSP9niR sZF/IBr5p8uQIDAQAB"

  7. Extremely bad advice by KjetilK · · Score: 5, Informative

    Have scripts that autorespond to any "from" that goes to any of the 4 dummy addresses, so as to waste spammers time with false positives.

    Do not ever do this! It is an extremely bad advice.

    From addresses are almost always forged, usually there are just random junk in the From. Quite often there are valid addresses there, and your autoresponders will spam those innocent bystanders. They will be very thankful, you bet!

    Finally, it is not uncommon that spammers forge in anti-spammers who have successfully shut them down before in there. When I was still actively pursuing spammers, I had my addresses forged this way. I have had my share of moronic autoresponders. It is not fun at all. If you do this, you only contribute to the spam, and you bet that if you annoy a real anti-spammer enough, you will find your own connection to be a smoking hole faster than you can imagine.

    In fact, having autoresponders at all is not recommendable at all at this time. If you first accept an e-mail and then generate a bounce message, if the MAIL FROM was forged, that bounce will go to a random bystander, which is bad. If you use autoresponders, or generate bounce messages, you should be careful not to bounce at forged from addresses.

    Allthough it is a bit controversial still, you may configure your system to reject spam and viruses at SMTP time. Then you will not generate a bounce, a relay may, but then, hijacked relays usually don't either (I think it is good reasons for this). So, I am of the opinion that this is good practice.

    Autoresponders are Evil however.

    --
    Employee of Inrupt, Project Release Manager and Community Manager for Solid