A Technical RFID Primer
gManZboy writes "Roy Want, principal engineer at Intel Research, has a pretty meaty technical overview of RFID up at Queue. If you ever wondered how these little things actually work it's worth a read. For instance, I was intrigued to find out how the tags (which are generally battery-free) can absorb enough energy from RFID readers to then power up and transmit their own signal back to the reader."
Mind the gap...
printf("Goodbye cruel world!\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b");
I'm assuming you'd let the engineers out of the office when the fire alarm was going off, otherwise you'd probably be looking at quite a jail term.
Every facility I have worked at with card readers on doors have crash bars and a door alarm, so that if you exit without swiping your card the alarm goes off. If there is a fire, nobody really cares about a door alarm.
(S(SKK)(SKK))(S(SKK)(SKK))
your supposed to post these anonymously karma whore
http://www.lenel.com/
http://www.ti.com/tiris/docs/products/readers/RI-H 4R-S5H3.shtml
could an "eraser" pulse be sent out from some unscrupulous individual?
There are some spec's on the standards. Google search for ISO15693. That covers near field tags operating on 13.56 MHZ.
Search for EPC-96 standard for the far field 915 MHZ tags.
Most tags are either read only with a unique ID number, or read/write, also with a non-alterable unique ID number. Some, but not all tags can be told to become de-activated. So yes, an eraser signal could be used against some tags. A huge surge of RF could simply fry them also. Tossing them in a microwave oven comes to mind..
Since the tags have collision avoidance, an unscrupulous individual could make an emitter that chattered garbage. With that, items with active tags could be taken past readers without being read as they wouldn't be heard in the chatter.
There is mention of RFID jammers. Do a Google search again. Google is your friend.
The truth shall set you free!
I was intrigued to find out how the tags (which are generally battery-free) can absorb enough energy from RFID readers to then power up and transmit their own signal back to the reader."
The high frequency tags don't actually transmit. They change the impedance of their antenna to modulate the reflection back to the transmitter.
Another problem the article didn't mention is that bags lined with aluminum or copper foil will thwart these systems.
Wansu, th' chinese sailor
If you go and implement this for all the entrances and you really DO want to be cautions about hackers gaining admittance, be careful what kind of RFID you choose. RFID Cloner
If would be easy enough to have the RFID readers ONLY within the building and give the engineers/manag^H^H^H^H^H^H/security/cleaning staff access to a sensitive lab, maybe. That way even if someone does manage to clone the tag while the engineer is in the street, they can't get in the building using just the cloned tag. If someone within the company did this, you probably have other problems anyways.
- "Nobody came out that night, not one was ever seen. But Old Man Stauf is waiting there, crazy sick and mean!"
The most interesting thing that I learned was that most all RFID tags have a 128 byte "user data" buffer than can be read or written by ANY RFID gate. (Ie: you can put an RFID interface on your laptop and query the tags and change the "user data" portion on them.)
Obviously, this means that any application that is sensitive to tampering should only use the hard-coded serial numbers, not the "user data" area... but history has told us how well people stick to "common sense" security practices in their implementations.
His paper and the Linux tool that allows you to query and change the data are located here: http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-media-archives/bh- archives-2004.html (scroll down to Lukas Grunwald under "Layer 0".
they are magnetic metallic strips which can be degaussed temporarily to allow exiting the store. if they arent degaussed, they resonate and generate an em field which sets of the alarm.f t1_99/artikel10/
see : http://w4.siemens.de/FuI/en/archiv/zeitschrift/he
Yah, but the transmitters are not clean (how the eff do they get them through FCC?). They splatter around their set frequency. Really a freakin mess.
-The energy sent BACK is very weak. So you really don't need much to block it. White noise around 125 Khz should be enough. Or, as I mentioned before, chewing gum wrapper. Take your pick.
-Random codes won't do it. Sorry, but there IS a check (pretty pitiful, but there is one) and if the checksum don't match, nothing goes through. Nothing gets stuffed. Most readers use 8051 or something lightweight. If it doesn't pass first base, it doesn't go no where.
-Pliers work real good at breaking them. Easier than EMP (which might be noticed). They also break pretty easily on their own.
IANAL, but I've seen actors play them on TV