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Avi Rubin and More on Electronic Voting

Posted by michael on from the undetectable-fraud-was-undetected-by-definition dept.

jgo writes "Johns Hopkins Computer Science professor Avi Rubin, posted his experience as an election judge on his website. It's an interesting read and exposes some potential security problems with electronic voting. At one point he held in his hand the five memory cards containing all of his precinct's votes." Rubin had posted his experience in the primary election earlier.

2 of 404 comments (clear)

  1. More on electronic voting... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    Probably old news by now, but what the hell, editors can dupe stuff, why shouldn't i?!
    (found on dailyrotten.com)

    http://www.bradenton.com/mld/bradenton/news/local/ 10083861.htm
    http://www.wnct.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WNC T/MGArticle/NCT_BasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=10317 78939157&path=
    http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/11/02/HNevoteg litch_1.html
    http://www.nbc4i.com/politics/3894867/detail.html
    http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/content/news/epa per/2004/11/05/a29a_BROWVOTE_1105.html

  2. You're missing the point. by melquiades · · Score: 4, Informative

    The machine doesn't just print out a paper record internally; what voting rights groups are asking for is a voter-verifiable paper trail: the voter can inspect the paper record of their vote. This paper record goes into a ballot box, just like a normal ballot. If the result is disputed, it's possible to have a paper recount.

    Of course, this is still subject to security problems -- e.g. what if an election judge discards some of the paper receipts? -- but they are problems shared by traditional paper balloting. The thing is, it's a lot harder to get a corrupt election judge in every precinct than it is to get one corrupt programmer in every voting machine company, so widespread rigging is more difficult and easier to discover.