Plausible Deniability From Rockstar Cryptographers

Posted by CmdrTaco on Thursday December 16, 2004 @09:04AM from the because-you-can dept.

J. Karl Rove writes "Nikita Borisov and Ian Goldberg (of many, many other projects) have released Off the Record Messaging for Gaim. Encrypt an IM, prove (at the time) that it came from you, and deny it later. The authentication works only when the message is sent; anybody can forge all the messages he wants afterwards (toolkit included). Captured or archived messages prove nothing. And forward secrecy means Big Brother can't read your messages even if he wiretaps you AND grabs your computer later on. All the gooey goodness of crypto, with none of the consequences! They have a protocol spec, source code, and Debian and Fedora binaries."

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Re:I wonder by roystgnr · 2004-12-16 09:35 · Score: 5, Interesting

What stops your correspondent from sending your messages to something like Stamper before you publish the temporary key? After the temporary key is published it will be possible to forge messages signed by that key, but it won't be possible without the collaboration of the timestamping service to forge messages signed by that key and dated before it's publication.