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How Can I Trust Firefox?
TheRealSlimShady writes "Peter Torr (who?) from Microsoft invites a certain flamewar with his essay 'How can I trust Firefox?' He raises some interesting security related points about the download and installation of Firefox, some of which should probably be addressed. The focus is on code signing, which Microsoft is hot on. Of course, the obvious question is 'Do I trust Firefox less than IE?'"
One of the many criticisms of Internet Explorer is that customers are fooled into downloading spyware or adware on to their computers. This is indeed a legitimate problem, and one of the ways you can reduce the risks of getting unwanted software on your machine is to only accept digitally signed software from vendors that you trust.
Hello? Microsoft? 99% of the stuff on the Internet is unsigned. Downloading software from DePaul University's FireFox mirror doesn't scare me.
What scares me are those freaking awful dialog boxes that IE allows. The ones that say "You MUST click okay to use this site!" or "Do you want to set CrappyAds.ru to be your homepage?".
And even if I press no, I *still* get spyware. Why? IE Sucks.
After I finally got rid of my beloved CoolSearchWeb installations, I installed FireFox for good. I've been spyware free ever since, and I download a lot of unsigned data. No IE, no spyware.
Microsoft is never going to get it.
A better question is, how can we trust anything from Microsoft. Without the source code, who knows what their software is doing behind the scenes.
Seen any of these errors? I've installed Firefox on several pc's with no problems at all.
I also noticed this comment:
"and not caring if my Virtual PC image dies a horrible death"
(emphathis added)
Could this person be having a virtual pc problem?
Some spywares are also signed with Verisign... Gator, Bonzibuddy, etc.
What's the point?
If mozilla buys a cert, then they are openly supporting the idea of PAYING VERISIGN FOR CERTS. Isn't that just supporting another monopoly? Of course Microsoft wants you to pay for the cert... they can certainly afford one. But what about all the little guys who write code for free?
And why would signing the code make it more
secure?
You can know that it is an official binary and
hasn't been tampered with. However, I can
accomplish this without paying Verisign money
using a standard fingerprint.
When you sign it with a Verisign certificate, the
trust then moves up the chain. So, the question
becomes, do I trust Verisign?
No.
In my opinion, this isn't even a problem. I make
sure I download files for sources that I trust,
and they make sure that those files remain clean
as a matter of site security.
It all boils down to this:
1) Normal users don't care about signed code, as
they happily click on "Yes, download this!"
without bothering to check anything.
2) Power users can verify the integrity of their
code without shelling out big bucks to Verisign.
Don't count your messages before they ACK.
From "How can I trust Firefox article" Hmmmm, wait a minute. I went to www.getfirefox.com, not mirror.sg.depaul.edu. I don't have any idea where that place is, and it sure makes me nervous. So lets do a dig on download.microsoft.com... download.microsoft.com. 3600 IN CNAME download.microsoft.com.nsatc.net. download.microsoft.com.nsatc.net. 300 IN CNAME download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 63.210.62.190 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 166.90.248.221 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 206.24.190.30 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 206.24.190.187 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 206.24.192.252 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 208.172.48.221 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 208.172.48.222 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 208.172.128.251 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 4.78.214.61 download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. 230 IN A 4.79.74.61 So I went to download.microsoft.com and I ended up at download.microsoft.com.c.footprint.net. I don't have any idea where that place is, and it sure makes me nervous.
Buying A VeriSign Cert is a bad idea, for reasons already mentioned. What *would* be a good idea, however, is for Mozilla foundation to to set itself up as a CA and sign all of it's software, updates and "Official" or semi-official add-ons. I trust Mozilla foundation much more than VeriSign, and protecting users from trojaned programs on mirrors is a good idea.
Name: GAIN
Publisher: Claria Corporation
The publisher was verified so you should install and run this software.
I fail to see how signatures fix anything that is wrong with Internet Explorer. Automated downloads via ActiveX are going to be a problem if they are signed or not. What a moron this guy is (and I'm normally a MS softie). He should be fired if he works for MS as he is exactly the type of thinker that got us into this problem.
More
(Beaten? No. Firefox is a success, so far. And... Microsoft is the arch-enemy of many on slashdot.org because they aren't as programmer-friendly or techie-friendly as other vendors, and they happen to be a colossal, market-dominating company, which makes their lack of programmer-friendliness more aggravating (if they were just a niche company, it wouldn't be nearly so bad, because they wouldn't be a constant irritation, just an occasional one).
.mozilla.org in the name (for example sg-depaul.mirror-firefox.mozilla.org).
.md5.sig for the millions of files on FTP servers that have md5 signatures available.
They have had a sketchy track record with security, but, until recently, they haven't really cared, so you can't blame them for just now trying to come up to speed. Besides, software is complex. Linux has bugs. IE has bugs. Firefox has bugs. Windows has bugs. The better developer is the one who can patch their bugs more quickly without breaking other things in the process (sometimes Microsoft is first to the punch, but they don't seem to always test their patches thoroughly).
They also are a damn good business. Many computer hobbyists really dislike the idea of large businesses being heavyweight players in their field of interest, because it means a stupendously-increased prevalence of things like patents, trade secrets, proprietary interfaces, non-disclosure agreements, and licensing fees.)
There are a few points I have to raise with this:
Mirrors are a *good* thing. The only thing that should possibly be changed is that links to mirrors should all have
I've never seen firefox spit out dialog boxes like that before. I don't know what this guy did (what variant of Windows is he running on this Virtual PC, exactly?), but, I've installed many versions of Mozilla and Firefox to many different operating systems and can't recall seeing any bizarre things like that since the beta / pre-1.0 days.
Signed software is a good idea, but, MD5 hashes aren't a bad alternative for people who aren't willing to shell out cash. Since he proclaims that IE is very good about checking the identity of files it opens, perhaps IE should include a plugin to check a file against its
"Install Now" shouldn't be the default, I agree (except perhaps if it comes from a known trusted domain).
He implies that there shouldn't be a "Do not ask me this again" option for "Are you sure you want to run this random downloaded executable?" I think this is perhaps a useful feature (what about trusted corporate environments where Firefox only accesses internal sites?) for saving a few seconds, although maybe putting the option in a config file somewhere would be wiser.
Flash is also _not_ an extension---it's a plugin. Perhaps Firefox does need a plugin manager; he raises a good point with that.
He also doesn't seem to understand the concept of extensions. Firefox is an attempt to just focus on streamlining the main part of webbrowsing, and leave it up to side projects and third-party developers to add little features via extensions; it's more of a community thing than an all-from-one-vendor thing, so of course a lot of good extensions come from other vendors. If he doesn't trust a certain vendor, he should test an extension under a different user who has no access to anything important, use a personal firewall that handles both incoming AND outgoing connections, and/or use an operating system that can lock a program into just a subtree of the filesystem (I don't know if NT or 2K can do this, but UNIX can chroot, and VMS can do even more specific things than this).
I also like this: "If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your computer, it's not your computer any more." IE comes packaged with Windows. It's hard to remove from it. Things stop working if you try to remove IE from windows. I don't trust the writers of IE. So, based on what he says, my computer is only mine if it's not running Windows---sounds good to me!!
I have posted on numerous ocassions my less than glowing feelings about Firefox. I run IE (well, to be fair, Maxthon) and am very happy doing so, haven't had problems in I don't know how long, and just in general I'm not especially thrilled with Firefox.
But this blog entry is beyond ridiculous.
First, I have installed Firefox on a number of ocassions, recently and beta builds in the past. I have done so on a couple of different versions of Windows, a few Linux versions some of which were running under VMWare. I have NEVER had ANY problem installing it. Certainly I've never seen a blank dialog like this guy claims to have.
He raises some interesting concerns about the download locations I think, legitimate concerns, but beyond that it's a bunch of obvious FUD drivel. The security warning dialogs he mentions, while legitimate issues for novice users, are a result of the way IE handles potentially unsafe content, NOT the fault of Firefox. I would bet most people downloading a new browser can probably handle these dialogs without too much trouble, and again, they are from IE, not Firerox. He's right, signing the Firefox download wouldn't be a bad idea, but it's hardly the big deal he seems to think it is.
Look, I think there are legitimate gripes about Firefox (just like there are about IE by the way)... I don't think either side needs to be making stuff up. I find myself sometimes defending MS against what I see as unfair assessments by the OSS community, but seeing posts like this blog entry makes me feel like an ass for doing so. BOTH sides need to be mature and compete fairly, may the best product win. It's annoying when crap like this sneaks through.
If a pion (n-) collides with a proton in the woods & noone is there to hear it, does lamdba decay into the source pa
Doesn't matter. Fact is, if even 0.1% of the downloaders check, any compromised original will be detected in just a matter of minutes - hours at the worst. Mother at home will grab it... then the media the next day will loudly announce the problem, the antivirus companies will tear the binary apart and release updated signatures in a few days, and her virus scanner will tell her about the problem in about a week. This does assume she runs a virus scanner... but if she doesn't, she's probably compromised already.
What the Slashdot crowd seems to be missing is that we don't need everyone to follow the MD5 signature. We just need an informed and vocal minority - e.g. Slashdotters - to detect the problem and pick up the pieces afterwards.
A witty [sig] proves nothing. --Voltaire
I don't like Microsoft, and I think Firefox is excellent, but this guy does have a point with the code signing.
y -services/code-signing/digital-ids-code-signing/in dex.html
Why isn't Firefox's code signed by VeriSign? It may seem frivolus but the average user wont MD5 it until hell freezes over.
http://www.verisign.com/products-services/securit
There, its $695 dollars for the premium version with a $50 000 gurantee. The Mozilla foundation can afford that. And it really would re-assure those non-tech users. It may not matter for us geeks, but it can only do good, so we might as well.
I'm a Student Ambassador to Microsoft, and promote VS.NET on campus. I think this guy is quite nieve (even if from Microsoft) or being deceptive. A few pointers:
1) At least when you post, do a similar comparison between both browsers. I want IE so when I search Google for download internet explorer, then the first link is "www.microsoft.com/ie/" which REDIRECTS me to http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/default.htm which again REDIRECTS me to http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/default.mspx
Can someone tell me if that is the same Internet Explorer? After all, Microsoft is a big company. I just wanted the regular IE.
2) Watch what you quote - when you wisely point out that Secunia has found (gulp!) 3 security advisories, did you know that only one was moderately critical and the rest were minor? Then, I noticed the advisories for Internet Explorer 6 (the most secure IE browser) - only 53 advisories from 2003-2004 (same timeframe), of which 42% (or around 24) were either highly or extremely critical! Oops, let's not compare using that website.
3) Then, there's the whole issue with downloading extensions - when I click on a link to download my XPI (no clue what it is, as naive user), it waits a few seconds (no surprises) and then asks me to install now or cancel. Oh, and horror of horrors, the Install Now is default! That's what I wanted anyway...and this isn't ActiveX that installs/runs immediately or whenever, but explicitly states that it starts on restart of Mozilla. So, I can even uninstall before reloading Mozilla if I have second thoughts! Hmm, sounds secure to me.
4) I've seen too many web sites that have Versign and a bunch of other BS images that give me no more trust than another site without them. So, I create a spoofed website with Verisign pictures and have no problem fooling users. But with a Firefox plugin, I'll know I'm on a spoofed website. Personally, word of mouth is the biggest way to increase trust, and that's why I recommend Firefox using word of mouth the most - I'll tie my name to Firefox because I use it and trust it. (Even carry it on my USB drive).
5) Why not fight for some real change and migrate AWAY from ActiveX controls and Microsoft-specific mangled HTML code (and even links) that I can't even run in Firefox? And build in some Firefox-like security rather than pretending the fire is under control!
This sig donated to Pater. Long live
Did you even read the freaking article? The author didn't say "Don't use firefox, they encourage bad behavior." He had legitimate points. If firefox wants to sell security, they need to appear secure. Not having the installed signed isn't a good marketing tactic. If I didn't know what I was doing, I wouldn't be installing firefox for the same reason the author brings up. It annoys the crap out of me that most (if not all) plugins aren't signed by their authors. Do you really think that just because nothing bad has happened yet that the good times will continue? That's foolishness. Firefox needs to be perceived to be at least as secure as IE. This article points out that the perception of firefox's security is less than IE under SP2. Stop being a blind zealot and start being realistically critical.
Frankly i dont need verisign (that company that tried to redirect all non existent web domains to its own site) to tell me whats good or not. Verisign is equally as much of a problem.
Just to state the obvious, I'll just give a rebuttal to some of these statements.
...
...but we'll never get past the spyware / adware problem if people continue to think that installing unsigned code from random web sites is A Good Idea.
Installing Firefox requires downloading an unsigned binary from a random web server
It's a web server that mozilla.org directs you to. If you're downloading Firefox, you need to trust mozilla.org. Likewise, if you're downloading Internet Explorer, you need to trust microsoft.com.
Installing unsigned extensions is the default action in the Extensions dialog
There's also a two (three?) second timeout and this dialog only appears when either the site is whitelisted by default (only updates.mozilla.org is) or by the user, or if the user clicks the yellow bar at the top to specifically access this dialog.
There is no way to check the signature on downloaded program files
Boo hoo. Authenticode isn't that big of a deal when ActiveX isn't turned on in the first place, considering that that's where 95% of Authenticode is used.
There is no obvious way to turn off plug-ins once they are installed
This one is just uneducated. Tools -> Extensions. Wait... that's, um, more obvious than IE. Oh well, someone wasn't wearing their glasses.
There is an easy way to bypass the "This might be a virus" dialog
There is an easy way to do that on IE as well. It's called clicking Run. Seriously, you're going to quibble over IE having one more warning than Firefox? Go develop a decent browser first and call me when you do.
This statement is built upon previous assumptions that are false (such as Firefox being downloaded from a "random website", see above). Firefox is demonstrably more secure than IE and has far fewer vulnerabilities than Internet Explorer.
To the Microsoft employee who created the original article: Rather than trying to convince people that something they know is inferior that it is not, why don't you try to make it... not inferior? Innovation speaks louder than marketing. Surely you can do better than a bunch of geeks spread across the globe, right?
It's better to vote for what you want and not get it than to vote for what you don't want and get it.
- E. Debs
If firefox wants to sell security, they need to appear secure.
.asc signature from ftp.mozilla.org, then get gpg, import the appropriate key from a public server, verify the signature and, if matching, run "Firefox Setup 1.0.exe" to install a verified, trusted version of the program.
That was his argument, alright. Appear secure. Sell security. Yep, that's what MS is doing, too - selling products that appear secure. They'll be selling Palladium next, too. Not that it would be a lot of help, but that's not the point, as it's pretty much meant to help their bottom line.
This is by now already redundant, but a signed binary is nothing to the average user. Heck, Verisign means nothing to the average user, either. They will happily check the "always trust" option for self-signed AX controls without wondering what it means.
On the other hand, if you do understand a little about security, you have the option of getting the (in this case win32) binary together with the
I agree, however, that unsigned extensions don't seem trustworthy. However, until some peer review mechanism is adopted for "official extensions", this is again a rather moot point. Do you trust an extension that's signed by foo@bar.com? even if this is somehow endorsed by mozilla.org (key signing, etc.) how do you know that foo does follow at least minimal security practices? and so on. It all depends on your paranoia level. Luckily, with javascript extensions, at least some people have the time/interest to unpack it and pore over the code to make sure it isn't trojaned. For stuff like flash, you have to trust the vendor, which makes it about on the same level of 'security' as claria et al.