LiveJournal Servers Go Down
Wind writes "According to any journal hosted off of LiveJournal.com, the LiveJournal data center Internap has suffered a critical power failure, leaving all of LiveJournal and its content temporarily offline and requiring the revival of 100+ servers. Perhaps Six Apart wasn't quite prepared for the responsibilities of a website of this size? Updated information is posted here."
Bush just appointed Internap's CEO to his National Infrastructure Advisory Council, yet the man can't keep a co-lo facility switched on.
I'm not sure what that says of Bush or of Interap. And it certainly doesn't seem to have anything to do with SixApart.
I know nothing of how InterNap is set up. I just want to throw that out there ahead of time. Now, it's time for my patent pending "Bull Shit Theory of the Day."
Ok, here is the rant. I used to work for a Colocation facility. Nothing special, small by Telco terms. The whole facility only had about 1500 cabinets. (Though I hear they are now full, and going to be expanding.)
We had a main power draw off of the local grid. We had a backup power draw off of the *next* cities power grid. (ie, when all the offices around us went dark, we still had power.) And you don't even want to know the kind of red tape we had to go through for *that* pull. I'm still not sure how they did it. We had fly wheel kinetic electricity storage systems, battery backups, and a diesel engine from a train so large it had it's own building.
We used to joke that if we lost power, we had more important things to worry about. And again, we were small time compared to some of the massiveness that is out there. *cough*AADS Chicago*cough*
So I'm kind of in agreement with the statement currently on LiveJournal. It's unknown to me how any self respecting colo facility can say "We've had a power outage that also took our redundant systems."
I have to call bullshit on that entire train of thought. If that's true then they don't *have* any redundant systems, and I'd be looking for a new provider. The most likely thing (at least in my mind) is that someone, somewhere got mad at something specific and decided to make a point by popping the main breaker to their portion of the facility.
Oh, that was another thing, each room had several "main" breakers. It took a hell of a power surge to pop all of them, and the Liebert systems had power filters of some kind, really really big capacitors or something I think, so a surge really never made it to the other side anyway, it got stored in the cap and then trickled out like the rest of the power.
But I was a UNIX admin, not the EE that was planning the power generation aspects of the facility. So take some of it with grains of what ever white powdered spice you prefer.
"Genius may shine aloof and alone, like a star, but goodness is social, and it takes two men and God to make a Brother."
At this point all my whiteboards are full of boxes of each database cluster, the machines in that cluster, which have passed their checksum tests. (innodb checksums each 16k page), which replayed their replay/undo logs, where in binlogs each was writing/reading/executing etc...
So lots of waiting now on the checksum validators. I don't want to put a machine back in and find out in a week there was a database page that was corrupt because the battery-backed write-back cache on the RAID card didn't work as advertised. (which happens on about 95% of RAID cards, in my experience, because they're mostly crap, even the most expensive ones...)
Also whenever there's any doubt about something's integrity, we backup or snapshot the potentially corrupt version before operating on it. That operation can take time too.
It's going to be a fun night.