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More on Newly Broken SHA-1
AnonymousStudent writes "Details are out about the reported broken SHA-1 hash function. The findings are that SHA-1 is not collision free and can be broken in 2^69 attempts instead of 2^80. This is about 2000 times faster. With todays computing power and Moores Law, a SHA-1 hash does not last too long. Using a modified DES Cracker, for the small sum of up to $38M, SHA-1 can be broken in 56 hours, with current computing power. In 18 months, the cost should go down by half. Jon Callas, PGP's CTO, put it best: 'It's time to walk, but not run, to the fire exits. You don't see smoke, but the fire alarms have gone off.' As Schneier suggests, 'It's time for us all to migrate away from SHA-1.' Alternatives include SHA-256 and SHA-512."
The new SHA-1 break only affects very carefully constructed messages. This means that it is completely useless for an attacker impersonating an existing message, unless that message was purposely constructed to be attackable. The attack is only useful if the attacker creates both messages, and the attacker can choose the exact format of both messages.
- Sam Ruby
The findings are that SHA-1 is not collision free and can be broken in 2^69 attempts instead of 2^80.
Well, doh - it's a hash you silly, there will always be collisions.
Anyway, it's nothing to panic about really. The ammount of computer power needed to crack it is still massive. Unless you're investigated by the NSA, SHA-1 will be fine for quite a while.
It simply means that it is possible to find a collision without a brute-force scan of O(2^80) messages. Instead, because of weaknesses in the algorithm, it is only necessary to scan O(2^69) times.
They already exist. RIPEMD-160 is tried and tested and seems secure, or at the more experimental stage there's Whirlpool.
I am trolling
Using a modified DES Cracker, for the small sum of up to $38M, SHA-1 can be broken in 56 hours, with current computing power.
Is that assuming that that the collision will be found on the last (or in this case, 590,295,810,358,705,651,712nd time) try?
Because statistically it's just as likely you will find a collision on the first try as you are on the last try.
Yes, but say someone creates a document (such as a contract) for you to digitally sign.
If they're prepared to spend a realistic level of time on it they could create two of them that hash to the same thing, with a small but effective change to the second.
You sign the first with SHA-1, but your signature also matches on the second, putting you in a weak position when you try and claim "I didn't sign _that_!"
The time/money requirements to do this aren't really practical yet, but they will be soon.
As the sub says, time to start shifting off SHA-1.
Remember kids, it's all fun and games until someone commits wholesale galactic genocide.
The attack has nothing to do with trying to discover contents based on the hash, it has to do with generating intentional collisions.
Attacks on hashes have absolutely nothing to do with discovering any kind of content, they have to do with the reliability of digital signatures, key exchange, data integrity, authentication etc.
As for any kind of cryptography being sufficient...no, not really. Consider CSS...the encryption used on DVDs is no longer considered any kind of barrier to access.
Similarly publicly visible hashes in password files on Unix systems haven't been considered secure for over 10 years, due to the simplicity and success rate of dictionary attacks (plus more recently, brute force is becoming increasingly easy).
The concern is not so much that the method described in this break is feasible on today's hardware, or even that this method will get cheaper and cheaper as hardware gets faster. The BIG concern is that this method provides insight in to the SHA-1 in general, and will be used by others to come up with more efficient breaks or more egregious flaws.
http://netlab.fe.up.pt/~ei01024/sha-1/
The AACS key is NOT 0xF606EEFD628B1CA427BEA93A9CA9773F
Creating pseudo-random numbers that hash to the same value != making any arbitrary document hash to the same value.
It's tragic. Laugh.
All crypto algorithms age, and even if the news of SHA-1's death is somewhat dramaticised by people who make their living from security work, it's important to see _all_ crypto algorithms as temporary shims.
That is why anyone developing new protocols and products that rely on security should use SASL, which abstracts the crypto layers in such a way that it's easy to change them over time.
SASL is an IETF standard and there are open source implementations like Cyrus.
Sig for sale or rent. One previous user. Inquire within.
Apologies, $80k per problem.
It might not be that much harder to generate a collision like this:
- I, John Smith, agree to sell my coin collection to Fred Jones for $10. -- JonesCo internal business form bma p3 rjphta,-9p.u2#H50982u.yha,cp. hxasnip
and- I, John Smith, agree to sell my nubile teenage daughter to Fred Jones for $10. JonesCo internal business form BUEQXBBX2 jma93#9g5xbaida htuEXOAhkra1255,y
And if cryptographers are finding stronger and stronger attacks against SHA1, it's foolish to assume the attacks won't get any stronger.Find free books.
The findings are that SHA-1 is not collision free
What, is that new? That already follows from the fact that there are only N possible hashes, and M possible messages, and NM. In other words, if you have an 8-bit hash (256 values) for a, say, 1K message, then you must get a lot of collisions.
If it takes only three days or so to find a collision, what does that mean practically? Almost nothing. Because the collision that you would find is most likely meaningless. The modification that you'd like to apply to the message (while sticking with the same, given hash) is likely to be something very specific, for example, change $1000 to $10.000. And that, unfortunately, is not easy. This vulnerability can't be easily exploited at this point.
But even saying that "if the algorithm has one vulnerability, then it's likely to have others" is totally illogical - unless a whole class of vulnerabilities has been pointed out.
It's not even time to 'walk to the door' because the fire alarm has gone off, as someone said later down in the comments. Instead, it's time to read the Chinese paper, produce more truthful descriptions of how much of a problem we are going to get with this (does it lead to more severe vulnerabilities), and start working on better hashing algorithms.
It takes roughly 56 hours to go from a message of which hashes to 0xAABBCCDD11223344, to a message of whichh also hashes to 0xAABBCCDD11223344, which means that it would have an identical signature, meaning that the original signature would validate the fake message.
Personally its not the huge end-of-the-world scenario everyone thinks it is. It would probably take tens of thousands of years for this machine to output a well-formatted message that had a hash collision and could not be trivially discarded as gibberish.
If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.