Mitnick: Security Not about Technology
renai42 writes "Companies eager to tighten up their information security perimeters should focus not on technology but on teaching their employees how to say 'no', ex-hacker done good Kevin Mitnick told a full house at Toshiba's MobileXchange conference in Melbourne yesterday. 'We can't expect our employees to be human lie detectors,' Mitnick said. 'One of the most difficult challenges in corporate cultures is getting people to modify their politeness norms.'"
Isn't this what (ex)hackers have been telling the IT industry all along?
'We can't expect our employees to be human lie detectors,' Mitnick said.
Sure we can: http://content.monster.com/martynemko/articles/arI do tech support at my school. My self and two guys finnally finished our new mobile computer lab. Laptops with WiFi cards installed. It makes me sad to think after we get the things nice, clean, working, etc that the idiots will have the things broken beyond recognition by the end of next week. ;_;
The ultimate security leak, people. >_
Speaking is NOT communication
I'm so sick of this guy's so-called "hacker" fame. He tricked a bunch of early tech no-nothings into telling him their passwords and protocols and now he's living off it forever. Jobs and Woz hacked the phone system, but then they went on to produce something. What has this guy actually ever produced, written, made? Seriously, I don't know and maybe that's a problem. He must have produced something valuable, but I don't know what it is. I'm sure some Slashdot guy will tell me, but isn't it funny that no novice (like me) knows what the hell he's ever done creatively/intellectually in his life?
Technical or human, good security requires balencing convenience and control. If you give your employies the power to refuse information to potential customers, you gain control and security but loose convience and maybe money. If you tighten your network down so much that users have to jump through hoops to send files to each other, you may be more secure, but the hassle will lead to lost productivity. You can't try to too hard for control or for freedom. You have to weigh threat and risk. You want to ensure against potential disasters, and eliminate any more likely security risks. It's probably too costly to treat a low threat but high risk (common) security hole as if it were a disaster. This is why stores find it cheaper to set prices assuming a certain ammount of shoplifting will occur. It would cost too much in lost sales and increesed labor to secure the store against all theft. Training your dumbass users, helpdesk, and even sysadmins to recognise social engneering, might just cost more then any losses from security breaches.
------ Take away the right to say fuck and you take away the right to say fuck the government.
remember this
The best education consists in immunizing people against systematic attempts at education. - Paul Feyerabend
THEN, you can fix "social engineering"
StupidChildren...the reason jesus is crying
Simple answer is to put a heavy duty cross-cut shredder beside that recycle bin or even better one that reduces documents to something resembling confetti. Certainly some paper waste companies do shred the paper they pick up, sometimes right in the truck they use to pick up the recycling. However for important or sensitive information you should not rely on this "service". Also a company rep, manager, or other person should verify that shredding takes place either by casually visiting the pick-up vehicle if they shred on-site or performing a site audit/visit at any central recycling facility to confirm the company is doing what they claim and what you are paying them for.
FOr myself, if it's particularly sensitive I'll shred the stuff at home.
Speaking of home and bringing up home workers. Companies should also provide a cross-cut shredder as well as that company computer, printer, or other technology for work-at-home employees. Teach them to shred stuff, even allow them to shred personal stuff if they have them. It will provide some added "noise" to the company confidential shredded documents.
It's just that they don't know when to say "no" versus when not to say "no".
Any dealing with any large, bureaucratic organization (a government bureau of any stripe, any telco, any cable company, any other sort of "utility", eBay/PayPal, Microsoft, IBM, etc.) will demonstrate quite aptly that no, they have no bloody problem saying "no". You can make a reasonable request and they'll quite cheerfully say "no" since it isn't part of their "script" to say "yes". (Then they'll tell you they're "sorry" they couldn't say yes. They aren't.) Meanwhile, the "bad guys" probably know how to work the system anyhow, and can get them to say "yes" by understanding said "script".
Simple example: I do business under my initials, and PayPal wouldn't let me change the name on my account to my initials for "security reasons". Even after I provided proof that both of my bank accounts had already been changed (to my initials). Even after I went back and forth with them at least half a dozen times. I finally had to go in the "back way" via talking to an ex-PayPal employee, who talked to a current PayPal employee, etc. etc...
They wouldn't change my name to my initials despite indisputable (and verifiable) proof from two established brick-and-mortar banks, yet they have absolutely no problems letting you set a crappy-ass password on your account... You see? Their priorities are backwards. They love saying "no", but they have no clue when to do it and when not to. The end result is that they suffer not only from security risks, but from bad PR.
With spending like this, exactly what are "conservatives" conserving?
From my experience in the workplace (100% tech savvy people, it's a software company): On the servers that force users to change their passwords every 90 days, most users use their regular password plus a number, adding exactly nothing to the security.
My org was hit bad. One could ssh into a remote host and within seconds the box would be rooted and keystroke loggers installed.
No amount of "social" training can solve this problem.
BTW. The software based loggers are professional quality. They are undetectable without booting from known good media and examining the kernel, all its modules, and all applicatiions. Hardware based keystoke loggers are available too.