IRS Employees Fall For Hackers
linuxwrangler writes "Treasury department auditors recently posed as network technicians and attempted to get IRS employees to reveal their usernames and passwords and/or change the password to one suggested by the "technician". The result: over one-third shared their passwords. If there is any good news in the story it is that the 35% figure represents a substantial reduction from the 71% who fell for the ruse in 2001."
Just like I always say. Social Engineering is the biggest security problem nowadays. Maybe this time it showed a decrease in the people who fell for the attack, but I bet that if the Auditors increased the sophistication of their ruse, that they would actually increase the amount who fell for it.
We need more incompetence out there giving away our life stories!
If there is any good news in the story it is that the 35% figure represents a substantial reduction from the 71% who fell for the ruse in 2001.
You know, there's an old saying in Tennessee - I know it's in Texas, it's probably in Tennessee...
While not perfect results, a 50% decrease in the number of users giving away their password is a victory. Hopefully in a few years it will be down to 10%.
...the user is the largest security hole. Either you can restrict them to where they can't do their job, or somebody can get them to reveal their u/p for a candy bar.
I'm sure that all this bad press for the IRS must be really taxing.
Sorry.
There are 2 kinds of people in this world. Those that can keep their train of thought,
Anybody who's had any significant amount of contact with government workers isn't impressed. You could probably get 35% of them to stick their tongues in an electrical socket if a "technician" told them it'd make their "Internet work better".
Other employees could not find the caller's name on a global IRS employee directory but gave their information anyway. Some hesitated but got approval from their managers to cooperate.
Scary.
Call me silly, but I think people should know that ANYONE in a position to legitimately be messing around with your account already has the ability to do what they need without giving you a call. There should be a simple policy (and maybe there even is, but obviously even some managers don't know): DON'T give out your password or userid to anyone. Period. And start telling that to the managers!
The two hour echo strikes again.
H.
Wetware too is vulnerable to buffer overflow exploits. Annoy a person for long enough and they'll do what you say just to get you to stop talking.
English is easier said than done.
"Some said they were not aware of the hacking technique and did not suspect foul play, or they wanted to be as helpful as possible to the computer technicians. Some were having network problems at the time, so the call seemed logical."
It all appears to come from these people naturally wanting help those who ask for assistance and claim to be trying to help them. It also can be the result of ignorance, with their lack of knowledge of this technique, and thinking that it would be logical to give that kind of information. But here's what I find most interesting:
"Other employees could not find the caller's name on a global IRS employee directory but gave their information anyway. Some hesitated but got approval from their managers to cooperate."
It was managers that gave this approval? Aren't they the ones who should be informing the employees of social engineering attacks? I think this may be the problem right here.
Wow! Tax chicks will date me?
I started using a feature that WatchGuard has on their website called ClickAware within 2-3 days of our big "security" speech at some of our clients.
We spent 4 hours discussing spyware, attachment best practices, viruses, adaware, malicious sites and policys on installing web apps.
Shortly afterwards, using the ClickAware site, we send out fake e-mail with ( my personal favorite ) the "Install this Microsoft Patch" message with a phantom 241K attachment.
I can then view the click rate and then match the click's to the internal IP browsing logs to see who's been a bad boy/girl/it.
I'm stunned most of the time when not but 3 days after a rather lengthy, yet energetic, discussion, some 70% of the people ( of 122 e-mails ) actually clicked on the phantom attachment and saw the "If this was real you would be in trouble" message.
As the subject says, I feel like I am wasting my time in performing these security meetings but hell, I'm getting paid for it.
I know there will be the obligatory ( you must suck as a teacher then ) comments but it would be good to see if anyone else has experienced the same thing after doing security discussions with their employees.
Why do overlook and oversee mean opposite things?
The company I worked for 6 years ago was upgrading some software on all of their computers. They emailed everyone asking them for their username and password so that the technician could log in to their computer at night and perform the upgrade. I refused to hand over my password and told them that I would be there at the time they wanted to perform the upgrade. They weren't very happy about it. When they came to upgrade, I logged in for them. And watched everything they did. I watched as they connected to the server and install the upgrade. After they finished, they rebooted and left. I connected to the server again using my account and noticed that on the server was a list of everyone in the company, their usernames and passwords. Including the President and CEO of the company, CTO, CFO, all the way down the food chain. I walked over to the IT staff, showed them what I found and told them "THAT is why I won't give out my password."