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Aggressive Network Self-Defense
Not being a big fan of most fiction (I tend to prefer history), it's hard to say definitively good or bad things about the quality of the writing. What I can say is that it's infinitely less irritating, and far more realistic, than Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon or Gibson's Neuromancer. No over-the-top smearing of adjectives to describe the mundane, and no unrealistic sequences of events. Then again, there's no character development and no real story progression, so it's not great fiction.
As a series of hacker vignettes, the book works just fine, and very well for the purposes at hand. Basically, what the authors want you to get from the book is two-fold: First, they want you to debate the issues around "strike back" attack methodologies. Several of the authors are open advocates of what are legal grey areas and open moral questions in the field of network security. Secondly, they want you to see how it's done, what you do when you actually use a tool to achieve a goal. Most books that do this, like Hacking Exposed, cover far more tools, but they usually do so without showing you each tool's use in a real-world scenario.
I won't bore you with a lengthy, detailed overview of the first part of the book. Like I said, it's a series of part fiction, part tutorial series of short stories. In them, you'll see tools like Metasploit, virus creation, some nmap, sniffers, and keystroke loggers, all in action, being used as an operator would use them, and achieving real goals. This is more valuable than a basic manual, and the stories themselves act as a nice setting. While not great fiction writers, the authors are decent enough at the job, and they write the technical material clearly.
The second part of the book is interesting. It makes up about a fifth of the book in volume, but a lot more in technical weight. The book bills this section as "The technologies and concepts behind network strike-back," and that's an accurate summary. It's a series of four unique perspectives and technical chapters that complement the rest of the book quite well.
The first introduces ADAM, the "Active Defense Algorithm and Model," which develops a methodology for network administrators to actively defend their networks against attacks. It's quite interesting, and brings together a number of risk models in an uncommon take. The authors are academic researchers from the University of Idaho, so it's a lot more academic than the previous material in Aggressive Network Self-Defense, but it formalizes a lot of the thinking that was present in the writing of the stories and techniques.
The second is Tim Mullen's classic "Defending your right to defend." This is the original position paper shared by Mullen with the information security community in 2002 or so. Here, Mullen makes a compelling case for actually striking back at worm infected hosts. After all, the position holds, someone should do something about them to help clean up the Internet. While it's a position I disagreed with at the time and still do, Mullen's writing is articulate and an important read. It really helps you understand a lot of the thinking that went into the book itself.
Dan Kaminsky wrote the next chapter, "MD5 to be considered harmful someday." Largely considered to be a follow-on to Joux and Wang's one-way hash function research, what it shows is how practical such an attack can be. Kaminsky never fails to come up with interesting ideas he puts into practice, and he adds another level of depth to this book.
Finally, Aggressive Network Self-Defense ends with an interesting paper, "When the tables turn: Passive strike-back." Like any good paper, it has a clear and thoughtful motivation, and really demonstrates the principles at play, namely building network resources that don't simply lure the attacker in, they trip her up. There are so many ways to do this, the authors show us, and ultimately it's almost fun. A good way to end the book.
An over-arching concern with the book that I have is the question of ethics. Mullen, in the foreword, states that he hopes the book stirs a debate about the ethics of the actions in the book. However, the book itself falls short in this area. Instead, sometimes the characters get busted, and sometimes they don't, but just because they didn't get caught doesn't mean some ethical lines weren't crossed. All too often the authors leave the ethical debate up in the air. While I prefer this to overt preaching or questions, the style leaves me wondering if this goal was achieved.
So, where do I stand on Aggressive Network Self-Defense? In the end, I like it, more so than a book like Hacking Exposed or other "hacking how-to" types. The style of presentation doesn't lend itself all that well to exploring a very wide number of tools, but it does give you a deeper context to see how they assemble into something larger. For many people I expect it will be a page turner, and I think the format has some utility, as shown here.
You can purchase Aggressive Network Self-Defense from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Smith and Wesson.
when you try to login and your network tells you
"I know Kung Fu"
Do not try to read the dupe, thats impossible. Instead, only try to realize the truth
What truth?
There is no dupe
...and it's great there's a book covering it. There are so very many security related tools available today, and the real problem nowadays is that few of them integrate in any usable manner. NIDS should integrate with each other and generate more comprehensive, multiperspective data about suspicious looking traffic. Networks should autoadapt to block malicious traffic.
The Army reading list
The only three programs you need to know.
While his proposed recommendations for network defense appear viable, nothing is more effective for protecting your computer than sucker-punching a random script-kiddy in the groin at a local LAN party.
...he's got some nifty visualizations of the MD5 attacks on his site; scroll down a page or so to see this and other images...
The Army reading list
One thing that really bothers me are things like this in my logs:
Mar 2 22:42:37 inetd[32684]: refused connection from 210.29.1.3, service sshd (tcp)
Mar 2 22:42:38 inetd[1534]: ssh from 210.29.1.3 exceeded counts/min (limit 1/min)
Mar 2 22:43:09 last message repeated 38 times
Mar 2 22:45:09 last message repeated 114 times
Mar 2 22:55:10 last message repeated 644 times
Mar 2 23:05:10 last message repeated 509 times
I routinely run into foreign systems hitting my server at extraordinary rates. These seem to be bursts here and there, more looking to probe the system than DoS it but sometimes a DoS condition occurrs.
I routinely to an IPWHOIS of these locales and send e-mail to the IP administrators, but some of the foreign ones are unresponsive. So what can you do?
Are there any scripts out there that can automate the process of reporting system probes?
Is there any recourse in taking aggressive counteraction against, for example, the hoards of chinese IPs that routinely probe and attack domestic hosts?
7f2c83031b3e693a86e2b0cc25df7ef7
Then again, there's no character development and no real story progression, so it's not great fiction.
Character development is massively overrated in lit. I'm not sure if this refers to how fleshed out a character is or how much he changes during the course of the story but in either case it saddens me to think that some people think this is the point of fiction.
Excellent work, editors, fixing the title like that. The "we're a bunch of whores" referrer link is still misspelled, with only one copy of the oh-so-precious letter g.
So close, and yet so far!
--grendel drago
Laws do not persuade just because they threaten. --Seneca
I am an author of ADAM (Ch 9) in the book, with Deb Frincke. I would like to point out that more information and resources on the topic of active defense and active response can be found at: http://www.activeresponse.org
I think InterSlice sounds more frightening.
I don't get it.
In order (somewhat):
/. poster)
1. NMAP the offender.
2. NSLookup, Whois, etc. I even go so far as to use GeoIP to get city, state, ISP, etc. Get email addresses to send to.
3. Look for open proxies on the address in the case of SPAM. If so, just drop the search there.
4. Nessus check for potential vulns that might have been exploited by common/known worms. Essentially, find how they were exploited, and if there is no known reason, assume they are malicious.
5. Take necessary actions to blacklist or block the IP on the offending protocol, or in some rare cases, kill the IP altogether. (rarer cases, the subnet)
6. Google. You'd be amazed at what I can do here. I put in the direct IP, I put in email addresses I've collected to find out where the person posts, etc. I get to know the individual, who they are, and further deduce if they are malicious. I used to even go so far as to imiate someone of the opposite sex their age and talk to them on their favorite IM and ask them if they are a h4x0r and can help me "get back at my brother, the bully at school, the girl that stole my boyfriend" etc. (never assume the gender of a
7. Email at a minimum 5 people, including Incident Response (https://forms.us-cert.gov/report/), the offending ISP, any emails off of the website of the IP in question, etc. Half the emails I CC just so that the individuals take the email seriously. Occasionally these will contain logs, IM logs, who the person is, what they do in their spare time, what forums they visit, their picture (if any) and etc. I do this from a TOR-accessed Hushmail account, so no one knows who the hell it is. One time I sent the email to the offender's mother. He sure thanked me with some profanities on that one (which were subsequently forwarded to his mother).
There's ways of "attacking back" in such a way that script kiddies die out, but you have to totally overwhelm them with your sheer capability to outsmart them.
Let's face it, we're all guilty of being lax in our network activity and leave IP trails on logs that Google indexes. It makes no sense to sit back and complain about script kiddies when it's quite obvious that we're unwilling to take them to task when they probe. The information is there, you just gotta do some digging and learn how to use Google's Advanced features. It's important to make your response to their actions overwhelming, so they are never tempted to turn back to random probing again.
I wrote an article back in 2002 (http://www.securityfocus.com/guest/16531), which was published on SecurityFocus, in response to Mullen's initial SecurityFocus article.
Not having read the book, I can't be sure, but according to the review there didn't seem to be much of a dissenting opinion in the book on the question of whether aggressive tactics are desirable (or effective).
That's unfortunate, since as you'll see in my article, I think a good argument can be made that aggressive network defense is both morally bankrupt and ultimately ineffective.
God is my Palm Pilot.
http://www.dshield.org/