Secure Video Conferencing via Quantum Cryptography

Roland Piquepaille writes "If you use a webcam to talk with your mom, this tool is not for you. But if you're working for a company and that you have to routinely discuss about sensitive future projects or the possible acquisition of another company, you need more security, and this new video conferencing system based on quantum cryptography is a tool you need. According to this article from Nature, researchers from Toshiba have developed a system which can generate 100 quantum 'keys' every second, fast enough to protect every frame in a video exchange. This technology, which today is working over a distance of about 120 kilometers, could become commercially available within two years at an initial cost of $20,000. This overview contains more details and references."

Comments

Hey Roland, I'm violating your copyright! SUCK IT!

[Anonymous Coward]

Secure Video Conferencing via Quantum Cryptography

If you use a webcam to talk with your mom, this tool is not for you. But if you're working for a company and that you have to routinely discuss about sensitive future projects or the possible acquisition of another company, you need more security, and this new video conferencing system based on quantum cryptography is a tool you need. According to this article from Nature, researchers from Toshiba have developed a system which can generate 100 quantum 'keys' every second, fast enough to protect every frame in a video exchange. This technology, which today is working over a distance of about 120 kilometers, could become commercially available within two years at an initial cost of $20,000. Read more...

Here is the introduction from Nature.

Scientists from Toshiba's Cambridge Research Laboratory unveiled their invention to business leaders and government officials at Britain's Department of Trade and Industry in London on 27 April.

Their system is capable of generating 100 quantum 'keys' every second. This is fast enough for every individual frame of video to be protected by its own encryption. "This makes the system highly secure," says Andrew Shields, who leads the Cambridge team. "It would take an enormous computational resource to crack this frame by frame."

Of course, today's videoconferencing tools using conventional encryption are already pretty secure. But if the NSA wants to check your conversation, I betit can. With quantum cryptography, this is a different story.

Quantum cryptography promises to stop such eavesdroppers. The system works by first establishing a 'key' that provides instructions on how to decode an incoming message. This key is built into the quantum state of photons. Intercepting a message breaks the key and alerts the sender and intended recipient to the security breach, because the very act of observing a quantum state changes it.

The Quantum Information Group at Toshiba gives more details on this subject on this page about Security from Eavesdropping . Below is a diagram illustrating the concept (Credit: Toshiba's Cambridge Research Laboratory).

Using single photons to carry the bit material for the key prevents undetected eavesdropping. Because each bit is carried by a single photon, it is not possible for a hacker to tap in and remove part of the signal, as shown in the illustration. Single photons do not split, so if the hacker (Eve) measures the photons on the fibre, they will not reach the intended recipient (Bob). Only the photons that arrive at Bob are used to form the key, so Eve cannot gain any useful information by this crude 'tapping' attack.

The first commercial applications of quantum cryptography are now about one year old. However, this new system offers new levels of performances, according to Nature.

Unlike previous systems, which become unreliable when they heat up, this device can run continuously for more than four weeks, says Shields. The quantum information can only go so far before being corrupted by random interactions with surrounding material, however. "We've shown this can work over 120 kilometres of fibre," says Shields.

Toshiba has already built a Quantum Cryptography Prot

Re:excellent

[_Sharp'r_]

I'm still trying to figure out why anyone would want to spend the cash on this when they could just tunnel through SSH, use a VPN, etc... etc...

Sure, it might use slightly more bandwidth than this, but come on, for that price....

Bandwidth

[514CK3R]

Now we all get to suffer the bandwidth consequences of the paranoid's video conferencing. The packets screaming over UUNet's backbone will be prohibitive if only a handful (per capita) of streaming video apps used this technology. I guess it would push providers to put OC48's in our neighborhoods though.

Limitations

[Bifurcati]

It should be pointed out that at the moment this technology is limited to sites linked by a fibre optic cable along which the entangled photons (which ultimately form the key) are sent. They claim that it can work over a 120km section.

For this to be really useful, you would need to be able to send the photons via satellite, something which is hard as the interaction with the environment along the way can destroy the entangled state. This would probably be interpreted the same as eavesdropping, further muddling the water. Physicists are indeed trying to get this to work, but it may take some time.

Its not really an advancement in cyrptography

[twfry]

What they are doing here is encrypting each frame with a different key where the key is sent using quantum states so that any eaves dropping will be discovered. Their stated reason is that decrypting each frame is much more difficult than if the entire stream was encrypted with a single key.

Basically what they are saying is their system has several thousand keys instead of just one. But that does not make the underlying transmission any more secure. If it is possible to brute force one key, it is possible to brute force many keys.

All they are doing is making it less pratical to use a brute force attack. I'd classify this as being closer to a "security through obscurity" technique rather than a real advancement.

Now if they sent the entire data stream using quatum bits, that would be something different.

Re:Boycott Roland Piquepaille Stories

[nacturation]

Yes, perhaps we should start moving to other sources where we can get some fresh writing and not be taken advantage of. Perhaps SecurityFocus would be a good source. Here's the first paragraph of their article titled Quantum crypto moves out of the lab:

"Quantum cryptography - long the stuff of cyberpunk novels and hi-tech spy stories - is leaving the laboratory and making its way into commercial markets. A briefing session at the UK's Department of Trade and Industry on Wednesday featured demonstrations of working quantum key exchange systems by QinetiQ, Toshiba Cambridge and US start-up MagiQ."

Or maybe we should use The Register's article titled Quantum crypto moves out of the lab. Here's their first paragraph:

"Quantum cryptography - long the stuff of cyberpunk novels and hi-tech spy stories - is leaving the laboratory and making its way into commercial markets. A briefing session at the UK's Department of Trade and Industry on Wednesday featured demonstrations of working quantum key exchange systems by QinetiQ, Toshiba Cambridge and US start-up MagiQ."

Or another article and you can probably guess that the opening paragraph there will make you think there's a glitch in the matrix.

Both The Register and SecurityFocus show ads, and they're just rehashing some company's PR spam and profiting from readers. But this is all academic -- the more interesting question is why you don't seem to find it objectionable that the bulk of these articles, even if from reputable places, ARE ads themselves?

Re:Just becase they can

[ericpi]

So, why the need for 100 keys per second? One key at the start of the stream should be enough.

If the quantum channel were fast enough, I'm sure they'd want to use it to send the video directly. Since it isn't fast enough, they're doing the next best thing: Send the encrypted video over traditional (possibly hackable) channels, then send the keys 'securely' using quantum tech.

Rotating the key for every 1/100 sec minimizes the damage in case some of the video is decrypted: the hacker would only be able to recover one frame, rather than the whole video. Probably also makes decryption attempts less desireable in the first place