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There Is No Safe Web Browser
Michael writes "David Sheets has up an interesting article on browser security, and I have to agree with his conclusion: no web browser is safe. The article details the recent Netscape fiasco, and touches on the whole Firefox/Internet Explorer debate. From the article: 'So if it sounds as if we're all at the mercy of hackers just looking for some new challenge, that's partially true. As law enforcement officers will tell you, crime finds you if it wants you bad enough, no matter what preventative measures you take. But the vast majority of criminals have an Achilles' heel: They prefer convenience to challenge. For now, it's more convenient for them to pick on Internet Explorer.'"
While I understand the point that Mr. Sheets is making, however, I disagree with his definition of safe.
The implication of this article stems in the absolutes of security: can it ward off intruders or not. This is a flawed approach, and while seemingly a logical one, denounces another reality of this level of breach: the lion's share of these breaches are not of the most malicious sort (read: that stupid data miner which causes popups, search bars from hell, etc). These kind of easily hackable sections of Internet Explorer are less prevalent in Firefox. Market forces of the sheer user base would dictate that if this were not so, more spyware would have been ported to Firefox by now. 25 million downloads, right? That's a sizable chunk for any malware vendor, or aspiring intruder, to infiltrate.
One must acknowledge the reality of security by statistics alongside security by absolutes.
The Crimson Dragon
Newsflash! There's no such thing as perfect security, who would have thought it? Whether it be through a flaw in the code (which we all try to fix, when they are found), or stupid users running crap they oughtn't.
I for one use Firefox, because it is MUCH more secure than IE. It may not be perfect, but it's by far good enough for regular use.
That's like saying that houses aren't secure, even the new model homes with electronic alarm systems. No crap, but that doesn't mean sell the alarm systems and leave your front door unlocked (like IE).
-Jesse, disliking alarmist poop articles.
Nothing says "unprofessional job" like wrinkles in your duct tape.
Nobody is perfect => there is no perfectly safe browser, or any other type of application. What app, besides maybe "hello world", has never ever needed a security patch?
v =270
http://www.vrlteam.org/home.asp?vrl=advisories&ad
"It's too bad that stupidity isn't painful." - Anton LaVey
This sort of thing may have already happened to you. Have you ever accidently just catted a binary file, and then discovered that your command history had all sorts of garbage commands in it? Same thing.
This sort of vulnerability has been around for decades. People used to trigger it via `talk' requests or by using the `write' command, and while talk eventually learned to filter things better, as for write eventually everybody just did a `mesg n', because all write does is write text to your tty, so changing write won't help. Of course, fixing xterm and other terminal emulators is another fix, but these features can be useful too. Still, I'm surprised that they haven't been disabled by default, but even today, xterm seems to have this `problem'.
Many vulnerabilities are caused by this sort of mixmash of different utilities -- in this case, netcat doesn't really have the vulnerability, but it would allow text to come in that could affect your terminal emulator.
Yes, with the right filtering of the output this could be safe, but not with netcat by itself. Still wouldn't make it a non-crappy browser though.
if you don't do proper bounds-checking on your "hello world" array, then you need a security patch...
[ducks and runs...]
I have something in common with Stephen Hawking...
All these "IE vs. Mozilla" or "IE vs. FireFox" or "Netscape vs. IE" or "Opera vs. IE" discussions (pick your poison) are irrelevant.
First off, it amazes me that I have run across paranoid *NIX sys admin friends who are very mindful of what runs as "root" on servers they control but then turn around and operate day to day on Windows desktops as an administrator.
Well, gee dip sh*ts, no wonder you're screwed if rogue code enters your system.
If people used limited accounts and then used impersonation (ever hear of "runas") under Windows, all of these discussions would go the way of the dodo bird.
More to the point they would be TRULY irrelevant. Sure send me to some baddie site, won't do much on my system. Whatever malware sent down the pipe to me can't do anything to change my system (C:\WINDOWS).
This is how I operate, i.e. a limited account desktop. The admin account is just that, for ADMINISTRATION, e.g., setting up new apps.
Amazingly, this approach is "novel" among even tech types since I keep hearig these discussions even on Slashdot.
The principle of least privilege is ANCIENT. Impersonation is part of Windows. Just as it is with other OSes.
The Windows NT kernel has had security since its inception. On the file system, registry as well as synchronization mechanisms such as mutexes, semaphores, etc.
Do you want to know why MS doesn't leverage it? Cost. Plain and simple. If WinAmp (which doesn't work under a limited account) stops working for someone on account of MS automatically setting up limited accounts for people, guess who is likely to start receiving support calls? "But it always worked on Windows 9x!!!"
Yes, it boils down to money. This is NOT a technical problem. MS alongside companies peddling its wares (Dell, Gateway et al) simply do not want to deal with the potential legacy costs of supporting misbehaved apps and/or apps whose designers were myopic and assumed the ability to write to any part of the file system and/or registry.
The great thing is, even with a limited account desktop you can still readily run WinAmp. You just have to know how.
All of this seems like "rocket science" to everyone. And I guess it is, since this discussion keeps rearing its head, namely browser security. The point is, a browser is another app that inherits default credentials from your login. Don't operate as administrator geniuses (sarcasm in case you didn't figure that out).
In the case of WinAmp. I simply defined an admin account that I leverage to run that application on my limited desktop (use the command line "runas" facility or change the properties on the shortcut through the "Advanced" button). I might mention that Shoutcast servers are capable of sending URLs (think JavaScript) that WinAmp will readily execute via IE totally disrespecting your browser choice. So taking another page from what Windows has offered from the start, I changed the ACLs for the IE executable such that my "WinAmp User" has absolutely no rights to the IE executable. Not even the ability to read that file. In this manner I short circuit this potential threat vector. In addition I changed the ACLs on C:\WINDOWS and some other directories so that this "WinAmp User" could only read from these directories.
Here's the moral of the story folks, use a limited account. Plain and simple. End of story. End of this not very worthwhile discussion (among tech people).
Yes I use LINUX, I use Cygwin's X server and readily use LINUX Mozilla complements of the latter. Not just a little, a lot. This IN ADDITION to the fact that I use a limited account for day to day activities.
I have never had spyware or a virus on my system. EVER.
-M
Is anyone aware of any Safari (OS X web browser) vulnerabilities, especially exploited ones?
I think the fact that OS X throws up an auth login whenever any app tries to access a directory that the current user doesn't own, pretty much makes casual takeover difficult, even by an insecure web browser...