No ELF Vulnerability in 2.6 Kernel
gaijincory writes "Greg KH, the co-maintainer of the 2.6 kernel has posted a comment on lwn.net confirming that there is indeed no such ELF vulnerability as spelled out by Paul Starzetz on isec. The bug was originally thought to be particularly nasty, allowing a malicious user to gain elevated privileges using a carefully crafted binary which would exploit the kernel's Executable and Linking Format. The bug's author confirmed that no one has been able to repro the exploit."
What about the DWARF and GNOME vulnerabilities though? Eh where's your answer now Greg?
I saw this story on OSnews today, but they made it out to be about the Hyperthreading issue. But that didn't make any sense since that is not ans OS bug at all, but a hardware issue. (If it is evan an issue)
Try out fish, the friendly interactive shell.
They've tested it and been unable to reproduce the vulnerability. But vulnerabilities are tricky things. I'm glad they still bothered to patch the kernel.
I am trolling
Is it a bug, if it can't be reproduced? Not yet, anyway. Did he really create this vulnerability problem, at least once? - so many people get sloppy on scientific method, conditions, variables.. and recording the details. Especially me. And what they think happened, did not.
Mike Harrison -
"I'm a bug author. Today I've written five bugs!" Sounds like a nice career choice ...
First, the obligatory joke to set the questions:
According to Starzetz report, the flaw is in the function elf_core_dump(), (...)
That writes itself. Adding in references likening this to bears and woods is optional and subliminal.
Anyhow, if there is an ELF core dump bug and no one else steps in it, does it really matter? Did it really happen?
Do we dump the kernel, insist on a grooming of all ELF involved code, and rebuild and recompile?
What is the threshold anyhow for reproducing a bug? How many people must do it? If only one person reports activating the bug, do we ignore all their documentation of the event as if it was spurious because we couldn't do it? Do we wait till a malware write manages it?
What is the proper level of concern here?
If my grammar and spelling are off, I am [distracted/tired/careless] (take your pick)
Speaking for myself, and elves everywhere, this is great news. I can finally use my favorite OS without worrying about any attacks I'm opening myself to.
Or it can simply be a fact that modern computer systems (both hardware and software) change states so much every second that its next to impossible to recreate the exact state required without having a rig that recorded the origional state and set it up as a test system. It could be a very obscure bug that requires some very exacting conditions that only occur extremely rarely, thats why noones been able to replicate it. Im sure that in the course of development, all programmers have come across a random one time only bug that causes you to shrug your shoulders, watch out to see if it ever happens again, but get on with life.
They've discovered most of the linux kernel vunerabilities in the latest ~2 years or so, and they've always disclosed them friendly, so I don't think they deserve all this noise. It's better to think that there're vulnerabilities and fix them than the contrary.
We found that almost all the exploits we tried did not work as advertised. Yet the security advisory lists blindly post these as if they work. While the design/implementation issues may be present in a range of kernels, I'm beginning to think that these exploits are not vetted, and that the exploit writers look for a possible weakness and publish a piece of software that sort of pokes at it and claim success. It is very frustrating, since if the vulnerability can be exploited, a bogus exploit gives a false sense of security (since you can't compromise the system using it).
'I had a project manager once who had a saying: "If it didn't happen twice, then it didn't happen once."'
Was he a zen monk? If you follow that philosophy then all occurances are first occurances and therefore never happen, causing the next occurance to again be the first.