Space Shuttles almost Ready to Re-Launch

stagmeister writes "CNN and Space.com are reporting that the Return to Flight Task Group, the overseeing committee that determines when the Space Shuttles can go back into space, has reported that the only items blocking the Shuttles are issues 'related to tank debris, orbiter hardening and tile repair.' They plan to re-meet in later this month to finalize their decision. However, 'NASA has made clear it intends to resume shuttle flights with the repair capabilities it has in hand without knowing for sure whether they would work in an emergency.' Would you want your children flying a space shuttle that hasn't been properly beta-tested?"

Comments

Re:Definition of a non-story:

[LooseChanj]

Issues related to. The bipod foam, which caused the Columbia accident, has been eliminated. You're never going to be able to eliminate all tank debris. The OBSS is a done deal, but I think they're having some problems with work stabilization, that is, having an astronaut actually work on tiles and not send himself flying all over the place. They've installed sensors in the wing leading edges that will be able to sense an impact. So it's not like they've just been sitting on their thumbs this whole time.

Re:Definition of a non-story:

[Rei]

If you'd been following the shuttle progress thusfar, you'd be familiar with what they had accomplished and what they hadn't. What they have accomplished is a modification to insulation application techniques (which helps not only them, but every cryogenic-fuelled rocket in the world) which looks like it will produce almost no insulation shedding, and no shedding of sizable pieces. What they haven't accomplished very effectively is RCC and tile repair. This is no shock at all; these things are tough enough to make and secure in the first place here on Earth. They can patch small RCC holes effectively, but not large ones. The tile patching material works well on Earth, but last I heard, it still looked like in a vaccuum, microspheres in it could rupture during application.

One of the biggest problems is testing. It's not like we have an extra shuttle to launch, punch a couple holes in, and have reenter. They do the best that they can on Earth, and will be doing more in-space tests on the first launch.

As for "what authority" the task force has, NASA safety boards generally have a lot more independence and authority than the equivalents in Russia, even before the accident. Without the board signing off, Congress won't be happy at all. There have been a lot of problems on ISS involving the Russians doing things like bring unapproved batteries onboard, or firing Progress rocket engines for an attitude-changing maneuver before the gyroscopes had been confirmed to be off, etc, that have led to a lot of major safety concerns.

Honestly, I feel sorry for the people who signed off on the safety of the Columbia launch: every other safety board in the shuttle's history, including those during the ones early in the Shuttle program. Furthermore, most, if not all, other hydrogen-fuelled rockets (for example, Arianne) have used similar insulation systems, and while most haven't had side-mounted payloads, they have had components that foam could have damaged. It's a good thing that this research is being done.

They've had a lot of blame heaped on them, when the shuttle has overall had a pretty darn impressive safety record - about equivalent to Soyuz (same % of craft losses, greater total casualties but far greater human launches). Its cost record, of course, is something different all together, and that is what justifies replacing this first-generation reusable with a second-generation craft that can take advantage of everything learned.

Re:The Only Things?

[TheKidWho]

The fact that it doesn't require a human passenger makes it inherently safe.

How so? Vehicles that carry humans aboard have to be human rated. Ie they have to be designed with much stricter tolerances, much more paperwork, higher quality, and so on. Not to mention the Russian Kliper is most likely going to be launched on top of a Zenit rocket anyways. The fact that it doesn't require a human passenger just means that no one is going to die unless the rocket explodes on the pad or crashes into someone's house.


You don't like the one I gave you, then tell me why it isn't acceptable (other than the fact that it hasn't flown as long).
I didn't say it wasn't acceptable, but like I did say, the Zenit 3S-L has only flown about 12 times, the Zenit-2 less then two dozens flights where it HAS blown up at least once. Not to mention, the Zenit only carries about 10tons into orbit, while the Space Shuttle Stack carries well over 130tons into orbit!(30 or so tons of payload)

You should also not forget that Columbia didn't blow up during launch, it failed during re-entry. Only Challenger was lost during launch and that could have easily been avioded if they decided to wait until it had gotten warmer(Although they did make the shuttle stack more reliable after that event)

Re:What about fiberglass shell?

[Free_Meson]

Didn't SpaceShipOne re-enter the Earth's Atmosphere using a composite resin body? How was SpaceShipOne able to do this without ceramic tiles? Was it Altitude?

SpaceShip One (orwhatever it was called) was going MUCH slower. It never reached orbital velocity, ~22,500 knots iirc. The heat experienced during reentry is from the atmosphere slowing the craft down. You wouldn't have to shield a craft at all if you were only traveling a few hundred mph. You'd have other problems, of course, but reentry heat wouldn't be one of them.

Re:Spirit of exploration wins out over safety a lo

[Rei]

That's unfair. You're must be counting unmanned Soyuz launches toward the total to get the 2% number; the shuttle only does manned work (we launch our unmanned payloads on other craft). All of the unmanned Soyuz failures don't contribute to your count - and there have been a lot on this "less brittle" craft, as you call it (as recently as 2002, where it ended in a firey explosion right after launch). You only mention the manned failures because it makes your side look better; the failures being on unmanned craft, however, was just a coincidence. By the way, that 2002 launch? It killed a soldier on the ground, who undoubtedly wasn't included in your count, in addition to wounding 8 (a mile away from the explosion, at that).

Even if you're counting unmanned launches, though, your numbers still don't make sense. Please elaborate. There have been far more than 4.5 astronauts killed per launch (and what's up with the "%"?), because 2% of shuttle launches have ended in casualties, and each carried 7 astronauts. There have been ~1600 Soyuz launches, but little over a hundred manned launches, of which two involved fatalities, one with one death and one with three deaths. Your numbers, quite simply, make no sense. By the way - if you want to count total casualties of the Soyuz program, you need to add in the 50 technicians killed by an explosion of a Soyuz booster on the pad on March 18th, 1980. It's kind of ironic to think of it, but when you factor in ground crew deaths, even a mostly unmanned (and when manned, minimally manned) rocket like Soyuz could even have a higher death toll than the Shuttle on a per-flight basis, even with 1600 flights (it's hard to say for sure, with Soviet secrecy)

And if you want to talk about Soyuz's abort modes, you better talk about miracles. Remember Soyuz 18a? The crew went through a bloody 21.3g, and stopped just short of falling off a cliff. One person's internal injuries were so bad he never flew again. And even its normal operation can be disastrous - the much maligned "land via wings" approach of the shuttle prevented things happening to it like Soyuz 23, which broke through the surface of a frozen lake and nearly drowned its cosmonauts.