Researcher Resigns Over New Cisco Router Flaw
An anonymous reader writes "Michael Lynn, formerly a researcher for Internet Security Systems resigned today rather than conceal his research into serious new flaws in Cisco routers, according to stories at Washingtonpost.com and CRN.
Interestingly, Cisco says the the problem is not a security vulnerability, although it chided Lynn for not going through proper vulnerability disclosure channels. Both stories note that Lynn is in danger of being sued by Cisco for revealing the information, details of which were pulled at the last minute from the materials handed out to Black Hat attendees." Update: 07/28 12:23 GMT by Z : SimilarityEngine writes "Cisco and ISS are filing a law suit against Michael Lynn and the management of the Black Hat Conference, following Lynn's presentation discussing a vulnerability in IOS."
From the article:
According to several people who made it on time to the 9 a.m. presentation, Lynn began his talk with a discussion about security issues surrounding services that allow people to make Internet-based telephone calls. Then, they said, Lynn suddenly changed topics and began discussing the highly technical details of his research into the Cisco flaw, saying he would rather quit his job at ISS than keep the information from conference attendees.
Why would anyone, after clearly being informed NOT to talk about this information, talk about this information ?
I know, freedom of information ideals and the like, but couldn't he at least have waited a few weeks to see how Cisco responds, instead of simply revealing the information of a hardware-level exploit
- Leon Mergen
http://www.solatis.com
As dependent on as our economy is upon routers, and Cisco in particular, it seems that his disclosure was definitely in the public interest, and if he isn't entitled to whistleblower protection, we need to mount a campaign to get him protected. Write your Congressoid.
"The mind works quicker than you think!"
The thing is (from what the articles say) it's not about one particular flaw. It's that ANY overflow flaw can be exploited to take control of Cisco IOS, which is bad news. Add Cisco's plan to abstract the hardware from IOS and then you've got a major problem. Basicly, it's about time Cisco implimented some form of DEP protection offered by current Intel and AMD processors + software, to prevent this from being an issue. Or check their bloody code of course.
The articles cited are light on details. But nowhere do the articles suggest that Cisco was burying the flaw. In fact, the opposite is indicated. ISS and Cisco are apparently working on a fix. In my mind whistle blower protection is valid if the whistle blower is uncovering corruption. Which does not appear to be the case here. Based on the information presented, the system was working on the problem, he just wasn't happy with it.
Where does it at all apply that the one follows from the other? Presumably they are saying that he was involved in confidential research into the flaws and was not supposed to make any statement on his own. His simply quitting the company does not remove his obligations. He was not some outside agent who found out about this flaw independantly and cannot be expected to be treated as such.
-Mark
that would keep all parties happy, is a modification of the current craze for bug-bounties.
Flaw is reported, accepted and cash is paid on a daily/weekly basis until the issue is resolved.
Submitters would get more for a complex bug that involves more work to fix it and the can happily keep their gobs shut from announcing the problem as they're getting paid to be quiet.
Just a thought..
"It is our belief that the information that Lynn presented at Black Hat this morning is information that was illegally obtained and violated our intellectual-property rights,"
Lynn decompiled Cisco's software for his research and by doing so violated the company's rights, Noh said. [emphasis added]
So basically, Cisco is claiming that decompiling their object code is illegal.
Isn't it a greater violation of the customer's rights to prohibit them from decompiling the code on their own equipment to check for security vulnerabilities?
We've come to the point where corporations believe they have the right to impose conditions of operation on equipment they no longer own. If Cisco sells someone a router, the customer now owns it. Cisco doesn't have any right to impose any conditions of use on the new owner, because they no longer legally own the product. The owner has the right (and some would claim even the responsibility) to decompile their router's code to check for potential vulnerabilities.
It seems that Cisco believes that even after they've sold it to you, they still own your router. And who knows, maybe this vulnerability was deliberately placed so they could own your router anytime they pleased...
The society for a thought-free internet welcomes you.
The filing in US District Court for the Northern District of California asks the court to prevent Lynn and Black Hat from "further disclosing proprietary information belonging to Cisco and ISS," said John Noh, a Cisco spokesman. "It is our belief that the information that Lynn presented at Black Hat this morning is information that was illegally obtained and violated our intellectual-property rights," Noh added.
Ok, let's look at this objectively, shall we? Proprietary information belonging to Cisco and ISS is nonsense. That information should belong to the customers who bought the router so they can take the appropriate steps; for example, a customer should be able to replace an affected router with something else if they're concerned about the problem, or modify the software on the router to alleviate the problem itself (and this is again another example of where OSS is so important).
In terms of violating intellectual property rights, what about violating the property rights of the people who own the router? What rights do they have in this whole situation? Are they expected to sit their with their collective thumbs up their collective asses and wait randomly for a fix? Don't the people who use the routers have the right to uninterrupted network services? What happens if this router belongs to a large ISP and a DoS attack brings the router down? Are they supposed to be stuck with the bill? I'll tell you this much - if this happened, Cisco would never credit them with the cost of service refunds to their end customers. Of course, this would be hypocritical on Cisco's part for obvious reasons, but I digress.
How can he be sued if "the problem is not a security vulnerability"
Way to go, Cisco.
The global economy is a great thing until you feel it locally.
It's hard to imagine giving the finger to his employer in a very public manner was good for his long term employability.
Now before I get modded down, I be to remind whoever might read this that what I am saying is FACT. - bogaboga
Ridiculed? They built a backdoor into their product that was such a security flaw that it made IT professionals worldwide look at Cisco in awe. Who the hell would use a master password for a product that's going to be in the server rooms of a thousand businesses?
I don't think "ridiculed" is the right word at all. They deserved the attention that was directed at them, as a master password is no small oversight. That'd be like Windows shipping with a master password.
"Victory means exit strategy, and it's important for the President to explain to us what the exit strategy is." G.W.Bush
you had me at #!
[re "master password thing"]That was from a while back. They had set up a master "backdoor" password in a version of IOS
So since that didn't work, they put a backdoor into the hardware, then slapped a superficial patch on the first (of a number of possible exploits) that has come to public attention. And now they are persecuting the guy who has publicized the underlying flaw, which they have neither patched nor fixed.
So I think it is time for these questions:
I guess I'd better get myself a new tinfoil hat. This one is worn out...
What changed at the last minute?
Makes you kind of wonder who else has known about this vulnerability and told Cisco to dummy up about it.
So again,
BTW, if anybody in a trenchcoat asks, I'm just going for "funny" here... and don't tell them that I'm opening a discount store for tinfoil hats, okay?
Two words "Professional obligation".
There used to be two general ways to handle security flaws when you discovered them. Either you could privately exploit the hell out of them. Or you could just privately report them to the company involved and wait patiently for them to release a fix.
However there is a big problem with this particular model. The problem is that companies like Cisco, Microsoft, etc. don't really seem to think that exploits that allow people to remotely execute administrator level code are really that big of deal, and they figure that they can just create a patch when "we get around to it" or "next year".
Meanwhile, do you really think that you are the only person in the entire world who is guaranteed to find the exploit? The black hats of the world have probably already found the exploit anyway in many cases. It's just the customers who are suffering because a patch is not available.
This model of waiting around forever was a dismal failure. So, security professionals found that by publicly releasing their findings, they could force companies to take security more seriously. The responsible way to do this is to first inform the company privately of your finding, and give them a reasonable chance to fix it.
What you think is reasonable is up to you, *not* them. They are playing by your rules. You are not playing by theirs. Remember, that you are being nice to them by not just publicly releasing the exploit the day that you found it. So, they should respect that. If they do not, that is their problem. Still, as a professional, you should rise above them and try to give them a reasonable time to fix the problem.
Now in this case, what he did was he informed them 4 months ago of the vulnerability along with a proof of concept. They decided not to fix the problem. They claimed there was no problem. He waited patiently for *4 months*. They said that this wasn't really a vulnerability. Then, they knew well in advance of his presentation at Black Hat, and yet they still chose not to fix the problem.
So, what is he supposed to do? As a security professional, it is his ethical obligation to publicly disclose his findings at that point.
In conclusion, Cisco should spend more money on engineers instead of lawyers.
Randy.Flood@RHCE2B.COM
What idiots modded this thread informative?
Probably the same idiots that modded yours "Insightful".
The following is off the IIS webpage.
About Internet Security Systems
Internet Security Systems, Inc. (ISS) was founded in 1994 by Christopher W. Klaus and made its initial public offering on the NASDAQ on March 23, 1998.
Profile The company provides security products and services that preemptively protect enterprise organizations against Internet threats.
ISS celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2004 and has commanded the leading edge of security innovation, inventing cornerstone technologies such as vulnerability assessment and intrusion detection/prevention.
The company continues to set standards in the security space with its Proventia Enterprise Security Platform (ESP), offering enterprise-wide preemptive protection that is tightly integrated with existing IT business processes.
X-Force Research The foundation of ISS' preemptive approach to Internet security is its X-Force research and development team. ISS can stop more threats because it knows more: by discovering, researching and testing software vulnerabilities and collaborating with government agencies, industry consortiums and software developers.
This is not a donation business. Companies and governments pay these people to provide products and services.
In response to:
Lynn did NOT work for Cisco, nor does ISS work "for / with" them.
I want you to read the following line very carefully ok!
The injunctions filed against him state that ISS and Cisco had been working together on the flaw for the past four months, and that up until earlier this week, a Cisco executive was slated to co-present the findings with Lynn at Black Hat.
This came from the washington post
Here is another one just in case you didn't like that one
We appreciate the cooperation we have received from ISS in this matter. We are working with ISS to continue our joint research in the area of security vulnerabilities."
Wow, joint research.
The court injunctions stated that they had worked with each other for months on this specific issue. Cisco states that they were doing joint research on security vulnerabilities. I can't believe people are making this big of a deal over this one point. The two companies worked with each other. I do not know if Cisco was a client of IIS but they at least worked with each other. It is hard for me to believe that IIS volunteered their time working with Cisco. I am sure a little money changed hands but that doesn't matter.
I can't prove that someone has not used this exploit; however I can indicate that no case has been found. Nothing has been reported. With that in mind what are the odds?
Let's look at a few things. While the exploit was a secret the only people who were likely to identify the exploit were people who could reverse engineer the Cisco OS like Lynn supposedly did. Not many people are able to do that. Fewer yet want to.
Even if several people did go through that process there is no guarantee that they would identify the exploit and then we have to assume that those individuals that did make such a discovery would act maliciously. What is the likely hood that a problem will crop up under those circumstances?
Next we have Lynn (Your Buddy) making a public display of how to exploit the Cisco OS. Now what is the likelihood that a problem will crop up? Did the chances that the exploit would be used go up or down genius?
Did Lynn serve the public interest by going public against the wishes of Cisco and IIS? I think not. You are free to disagree. You are even free to be pricks about it.