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Dealing With Laptops in a Business Network?

lanimreT asks: "Notebooks are a large problem for IT managers. They carry viruses and other malware back into the network and are less reliable than desktop PCs for more than one reason. Yet, every employee MUST have one for his job. How have other IT managers dealt with the various problems that notebooks create?"

16 of 106 comments (clear)

  1. Here's a start for you. by grub · · Score: 5, Informative

    Put your laptops on a DMZ-like subnet. Don't allow unrestricted access from that to the rest of the LAN. ie.: only allow them access to your servers and other necessary resources. If they don't need to access Bertha's PC in Accounts Receivables then block it.

    Block spyware sites on your firewall and log it. If you see a laptop trying to get to $SPYWARESITE you know they've installed crap. Go remove it.

    Make sure they have antivirus and antispyware stuff installed, up to date and running. A lot of people turn it off because "it slows my machine down"

    Ideally you won't let them have admin access. Far too often laptops show up with Kazaa or other shit installed because they let their kids play with the machines at home. Bad move, it's company property with company information but many people think the other way around. Assuming you're the IT manager you should have every right to remove such crap. Check your policies first.

    Very important: Make a log of everything you have to fix If and when you start to enforce policy you need hard data to back up your actions.

    --
    Trolling is a art,
    1. Re:Here's a start for you. by grub · · Score: 2, Informative

      We have a bunch in our PIX configs. Here's a few to start (and some may be old or broken, we don't actively check) I usually google around for the spyware places. Not sure how this will wrap...
      : www.xcelent.biz evilness. see http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/22/opt-out_ex ploit/
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any host 61.218.79.53

      : gator.com [SPYWARE]
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 64.94.89.0 255.255.255.0
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 204.238.120.0 255.255.255.0
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 64.162.206.0 255.255.255.0
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 63.197.87.0 255.255.255.0
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 216.30.17.0 255.255.255.0
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 208.184.198.0 255.255.255.128
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 216.141.76.128 255.255.255.248
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 64.152.73.0 255.255.255.0
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 66.35.229.0 255.255.255.0
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 64.152.64.0 255.255.255.0

      : cydoor
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any host 209.10.17.133
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 209.73.225.0 255.255.255.0
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any host 212.29.215.3
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any host 209.11.42.240

      : friendgreetings.com "worm", see
      :http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcente r/venc/data/friendgreetings.html
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any host 207.21.232.104
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any host 65.89.168.69
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 216.34.38.64 255.255.255.192
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any host 216.65.63.139

      : activex viruslike crud, see http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105_2-1026228.html
      acc ess-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 216.187.107.0 255.255.255.0

      : www.freescratchandwin.com <- spyware, logger, hijacker.
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any 206.161.193.0 255.255.255.0

      : zotob worm. Mainly for detection internally. grg 20050817
      :diabl0.turkcoders.net port 8080 normally.
      access-list CSM-acl-Ginside deny ip any host 84.244.5.237
      etc etc etc
      --
      Trolling is a art,
    2. Re:Here's a start for you. by Dan+Ost · · Score: 4, Interesting

      The laptops at work come locked down and you can't do anything until a tech
      visits. Rather than wait for days until a tech comes, some people wipe the
      drive and reinstall windows, thus negating any benefit of locking the machine
      down in the first place.

      The moral of the story is if you have access to the hardware, then the machine
      isn't really locked down.

      --

      *sigh* back to work...
    3. Re:Here's a start for you. by karnal · · Score: 3, Informative

      If you attempt to wipe the machines where I work, you shoot yourself in the foot.

      At that point, if you want to install any work related software, you need to be a member of the domain/active directory. If not, you don't get connected, either while in the office or via VPN.

      Of which, you can't install the necessary VPN software unless you are in the office, or we ship you a cd.

      We haven't had anyone try to get around this yet. I think it's safe to say the people who work on them in my business realize they'd be down a lot harder if they tried to....

      --
      Karnal
    4. Re:Here's a start for you. by SlamMan · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Bullocks. No one, outside of developers and other IT staff, needs to install software. If you needs software installed, contact the IT staff, who'll take care of it.

      Likewise, you're machine shouldn't talk to any other users machine directly. You should be talking to servers.

      --
      Mod point free since 2001
  2. insurrection by St.+Arbirix · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Nip the virus problem in the bud: keep OSX up to date on all the laptops.

    *ducks*

    --
    Direct away from face when opening.
  3. laptop == teh suck by vbrtrmn · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Every employee needs a laptop?

    I work for a large company, my boss excidedly says, "Hey do you want to trade your desktop in for a laptop?" I sternly reply, "Hell No!" Confused he asks, "Well why not?" I respond, "Well, I don't want to work from home and I don't want to be responsible for a $2000 computer which isn't mine."

    Now I have 4 desktops under my desk :)

    --
    it's a sig, wtf?
  4. Deepfreeze by QuantumRiff · · Score: 4, Informative
    Great program, reboot your PC, and all changes are reset. It is so much fun to load Kazaa onto a computer, reboot it, and it is all gone.. Of course, you have to get them trained to save absolutely everything to a Pen drive..

    Actually, i think there is a configuration to allow it to make changes to a certain folder, ie, c:\data that will not be wiped on reboot. Lots of fun for viruses too.. Had a lab machine infected with something, (never did look), rebooted the pc, and the virus went away...

    Faronics sells this.

    --

    What are we going to do tonight Brain?
  5. Simple by booch · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Just point out to the notebook users that they're working overtime from home for free.

    --
    Software sucks. Open Source sucks less.
  6. VPN, policies, etc. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

    Posting as AC to protect my job, however our method is quite extensive, and the high-level details are worth sharing for others to learn from.

    My company's (a large online e-tailer and book seller) approach involves several methods to protect remote machines and limit access.

    For remote access, a customized platform agnostic VPN device (running an embedded linux) piggy-back's onto the laptop. The device is powered by the laptop's USB port, and acts as a firewall in addition to a VPN gateway. The device can connect to the internet either via it's built-in compact-flash wireless card (supports WEP or open wireless) or an ethernet connection. When the tunnel is down, the laptop is still well protected by said firewall. When the tunnel is up, all traffic is routed through the VPN tunnel, and subject to corporate firewall rules. The VPN device is tied to the laptop's MAC address, and will not work with any other machine unless reprovisioned by an admin with appropriate rights. The user must authenticate on the device (which updates credentials each time it connects) before access is granted internally, and only the provisioned user has access to login to the device. Three failed login attempts will delete the data on the device, rendering it useless to any theif, and requiring it to be reimaged by corporate IT. The only means of accessing corporate data from "the outside" is via this device or a direct dial-up. There is zero access to internal systems without either of these methods (not even webmail). Dial-up numbers cannot be modified by the user which prevents them from connecting to any random ISP.

    I don't know if either connection is dropped into a DMZ for further protection, however the local VPN device does packet filter certain types of packets on the way out for extra measure.

    On the software side, the machines (when running Windows of some sort) run an antivirus and policy enforcement suite which is maintained by a corporate server. Policies enforce encrpytion of the user's mydocs directory should the laptop be otherwise compromised. Policies also restrict the user from installing software that isn't deployed via SMS. Additionally, anti-spyware software is installed on the machine to allow IT to remove threats. Because users must connect to the corporate network to do most job functions, these tools remain fairly up-to-date.

    To protect the laptop, user passwords are changed regularly and a strong password requirement is enforced in addition to a fairly long password history retention to prevent reuse. Usernames are not retained in the login screen. Laptop screens are forced to lock after a short amount of time to prevent unattended access.

    For browsing, users are permitted either IE or Firefox, however most users prefer the latter :-) Email can be accessed via web, Outlook/Evolution (ick) or Thunderbird via IMAP.

    I'm not sure on the size of your company, but if your budget allows, this seems to be highly secure and admitedly, well thought out means of enforcing security and protecting networks.

    1. Re:VPN, policies, etc. by DutchSter · · Score: 2, Interesting
      Now the worst: "Policies also restrict the user from installing software that isn't deployed via SMS." If you intend to use this at all, you will have to heavily tailor the policies for different users. Developers will need one, or often multiple compilers installed, as well as tools for every piece of the development process like Java runtimes and Cygwin or Rendermonkey and model loaders depending on their job at the time. Content creators may need to add arbitrary plug-ins for software that the company may only own one or two copies of. Modelers may need Pro-E on one machine and Maya on another. Look at who your users are and consider what they need before forming a network policy.

      Where I work, we've found it helpful to have multiple domains with different policies. All the developers have access to the MAINDEV domain, and they have administrative rights to those workstations. There's also a MAINTEST domain where devlopers have mid-level access, and then MAINPROD which is the corporate network - on this, developers are just like anyone else, limited rights. Each of the domains are on their own physical subnets with firewalls between them. For example, a developer can TS into his MAINDEV workstation from his MAINPROD workstation, but not transfer files. In fact, we keep all the development machines physically under lock and key as part of the server farm and require TS/Raritan for any type of console access. When push comes to shove, there's a web interface for rebuilding DEV and TEST workstations.


      As for apps required on the main corporate domain, there's a small group of people who are full-time dedicated to scripting apps and their related plug ins. Access to the apps is controlled strictly by AD groups, which is good because it then forces the install script to run as opposed to the user configuring as they see fit. At the same time, it also gives us license compliance. Regular workstation scans are run at random intervals to compare the applications that each workstation reports as installed to the active directory groups that the user is a member of. Any difference is sent to an administrator who will remotely access the workstation and assess the situation. If it turns out there is unauthorized software, the user is booted immediately from the machine and their user ID is locked out until they call the help desk. At that point, there's a procedure to go through where someone has to come out and reimage your machine, no questions asked.


      As to the idea of employees rebuilding their machines, any machine that attempts to connect to a network segment is checked to see if it is a member of the domain it is trying to get an IP address on. If the answer is NO, it is investigated. Hooking an unauthorized PC to any network segment is an immediate termination situation - I've seen it enforced many times, and on people who are "too important" to be bothered by such policy drivel.


      Getting the OK for this policy was easy - the costs of unauthorized software, from license compliance costs, and the potential of employee/company downtime was presented to the Board of Directors and they directed the CEO to adopt the policy, in full. It also worked well that the policy was sold at about the time that SOX was coming in as the latest buzzword, so it really was an easy sell.

    2. Re:VPN, policies, etc. by DutchSter · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I'd be interested to know what software you use to perform all this.. Any chance of telling? :)

      Nothing fancy actually - it's pretty much all Active Directory, SMS, and Perl scripting. Some strategically placed network probes on the DHCP server allow us to listen for incoming DHCP requests, and the response with the IP address allocated. A filter with an event handling logic runs on the probe which then calls a Perl script to runs an NBTSTAT against the computer to see what it's a member of and does an LDAP lookup to see that the workstation name is in one of the offcial AD OUs. The script has the ability to manage the switch and shutdown ports, send emails, etc.

      I'm not entirely sure of how exactly it's all accomplished since that's a different area of my department, but I know the 10,000 foot view. I do not know what Network filtering software they're using for the sniffer probe. Really, the trick is effective use of Group Policy, and the grunts to physically back it up (that is, enforcing the policy outside the computer world - the guys who make visits to you and your manager for violators, etc). As to the different physical segments for the network, that's as simple as having the electricians run extra Cat5 to a different patch panel in a different room and then connecting the different segments via Stonegate firewalls.

  7. absolute standardization by eagl · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Require absolute standardization. Create a custom installation image similiar to the standard desktop installation including all utilities and software licenses required for the job. Do not give the users administrator rights to anything. Require them to hook the laptop up to the network every week or so to receive updates, patches, and submit to a system scan for unauthorized software and files.

    If the system is determined to not meet company standards, give the employee a day to remove personal and work files, and then take the computer back to your IT cave, scrub the hard drive, and re-install the standard image from scratch before giving it back to the employee.

    If the company has purchased the laptop, it must be very very clear that the laptop, and everything on it, belongs to the company, period. Policies like this will help keep "innocent" employees from accidentally bringing back something hazardous to the company network, and any employee savvy enough to work around the restrictions should also have the skillz to avoid undetected malware.

    And if you have trouble employees who keep getting caught with unauthorized files, software, or who keep bringing back malware infested machines, your security policy and the measures required to circumvent the policies ought to be enough ammunition to support firing them for cause. Or at least confiscating their computer, locking their account, and demoting them to a job that doesn't require the use of a computer. Like janitor or something.

    Make it very clear that as their job depends on them having access to a computer, and their access to a computer absolutely depends on them taking care of it and following company policy, if they do something to cause their network and computer privledges to be revoked then they will either be moved to a less technical job or released.

    My company works in a very similiar fashion, except that we have the threat of jail time thrown in just for flavor. Guess what... Nobody f**ks with the IT guys and the very very few who violate policy and get caught become well publicized examples of how to ruin you life. Is installing that intardnet solitare game, or peeking at the porn site worth your job? How about worth half your salary for 3 months and a month in jail before you get fired? Well, most companies don't need to go that far, but the general idea that messing with the IT resources is dangerous to company survival is something that nobody will seriously consider unless the both the policies AND actions taken to enforce those policies are black and white. No questions askes, fail to bring in your laptop for a weekly update/scan and you lose compter network privledges until you comply. Fail to comply 3 times or get caught violating the rules 3 times, and lose privledges until reinstated by the appropriate company VP, board member, co-owner, whatever.

    If you let people take advantage of the IT department, EVERYONE will bypass the rules. Sure, most slashdot readers could do that without causing harm and many could do it without any real risk of getting caught, but chances are that some of the policy breakers will be relatively incompetent and one single person can bring down the entire company, if the security compliance policies are not clearly defined and rigorously enforced, with real penalties for violations and repeat violators.

    I've been on both ends of the corporate IT stick... Been beaten for sidestepping policy, and done the beating later on when it was my turn to enforce policy. There can't be any question in anyone's mind that the policies simply can't be broken without consequences, no exceptions.

    Go ahead and do it differently, if you don't mind seeing your company on "CNN Money" next week as being the latest gropu who just let some intruder walk away with your customer database or all your company's proprietary info. Yea, that happened to my company too, with some stuff that had been outsouced. Sucks to know that access to my entire personal financial records have been stolen not once, not twice, but three times due to incompetent IT departments my company has outsourced to.

    1. Re:absolute standardization by anomaly · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Great in theory, lousy in practice. For what it's worth, I worked for years as a part of the desktop management team for a Fortune 500 company. I switched jobs about a year ago. On my corporate-issued laptop, I have the full suite of applications 'certified' to work on the reference build of XP.

      I just checked and found that as a part of DOING MY JOB, I need 50 - count them - 50 utilities that are not provided, certified, or approved to go on my laptop. I'm not a developer, but I am a tech lead for implementation of a COTS product deployed on a J2EE app server. Those 50 utilities include:
      Cygwin, jEdit, filezilla, ultravnc, SP2 & a RAM defragger (b/c my laptop won't hibernate without it) ldap tools, putty, gaim, pdf utilities, an HTML editor, and many others. Pretty much none of these would be 'corporate approved' and without them, my job would be MUCH harder.

      I can edit config files in notepad, which *is* corporate certified. It it the most efficient tool? No way! Editing in jEdit is much richer and faster - syntax highlighting for perl, xml, shell scripts, batch files, etc.

      This also does not address the issue with the fact that without local admin I'd be unable to install print drivers for my network-attached printer at home. I also would be unable to connect to my wireless LAN at home, because I would not be able to configure the WEP settings. Do I do real work at home? Yup.

      Here's my point: I'm not using my laptop as a personal computer. My kids never touch dad's work laptop, and my personal software is installed on my personal PCs. Without local admin, my job would be MUCH harder. Is it expensive for our company to let me have a unique config? Probably. How expensive would it be to not let me have the tools I need to do my job?

      What makes sense? In my view, you're penny wise and pound foolish to prevent me from installing the tools I need.

      just my .02

      Respectfully,
      Anomaly

      --
      But Herr Heisenberg, how does the electron know when I'm looking?
  8. Re:There's a simple solution... by gstoddart · · Score: 2, Insightful
    The real problem with laptops is that most IT departments treat them differently than they would a desktop. Don't. Don't give your laptop users administrative access, no matter how much they complain. It is your job to keep the machine in a usable state, no matter what they do to it, so don't allow them to do things that you know will break it.

    Well, a lot of corporations don't differentiate. When replacement time comes around, we can get either a desktop or a laptop. Most people have latops.

    There's so much you can't do on a Windows machine without Administrative access as to make it useless to own one.

    No, your sole job is not to keep the machine stable and locked down. Your bloody job is to provide support for the infrastructure and not be Mordac the Preventer in IT.
    --
    Lost at C:>. Found at C.
  9. Re:"if the company has purchased...." by museumpeace · · Score: 2, Informative

    I would suggest to the poster that ONLY company issued machines be allowed to ever connect to the company systems, in or outside the perimeter. The "locked down" bare bones configuration are standard practice with better defense contractors and large financial companies, especially brokerage firms...I know this from experience. SecurId two part logins through VPN that basically only let you access your desk top system and only as your employee identity tend limit unauthorized access. And be very careful with wireless. If it is tolerated at all, be darn sure users don't ever get a chance to work without encryption turned on.

    --
    SLASHDOT: news for people who can't concentrate on work or have no life at all and got tired of yelling back at the TV.