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Red Hat Seeks to Deliver Most Secure Linux
Jack writes "ITO is running a story on Red Hat's plan to become the most secure Linux platform. From the article: "Red Hat officially joined The National Information Assurance Partnership to bring an improved level of security and assurance to Linux. This means that the next version of Red Hat Enterprise Linux will contain kernel and Security Enhanced Linux policy enhancements, developed by IBM, Red Hat, TCS, NSA and the community.""
The article left out a hyperlink, corrected here :
Trolling is a art,
As sections of the Linux community, such as RedHat, start merging with big businesses, such as IBM, we have to wonder how long it will be before the Red Hat team starts walking on 2 legs...RedHat could be well on it's way to becoming the next Microsoft.
ITO is running a story...
...and probably running it as root, too, the stupid bastards.
Major corporations (such as oracle) target Linux; specifically RedHat. With RedHat, you gain all of the applications that already work with Linux plus security enhancements. With OpenBSD, even though they have a decent amount of applications, they have nowhere near the variety that Linux has, so that gives Redhat an edge.
Cavity searches.
Well Red Hat already is a key innovator into securing the kernel. As most know, Red Hat contributes more code to the kernel than any other entity. The kernel is their livelihood. SELinux patches work with the kernel now because Red Hat engineers worked closely with the SELinux NSA guys to get it to that point. Red Hat also created exec-shield which implements a number of security benefits including NX (NoExecute) and PIE (Position Independant Executables). They release both RHEL and Fedora with sane but secure SELinux policies, compile their major services with FORTIFY_SOURCE and other GCC options that find and/or block many types of overflows and other bugs. PIE is pretty neat in that it randomizes the memory layout so an attacker executing an attack can't know what memory lays ahead, often making the overflow useless. PIE has some performance impedements, so its only typically used on public facing services. Red Hat already forces yum and up2date to verify all gpg signatures by default, and they designed the RPM format so it is highly secure and you know what you're getting when you get it (gpg signing, double hashes (MD5 and SHA1 so that even if one is cracked, the other can act as a crutch until a new solution is found). Red Hat is also reknowned for getting security updates out sometimes days before others. Red Hat is responsible for many of those security patches, and one of the reasons Linux has such a good reputation for getting patches out quickly is a direct result of Red Hat. Anyway... if I had to put my money on someone doing this for Linux, Red Hat would be where I'd put it. They've already shown that they do much for the community, they gave us cygwin, they maintain GCC and libc, they created GCJ so we can run about 95% of java programs natively, including OpenOffice and Eclipse (albeit GCJ is still under heavy development), plus many more things from writing lots of code for projects like Apache and Gnome. (I can't forget to mention buying Netscape Directory Server and giving it to the community, as well as GFS, Global File System). Red Hat's legal department sometimes stirs trouble with derivatives using thier trademark, but the Red Hat engineers actively help CentOS and others. Red Hat is the only major linux player who depends on linux to succeed. All the others, IBM, Novell, Sun, etc.. have come onto the linux "train" to see if it can make them lots of money, if Linux fails however they'll just move on to the next big thing, like they've always done. Red Hat's entire being revolves around linux and its success, they have the motivation that is needed.
Regards,
Steve
Microsoft says it plans to create and ship the most secure version of Windows.
No folly is more costly than the folly of intolerant idealism. - Winston Churchill
First off, I should let it be known that I am a BSD fan, and not a Linux one. However, despite my many issues with Red Hat and Fedora Core, they have been integrating some really cool stuff of late, things I had wanted to have easy access to in a open source operating system for some time, such as the SELinux functionality.
It's absolutely fantastic work they are doing; making SELinux a default in their systems in meaningful ways, while at the same time, doing their damndest to make it as transparent as possible to the everyday user. No one else is doing that. OpenBSD are the kings of UNIX quality control, but they offer nothing in the way of mandatory access controls. FreeBSD has comparable technology in the form of the TrustedBSD MAC Framework (which is excelant), but they are not yet offering security policies that are transparent to ordinary users of the system, and like SELinux in most distributions that support it, it's a pain to set up correctly.
Now if only they (Fedora especially) would ship a basic "desktop install" on *one* CD image instead of requiring 2-4 CDs, my major gripes with their software would go away completely. This kind of hardcore but transparent security is most definately needed by everybody today, and right now, only Red Hat and the Fedora Project are providing it. As much as I prefer the saner development methodologies and more well thought out kernel architectures provided by the various BSDs, in an online world as inherrently dangerous as our own, employing an operating system that supports these security technologies is the only real way to go.
Come on FreeBSD! What are you waiting for? Keep up the (mostly) good work Fedora people!
Trustix Secure Linux has been one of the most secure distributions since its inception. No services are on by default and only a minimal install is needed most of the time. Updates come out seemingly hourly (more like daily) and it's one of the smoothest and securest server operating systems out there. If you're looking for desktop, you're not going to find it with Trustix. I've been using it as my main server distribution for ~3 years without a single problem.
Colin Dean Go a year without DRM
Titanic... couldn't be sunk
Windows 2000... unhackable
RedHat Server 2007... uncrackable
Don't think so...
That is all.
-"...bad old ideas look confusingly fresh when they are packaged as technology" - Jaron Lanier (Digital Maoism on Edge.o
OpenBSD, from what I've heard, is good, but most of its security is based upon correct implementation. This is good, but the OpenBSD team can only audit and control the base system, meaning that applications and libraries added to the system can often degrade the security of the system as a whole.
u x-privs/kernel-2.4/capfaq-0.2.txt
Judging from the technologies and companies mentioned in the summary, this attempt at Linux security is based on providing better access controls and privilege models in the Linux kernel. By better, I mean that these mechanisms can:
1) Provide finer grain privileges so that fewer programs can be exploited to escalate privilege, and
2) Isolate unrelated programs and users from each other (e.g. an exploit in a DNS server is restricted to only accessing DNS files but is not able to manipulate web server pages).
These two techniques basically reduce the number of avenues an attacker can use to exploit a system. It is less likely that a piece of exploitable software will have sufficient access to whatever it is the attacker wants to get to. Granted, it is not a complete solution, but it's a handy thing to have in one's security toolbox.
I believe that the OpenBSD/OpenSSH teams are beginning to do similar things (e.g. OpenSSH privilege separation), but I don't think they've taken the leap to providing more sophisticated access controls in the kernel.
If you're interested, examples of trusted operating systems/access controls can be found at the following places:
Linux Capabilities:
http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/lin
Trusted BSD:
http://www.trustedbsd.org/docs.html
Argus Systems Group (go to the Support section and take a look at the docs for PitBull LX and Foundation; they give a rather complete description of the mechanisms):
http://www.argus-systems.com/
Trusted Computer Solutions (mentioned in the article):
http://www.trustedcs.com/index.html
Disclaimer: I used to work for Argus Systems Group, and I know a few of the TCS employees (as they are also ex-Argus employees).
There are already a number of quality server distributions out there with security tools like SELinux, GRSecurity and PaX, but it will be interesting to see Redhat contribute to the mix. Personally, I use a number of modified Redhat patches while building HLFS-based systems.
While this is undoubtedly off-topic, what I really want to see (and continually try to create) is a desktop system with some of these advanced security concepts enabled. The problem seems to be finding the right balance between security and ease-of-use, it's a lot easier to create a server with non-standard access control than an xorg/KDE desktop.
Contributing to this problem (at least in my experience) are the documentation problems. These can occur in many opensource projects but seem to be magnified in security projects. Even with a fair working knowledge of relevant areas, incomplete and esoteric documentation provides a stumbling block for a lot of us.
Sure you can do it. Samba and Apache just have to be part of the same security domain. Study up, boy.
I, for one, welcome our new Antichrist overlord.
Looks like it's time to trot out this link again:
Jonathan S. Shapiro, Ph.D: Understanding the Windows (and Red Hat) EAL4 Evaluation.
"In the case of CAPP, an EAL4 evaluation tells you everything you need to know. It tells you that Microsoft (Red Hat) spent millions of dollars producing documentation that shows that Windows 2000 (RHEL 5) meets an inadequate set of requirements, and that you can have reasonably strong confidence that this is the case."
Granted, RHEL is being evaluated for LSPP as well, but EAL4 is still weak.
All the comments about OpenBSD are missing the point: Common Criteria isn't about actual security; it's about security documentation. It's also about certain government purchasing requirements. Nothing to see here.
Where I work, it's a Windows/Novell shop. The director doesn't care about security nearly as much as usability. Is that wrong? Hell yes, but that's how it is. Security is our responsibility (not his), and when he's choosing products, he goes for usability. He only recently allowed us to test some SuSE boxes because a) they were endorsed by Novell, and b) he liked YaST. He wanted to understand what we are doing to the boxes. Command line is evil to him, as is anything "open source" or free as in beer (free as in speech means nothing to him)). If it doesn't cost a lot of money and doesn't have an "easy" interface, it's inferior.
SELinux is a great idea but really complex to the point of obscurity. I couldn't come up on my own policy rules for SELinux to make Samba run in a more secure manner. I am the first to agree OpenBSD is the king of secure policy but really bites at allowing an administrator to manipulate them. This is where RH comes in and does very well with their push into SELinux. It is sufficiently complex but in most cases the way RH uses SELinux the user never notices.
Ever since they've introduced SELinux in the default install they've claimed it is incomplete but are adding rules every chance they get. And even better, there is nearly transparent to the "uninterested user". There is a seperate SELinux package that merges in every time they update it so my interaction (and the chance for me to break it) is minimized. And I'm constantly surprised by the settings they do work out as well (for instance some of their Samba settings are really good security policy anyway).
Red Hat's support for things like SELinux is stellar but it needs to be better and they are the first admit it needs more work. Isn't this what Open Source is all about?
Re: I don't know how to do it and therefore it can't be done and therefore it sucks.
It can be done. Here's how:
First some good documentation.
Run:
# up2date --install (or yum install) selinux-policy-targeted-sources /etc/selinux/targeted/src/policy
# cd
# make enableaudit
Run whatever service that is currently broken because of SELinux. Then:
# audit2allow -i /var/log/messages -l
allow httpd_t cifs_t:dir search;
allow httpd_t unlabeled_t:dir { getattr search };
...which will tell you where SELinux blocked the service. (Just some sample output here.)
Then add your own rules like this:
# cat >domains/misc/local.te <<EOF
allow httpd_t unlabeled_t:dir { getattr search read };
allow httpd_t unlabeled_t:file { getattr read };
allow httpd_t unlabeled_t:lnk_file { read getattr };
allow httpd_t cifs_t:dir { getattr search read };
allow httpd_t cifs_t:file { getattr read };
allow httpd_t cifs_t:lnk_file { read getattr };
allow httpd_t default_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
EOF
# make reload
The above is again just an example.
Try again. If it doesn't work you need to allow some more stuff, which audit2allow will tell you.
You are indeed wrong. OpenBSD includes a number of systems which make buggy code more secure. Some examples:
The OpenBSD team realises that no developer is infallible, and they work hard to ensure that security extends far beyond the base system. The work they've done on memory allocation alone is staggering - the diagrams I saw showing the before and after pictures of memory layout were staggering - and all of this was done to support a legacy architecture (x86) because a lot of people use it and they didn't want to force everyone to buy new NX-supporting chips to get the required protection.
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