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CA Sec. of State Panel on Open Source Elections
goombah99 writes "The Open Voting Consortium has announced that California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson is forming a panel to investigate using open source software in elections. Suggested Panel members include Security expert Bruce Perens and Python guru David Mertz who is associated with the sourceforge EVM2003 voting machine project. This is big since a favorable outcome could help fund prototypes of true open source election equipment and systems."
I don't hold out much hope, especially since this is California - the land of the Guvernator. On the other hand, it is also the hotbed of the open source movement. So, there might be some hope.
What we really need is a tremendous scandal in an election: something like all votes are lost and Ross Perot gets elected to the school board, or something. Only then will people actually wake up and realize that they vote is easily in jeopardy from proprietary and unresponsive (and partisan, I might add) election powerhouses like Diebold.
let the flamebait mod down begin...
No, I'm sorry, but that's not sufficient.
The compiler (which is executed as a binary) itself could be subverted.
The compiler can take the good friendly Open Source, compile like normal (for the most part,) but then inject some nastiness wherever it was programmed to.
Even observing the compilation of the compiler does not help, because someone can subvert the compiler that compiles the compiler.
What I recommend: Humans performing pencil & paper counting under scrutiny of video camera and representatives of competing parties. Distribute the video tapes of the counting process on the Internet, and maintain archives for at least 12 years.
Bruce
Bruce Perens.
Its not clear what point you are making here.
- Is it they do other critical transactions so they must be good at it.
- Or is it that their ATM machines might be bad too.
If its the later, ATM machines are completely different problem from voting machines.
ATM machines have to have printers and provide a receipt at least as an option. Most of Diebold's machines have no printer and no option to get a receipt.
If Diebold's ATM machines start doing wrong transactions it would become immediately apparent to the bank and any customer who has a bookkeeping system.
ATM machines and bank transactions don't have to maintain anonymity of the user, voting systems do. It really complicates validation of the transaction.
A paper receipt, verifiable by the voter, deposited in a lock box and subjet to very random recounts would solve most of the uncertainty in electronic voting.
All in all open source would be better than closed source for electronic voting machines but it would provide zero certainty that the election still isn't being rigged electronically. The only two good ways to insure good elections are:
- paper ballets marked with a pencil, watch and counted like a hawk by multiple adverserial observers which works great in just about every country but America.
- if you have to do evoting, you have to have a printer, and a human verifiable receipt going in to a lockbox and hand recounted by adverserial.
@de_machina