Airbus A380 Under Fire

jose parinas writes "The security of the Airbus A380 jetliner is questioned by a U.S. Engineer that faces arrest and bankruptcy in Austria. A year ago, Mangan told European aviation authorities that he believed there were problems with a computer chip on the Airbus A380, the biggest and costliest commercial airliner ever built."

Comments

ha

[Anonymous Coward]

This story will never get off the ground.

Re:ha

[Anonymous Coward]

I'll tell you the secret that I discovered. I always liked moderation, but never got to moderate much. I've always had excellent karma, so that wasn't it. I read Taco's posts about /. on his Journal, and one day he mentioned thinking of re-dooing the moderation system, and how there are different kinds of moderators, and what not. He said something along the lines of "I can count on one hand the number of excellent moderators there are" and that they try to give them more points. Recently, I've been moderating at least once a month if not more.

The secret: never (almost) moderate a comment with a score of 3 or higher up. By that point, the comment is known. You can moderate any comment down if it deserves it (don't bother moderating the 0 and -1 posts down). Find the diamonds in the rough. Read at -1 when you get mod points and mod up those posts that are really good/funny. Even if they are from ACs or start at 1, moderate them up.

This is easiest to do if you do it on new stories. Get in there with the first few comments. That is your best chance to find them. Once the post count grows, many of those posts are already up at 5, and you are unlikely to find any new great posts down low (unless everyone completely misses the point of the story).

One other thing: I never meta-moderate. I used to. I did it daily. It never seemed to increase the number of mod points I got. I stopped meta-moderating because the politics section appeared (I'm right-wing and I can't STAND reading the politics section's comments: they are so full of hate and so far left very often. There is no respect and the most hateful vitriol can end up +5 Insightful fast.) Shortly there after, I discovered the technique above and have been getting many mod points ever since.

Last (and hopefully obvious): USE THE POINTS. Don't let them expire, otherwise it will be a long time before you get more. Save them for a story you know a lot about (something in your field) if possible, but don't let them expire.

Re:ha

[Impy the Impiuos Imp]

If they haven't changed it since they hid it, then the cap is 50. Ironically, there is no "momentum", so you could be pegged high at 50, get a bunch of +5's in a row, which just evaporate, then get a single -1 and presto, you're down to 49.

easy

[Dance_Dance_Karnov]

Take chip, look for problem, if exists fix and replace. It isn't like they would have to rebuild the whole plane.

Re:easy

[Cylix]

Except now the chip has to be recertified for aviation.

In effect, the article states it has already been modified and there was some sentiment that it really should be re-certified yet once again.

Re:easy

[saj_s]

And given the fact that they've only built about 3 A380's so far, it should be pretty easy to do!

Re:easy

[Anonymous Coward]

The problem isn't just with the chip. The problem is that where typically these systems on commercial airlines are triply redundant (from three different manufacturers, even) for safety, plus a manual override, the Airbus has only one system and no manual override. But Airbus wanted to save some weight, and cut out the backups. Bringing the system up to customary standards would indeed require a lot of redesign.

Re:easy

[Mostly a lurker]

One of his key concerns is that all the chips used to control the pressure valves are of the same type. Historically, this has been considered a risk because any logic flaw could cause all the chips to fail simultaneously: an extremely dangerous possibility. This is apart from the claim that such logic flaws do currently exist in the chip and the company tried to cover them up (to the extent of forging his signature). According to TFA, alternative methods would lead to extra weight and throw off the whole design.

I usually treat employee claims such as this with extreme skepticism, but his position within the company (chief engineer) and his obvious sincerity make this case very troubling.

Re:easy

[iamwahoo2]

The problem is that there is no redundancy in the system. You can never guarantee that a system is 100% failsafe and in safety critical systems you counter this by adding redundancy into the system. Why else would Boeing put triple redundancy in cabin pressurization valves for their aircraft? They do not like spending extra money or adding weight anymore than Airbus. It will of course come back to haunt Airbus if this gets more publicity.

The airline industry...

[Anonymous Coward]

They always fix KNOWN problems with airplanes. A known major problem has never been ignored in a passenger airliner....

Autopilot

[Cthefuture]

The story about the plane losing pressure then flying on autopilot before crashing is interesting. Doesn't the plane know it has lost cabin pressure? If it's on autopilot why can't it reduce altitude so the people can regain consciousness? Hell, why can't it just declare an emergency and automatically land at the nearest airport after receiving an OK signal from the airport that it's safe to land.

We have all this technology but it's implemented by idiots.

Re:Autopilot

[jsight]

Not true at all... some airplanes can land automatically with a full ILS.

And, of course, the UAVs (as used in Iraq and elsewhere) can as well.

Re:Autopilot

[sdo1]

I don't think that's true. I flew into Boston's Logan on a very foggy night, looking out the window, I couldn't see the ground until literally a moment before the wheels touched down. After we landed, the pilot came on the PA to say that the landing was done entirely on autopilot. I'm not sure why he felt the need to share that with the passengers, but it was interesting none the less.

It makes me wonder why they havent instituted some sort of anti-hijack system that would auto-pilot the plane to a military airport or something. Pilot radios for help, enters a code on the panel, ground does the same... and instantly, all cockpit controls are locked out unless the pilot unlocks them. Autopilot then takes the plane to a "safe" location. Seems like it would be fairly easy. If the system failed, the worst case would likely be a plane full of people landing safely at an airport that they didn't intend to go to.

-S

Re:Autopilot

[david.given]

They were trying to take off, and the enhanced autopilot decided they were trying to land and took over, so it got about 100ft off the ground and started heading back down, off the end of the runway and into a forest. Nice large fireball too.

Sorry, that's incorrect.

What you're talking about here is Air France Flight 296. There's a full description on the link, but the short version is that the pilot tried to throttle up because the plane was too low, and the fly-by-wire system overrode him due to a fault. Nothing to do with the autopilot at all --- autopilot landings are quite common these days.

(There's also been a lot of controversy about that accident, because there are a number of irregularities with the investigation indicating that the evidence has been tampered with. Check out this link for more information.)

(Oh, yes; only three people died, although about 50 were injured.)

Re:Autopilot

[Colbalt Blue]

You are way off on what pilots use autopilot for. On most commercial flights these days the pilot rarely touches the yoke after takeoff. He enters all headings, altitudes, speed and vertical speed settings into the autopilot and the computer takes care of it for him. In my plane I can enter my entire flight plan into the computer before taking off, engage the autopilot at 500 feet off the ground and not touch anything except the radio until the computer has me lined up for a landing at the destination airport.

Re:Autopilot

[LWATCDR]

It really is just not that easy. What happens if the sensor fails?
What happens if it is on a trans pacific flight and there is no good place to land?
What if there is more than one airport in range? How does it know where to land?
What if you do include a datalink so remote control of the plane is possible? How do you secure it?
Frankly the rapid and total loss of pressure is very rare.

Re:Autopilot

[Anonymous Coward]

The story about the plane losing pressure then flying on autopilot before crashing is interesting. Doesn't the plane know it has lost cabin pressure? If it's on autopilot why can't it reduce altitude so the people can regain consciousness? Hell, why can't it just declare an emergency and automatically land at the nearest airport after receiving an OK signal from the airport that it's safe to land.

Do you really want an aeroplane that makes decisions by itself?

What if, for example, it dedicded that it was a revolutionary and flew to Cuba?

Or perhaps it decides to become Wahabbi and makes a beeline for the nearest skyscraper?

What then?

Perhaps the pilots will be required to have a degree in psychology and be liscensed therapists in order to convince the aeroplane it has made a poor decision?

Re:Autopilot

[rv8]

1. There are already multiple possible failures that could cause a depressurization (cabin window failure, door failure, engine rotor burst, crew error, etc). The design requirements call for systems to alert the crew if the cabin altitude exceeds normal values, and there must be oxygen masks that they can don within 5 seconds. The operational requirements call for the crews to be properly trained in the use of these masks, etc. So even if this chip has a problem, it doesn't necessarily create a new safety issue. Of course, the problem, if it exists, should be corrected.

2. Some business jet aircraft do have an autopilot mode that will automatically descend the aircraft if the cabin altitude exceeds a certain value (several Cessna Citation models, some Gulfstream models, latest Bombardier Global Express, etc). These aircraft often cruise at altitudes up to 51,000 ft, which is quite a bit higher than the maximum altitude for the A380 (apparently 43,000 ft, but typical cruise altitudes will be lower than that). The smaller cabin volume of the business jets mean the cabin depressurizes much quicker, given a similar failure.

Re:Autopilot

[jcr]

If the folks in charge of writing autopilot software are idiots, then I invite you step right in and do it for them, since you seem to know what's what.

He wasn't bashing the implementers, he was bashing the people who decide what to implement.

-jcr

Re:Autopilot

[Paul Jakma]

but the short version is that the pilot tried to throttle up because the plane was too low, and the fly-by-wire system overrode him due to a fault.

If there was a fault anywhere it was in the engine. The pilot claims it didn't spool up fast enough, it may have suffered a stall. The official accident report concluded he simply applied throttle way too later (some conspiracy theories say the FDR was hacked by 3s to make it look like he left it too late). That said, even if that claim of the captain's was true he still furked in several other ways, which led him to be flying 30ft off a runway, when he had intended to be at 100ft (and he would never have hit those trees then..).

Ie, it was definitely compound pilot error (as is often the case), and possibly a (what should have been) problem with an engine. "Computer overrides pilot and flies into trees!" is catchier though, but simply not true - no matter how many times people repeat it.

Re:Autopilot

[Anonymous Coward]

You can't design by anecdote. Complex designs need a philosophy behind them. One of those philosophical points/principles is that (at least in some companies) you can't save the airplane from the pilot.

Other than that, there is a lot of history (and inertia) in aerospace design. Some of these thoughts (like yours) are prompted by accidents and some of those thoughts are considered in the newer designs (certainly you can't foresee every problem that can happen in the real world). That is why the modern airliners are safer than the older ones.

-srr

Re:Autopilot

[Paul Jakma]

Also, don't forget that the cockpit oxygen masks drop down before the main cabin

Cockpit masks don't "drop down" - They're a far more robust (and bulky) construction than the el-cheapo plastic cup+bag things the passenger cabin has, and anyway the space above the pilots tends to be occupied by switch gear and breakers. They're stowed within easy reach of each pilot (to the side, under the seat).

- the cockpit pressure sensor is pegged at a higher level, so that if there is a slow leak, the pilots can don their masks early and do a more controlled descent.

Lower level surely you mean (be it in terms of altitude or barometric pressure). I'll have to ask to find out if this is true, it doesn't ring true at all with me though.

modern aircraft are fitted with ground avoidance radar (what causes the 'whoop-whoop, pull up!' scenario).

The radio altimeter you mean? The one which provides highly accurate relative readings, but only when you're reasonably close to the ground (ie within 1 or 2k feet)? I've never heard it called "ground avoidance radar"...

But, as for the plane landing itself... well, we're still a fair way off with that one. Airports have to be equipeed with differential GPS beacons that allow the plane to determine its position down to about half a metre.

Ok, now I know you're definitely not a pilot but a troll. If you were a pilot you would know that ILS and auto-land systems have existed since at least the 1960's which can guide an aeroplane to within 50ft or so of the runway and that more recent ILS (since the 80s or so? i don't quite know, maybe before then) can bring the aeroplane to 0ft. You'd also know that ILS uses two polarised planes of radio waves - GPS doesn't come into it at all.

You, sir, are a troll. Mods: please undo parent's "interesting" moderation.

(FWIW, my father *really* is a retired commercial aviation pilot).

Re:Autopilot

[csirac]

There hasn't been an airliner with an "engineer's station" since the 1970s, IIRC...

But to put it bluntly, you're adding a lot of complexity, reducing reliability and introducing even more premutations of different failure modes than they already have, with VERY little gain.

Not to mention the safety-critical decisions you have now entrusted to the system: maintaining safe terrain clearance, announcing its unplanned departure from its allocated flight level to warn other traffic to avoid collision, not to mention the complexities involved if there are other problems apart from depressurisation (for instance, many autopilots disconnect and depend on manual control if there is an engine failure - is your decompression going to override that behaviour?).

There is a way of looking at this that might shed some light on why this hasn't been done: the simple fact that decompression resulting in flight crew incapacitation is extremely rare.

Therefore, we have to look at the benefits (would the proposed idea have helped these rare cases?) and the disadvantages (will failures of this system reduce overall safety more than it improves it?).

If the pilot has the presence of mind to read, understand and respond appropriately to the y/n question, they might as well dial 10,000 feet on the altitude-hold autopilot controls or just click off the autopilot completely and do the descent themselves, the way they are continuously trained every year in their ATP simulator checkrides.

The people designing these things are incredibly smart and I'm not sure people out there really appreciate the level of detail and thoroughness any new feature must be considered with in aerospace engineering... even the simple fact that most aircraft are designed with 25 year life-cycles makes the engineering effort totally unrecognisable to most other industries.

The moral of the story is, automated aircraft systems make day-to-day operations much smoother, more efficient, and less tiring for the human pilot. When it comes to emergency scenarios, it really does take a human to make the best decisions - autopilots don't have situational awareness of the surrounding scenario, and are unable to correctly prioritise aspects of the flight and consider everything in the full context of the emergency which requires human reasoning.

Re:Autopilot

[csirac]

It's nothing like adding grammar check to OpenOffice, for example.

_ALL_ features must endure full engineering analysis in its effectivness, usage, cost, failure modes, complexity, and maintenence. For this idea to be considered, all these factors must offset the expected increase in safety (preventing the very rare occurance of decompression resulting in death), and it must be a demonstrable INCREASE in safety (are the potential failure modes and their frequency likely to result in MORE deaths than it will prevent?).

Just the mere fact that most aircraft are designed with 25 year life-cycles in mind makes the entire process almost unrecognisable to other industries.

The people in charge of deciding what features go in to the avionics are engineers as well, not just the implementors that they assign the work to.

Re:Autopilot

[Martin Blank]

No, it does not have a 100% mortality rate. The Aloha Air accident a number of years ago in which a section of the first class wall and roof ripped away at 24,000 feet was an example of instant decompression, but only the flight attendant that was sucked out of the plane was killed. All passengers and remaining crew survived.

Most depressurizations are survived entirely.

Re:Autopilot

[idlake]

If the folks in charge of writing autopilot software are idiots, then I invite you step right in and do it for them, since you seem to know what's what.

Written by someone with no clue about how contracts are awarded in this modern economy. In real life, technical competency and contracts are at best weakly related.

Re:Autopilot

[EvanED]

Good luck designing a computer system that can safely land a extremely heavy aircraft at several hundred MPH

It's been done! For years!

Read the other comments in this thread, or something about autopilots. For instance, the Wikipedia entry, which states that "Modern autopilots generally divide a flight into taxi, take-off, ascent, level, descent, approach, landing, and taxi phases. Autopilots exist that automate all of these flight phases except the taxiing, and some incorporate automated collision-avoidance, as well."

(Oh, and BTW, your "several hundred MPH" is greatly overstating. For instance, the typical landing speed of an A340 is 140 knots, or 160 MPH. This says the landing speed of a 747-400 with full flaps is about 120 mph. (Another site said 160.) The 767 lands at 150 mph.)

Re:Autopilot

[Paul Jakma]

According to the accident report, yes there was, and it was a very basic piloting error:

The problem with the altimeter was, again, due to pilot error. Barometric altimeters derive altitude by measuring air pressure (obviously ;) ), however this means they are highly susceptible to variance, eg due to weather (as all pilots are well aware of). They must be carefully calibrated at the beginning of each flight, and sometimes recalibrated during flight. Further, the barometric altimeter measures altitude from sea-level (ASL), not from the ground (descending to X thousand feet ASL can be fatal if the ground is higher than that ;) ). The pilot got this wrong and miscalibrated the barometric altimeter so it was off by 70 feet or so.

However, that shouldn't have mattered, as all half-modern airliners have highly accurate radio-altimeters (which measure /relative/ altitude using radio ranging - bouncing radio signal off the ground and measuring the delay, RADAR but without the Direction). The pilot though for some unknown reason decided not to rely on the highly-accurate radio altimeter, but flew by the barometric altitude instead. He also decided to ignore the audio ground-proximity warning which was triggered by the radio-altimeter, which should have woken him up to the miscalibration of the baro-altimeter, deciding instead the radio-altimeter must have been wrong.

So yes, altimeter problem, again the pilot's fault.

First Matter of Business

[Brent Spiner]

TTTech? Are these the people that made the PPPowerbook? No wonder shit don't work.

Offer

[mysqlrocks]

TTTech has offered to drop its legal action against Mangan, court records show, and pay him three months of severance, if he retracts his statements.

This doesn't sound like much after all he's been through.

Re:Offer

[nutshell42]

This doesn't sound like much after all he's been through

It sounds like much more than he deserves if he really started spreading FUD after it was clear that he was going to lose his job.

The only way to decide whether he is a whistle blower or a liar that tries to make some cash by blackmailing his former employer and Airbus is to have an independent review of the chip in question. Airbus said they did that but of course they're biased.

Re:WTF?

[biryokumaru]

Maybe he was thinking that they Airbus was built and designed in Europe? And that he'd need to move there in order to work on it?

http://www.airliners.net/info/stats.main?id=29

Pure propaganda, or whatever...

[antek9]

Let's just hope at least slashdot does keep its hands out of the propaganda war already started between Boeing (US) and Airbus Industries (EU). It's a dirty economical struggle, its about jobs and profits in the US, or jobs and profits in Europe. And because of that, plus the military aspects of aircraft research and development, both companies are, and will always be heavily funded by the respective governments.
Keep that in mind before making mindless posts about A. vs. B. . Thanks for your time.

Re:Pure propaganda, or whatever...

[guardiangod]

Well when it concerns about the lives of 800+ men, women, and children. I think it is safe to think that we better get it right the first time around. If we don't, welll... This is not a matter of US vs world- if the plane has known flaws, yet it is still certify to fly for cost/politic reason...I want to see heads rolling- and not from my side either.

Re:Pure propaganda, or whatever...

[niXcamiC]

RTFA! It says that both Airbus AND Boeing are going to be useing this new chip. It seems like people go out of their way to trash stories, when they have no idea what there talking about.

Re:Pure propaganda, or whatever...

[Thu25245]

Since the beginning of Airbus vs. Boeing (Indeed, since Boeing vs. Lockheed vs. Douglas) there has been one rule:

Don't impugn the safety of the competitor's aircraft.

By and large, these huge, competitive companies have all followed that rule. They bribed, called in political favors, exaggerated, waged huge PR campaigns against their competitors...but nobody at Airbus claims that a 737 is unsafe, and nobody at Boeing claims that an A320 is unsafe. Because everybody knows that passengers don't know squat about aircraft, and that the flying public only flies because it has faith that all flying machines are equally, perfectly, safe.

There have been a few minor skirmishes over the years, several having to do with the number of engines needed to safely carry a plane over an ocean. But all of the players (which is, both of them now) have largely refrained from saying "The other guy's planes will fall out of the sky!"

If this is a Boeing PR move, it's a dangerous and stupid one.

Re:WTF?

[DrSkwid]

He lived & committed the crime in Vienna, how would your US law provide any protection ?

Try reading stuff, it usually helps.

But are the problems only limited to the one chip?

[CyricZ]

Let us assume that a problem is found. But even if it is fixed, then how can we know for sure that other problemtic parts were used? If this chip was able to get through the engineering screening process, perhaps other faulty componentry was used as well. A fault here could, in theory, make need for a complete analysis of every single part used. And in a plane this size, that's a massive amount of time and effort.

The next concorde?

[Dingo_aus]

The fact that the company forged his signature on internal certifications should be enough to throw the burden of proof on the company. What worries me about this chip is "The system was executing "unpredictable" commands when it received certain data, possibly causing the pressure valves to open accidentally" So with the right junk data the system fails........at 30,000 feet, great :( Why are they moving away from using several chips from several manufacturers to reduce the risk? Will this be the next concorde? I suppose we'll have to wait a few years until the right (wrong?) junk data is sent to the pressure control chip and 800 people die......... I sure hope not.

Re:The next concorde?

[Martin Blank]

The fact that the company forged his signature on internal certifications should be enough to throw the burden of proof on the company.

It's not a fact. It's a claim made by Mangan that no doubt will come up during trial. If this can be proven, then it's a really bad mark against the the company.

They're not very secure

[freeweed]

After all, it's easy to lose your daughter on one.

To top it off, the flight attendants just don't care :(

He violated the judges orders too

[br00tus]

The story begins with a portrait that tries to paint this fellow sympathetically, and I normally would look on him sympathetically. He goes to the government and complains about problems he perceives, and he gets fired. The events transpire, and eventually a judge tells him to be quiet. By now this is out in the public - he is an American with a family in a foreign city and if he had a need to do something he did it. But then he violates the judges order and begins posting about this on a blog? It makes me think there's something more to the story, or as aviation consultant Weber says "There is something really unusual about this case in the sense that there is this hard standoff between Airbus and the individual, it doesn't make any sense to me." It doesn't make sense - him violating a judges order doesn't make sense, them filing criminal charges doesn't make sense. There seems to be something more at work here. I'll read more about this, but both parties are acting unusual to the point where I am really on neither side, whereas normally I suppose I would be on his side.

Oddities in the article.

[Chmarr]

The article claims that a failure in the chip could open valves that would cause rapid decompression.

There is NO WAY a valve could open up far enough to cause that kind of decompression. It would take several minutes to equalise with the outside air.

The article also claims that such depressurization would cause uncomciousness 'within seconds'.

Well, at 45,000 feet, you have 15 seconds of useful conciousness. Most craft cruise at around 38,000', where you'd have a full minute of useful conciousness... PLENTLY of time, in both cases, for you to put on supplemental oxygen masks.

There may well be problems with that chip, but the article really hypes up the fear factor. Typical of today's journalism: just repeat what others say, dont even bother making your own analysis, and you can't be sued.

Re:Oddities in the article.

[Yoohoo Ladies!]

A slow decompression is even more dangerous than an explosive one because hypoxia can sneak up on anyone without them realising it. It takes a very special person to recognise the symptoms of hypoxia when they're not looking for them specifically.

Re:Oddities in the article.

[Chmarr]

I agree. However, there are other systems in the aircraft that detect the low pressure, and THESE cause additional alerts, plus the oxygen systems to activate.

In addition, a slow 'leak' gives the pilots great time for an emergency descent. Give me a slow leak over a fast one anyday.

Re:Oddities in the article.

[Bonhamme Richard]

Navy flight surgeon http://www.vnh.org/FSManual/01/03Hypoxia.html/ gives you a maxium of 45 seconds of useful consciousness at 35000 ft. assuming a rapid loss of cabin pressure. Its only 45 seconds at 40,000. This is assuming that you are sitting still. If you are preforming "moderate activity" (say screaming your head off because you are are scared stupid) it drops to 30 and 18 seconds (35 and 40 thousand ft, respectively.) Even 30 seonds isn't a lot of time. You need to recognize that there is a problem, identify the problem, and correct it, all in that time, with impared cognitive abilities due to hypoxia. If you're a hot shit Navy Jet Jock whose trained for years to handle that kind of conditions, then no problem. If you are the average airline passenger (and likely the average airline pilot) that's not nearly enough time. I have no idea how violent a depressurization of this kind would be, but if it didn't rock the plane too much, the pilot's first warning that something is wrong might be when he passes out. Hypoxia = nasty

Re:Oddities in the article.

[Anonymous Coward]

I thought many if not most airline pilots started their careers as a hot shit Navy (or Air Force) Jet Jock?

Re:Oddities in the article.

[tftp]

It's more important to ask why they ended their careers with Navy.

the answer is in the article silly

[guardiangod]

If you care enough to RTFA, you will see the following line

Yet his employer ignored his concerns, he alleges, because fixing the glitches would be costly, could take up to a year and would further delay the A380's launch.(a year behind already)

Very strange reporting

[Anonymous Coward]

Really strange reporting. For starters, they don't even get basic facts right, e.g. they report Airbus was "owned by Dutch and British companies", when in fact it is owned by EADS (80% share, French/German) + BAE (20%, British). They also keep calling it a problem between Airbus and Mangan, when the actual events (as per their own article) seem to only involve Mangan and his former employer, TTTech. Airbus doesn't seem to have any involvment in this.

Re:Very strange reporting

[amabbi]

For starters, they don't even get basic facts right, e.g. they report Airbus was "owned by Dutch and British companies", when in fact it is owned by EADS (80% share, French/German) + BAE (20%, British).

Actually, that part of the article is spot on. EADS is multinational but incorporated in the Netherlands.

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[Anonymous Coward]

Read the article again. This chip didn't "get through." According to the whistle blower, the company forged his signature on documents approving the chip. If true that means they knew about the problem and tried to cover it up.

Crazy, but possibly in the right

[Anonymous Coward]

I am an Australian working for a French aerospace company and there is no way I would trust a European Government to back me up in a case like this.

More than in the USA aerospace firms are seen as a branch of defense in Europe, and the courts will not look kindly on whistle blowers.

He should have gone back to the USA and started his campaign from there. He would get more backing from Boeing supporters and the US Government certainly would not act against him for criticising EADS.

Snitching on your employer

[Muhammar]

I worked for 3 pharma companies. I would never openly challenge a company like this about their product. I would find a new employer first and then I would try to leak out what was going on - and I would be extra careful that my new and old employers would not find out it was me. Why volunteer yourselfs to go in front of a firing squad? - It is not important that you made the point first, give a journalist a hint, he will give you a story. If they then call you then to testify, you do it, maybe without trying to look eager.

Reporting to autorities on your own employer - even if there was a serious wrongdoing - is certain to end your industry career.

Re:Snitching on your employer

[Anonymous Coward]

what is the difference between letting a random stranger die from a product defect so you can keep your paycheck, and shooting a random stranger to take his money ?

Corporations do the first one all the time without impunity, while governments do the second?

Joseph Mangan's Blog

[Anonymous Coward]

Looks like his blog is here: http://www.eaawatch.net/

His blog

[HotNeedleOfInquiry]

I'm not positive this is his blog (it looks more like a static web page) but it does have a ton of information on the subject:
http://www.eaawatch.net/index.html

Re:His blog

[burne]

Well.. I did RTFB, and I get the suspicion that Boeing isn't going to hire this guy this century. Or next. And neither will Honeywell. Both get similar flames and incoherent insults on their policies and designs.

Perhaps we should rename this posting to 'Disgruntled Engineer pisses off most of the industry in a single day'.

This reeks of FUD

[Anonymous Coward]

"Mangan told European aviation authorities that he believed there were problems with a computer chip on the Airbus A380"

"Mangan alleges that flaws in a microprocessor could cause the valves that maintain cabin pressure on the A380 to accidentally open during flight"

If there was an inclining of truth to this I doubt he would be going through this drama. Europe is VERY different to the US when it comes to corporate coverups.

I believe there is a major flaw with the fuel injection computer on ALL Ford motor vehicles which could at any time take control of your vehicle, disable the airbags and crash into the nearest telegraph pole (which it finds by GPS) at high speed.
Buy a Chev instead, to be safe!

No, it was an Airbus

[LibertineR]

The pilot had made a slow pass over the field, and when he tried to pull the plane up, the computer overrode his commands thinking he was trying to land, and that is why they crashed into the forest. After that, an emergency pilot override was placed in AirBus jets. The Boeing 777 can takeoff and land automatically. Hell, that airplane can do anything.

Re:No, it was an Airbus

[rv8]

The pilot had made a slow pass over the field, and when he tried to pull the plane up, the computer overrode his commands thinking he was trying to land, and that is why they crashed into the forest.

While there some conspiracy theories, as with many catastrophes, the generally accepted story differs very substantially from the above.

The aircraft was flown at maximum angle of attack (AOA) at about 30-35 ft above the runway during an air show, with passengers on board. The pilot disconnected the autothrottle system, as its "alpha-floor" system would have automatically increased the engine thrust, preventing him from slowing the aircraft as much as he wanted. The aircraft eventually ended up at about 30-35 ft above the runway, with the engines at idle, and at the maximum allowable AOA.

The co-pilot noted that the obstacles ahead were higher than the aircraft, alerted the pilot, who pushed the thrust levers (i.e. throttles) ahead, and pulled back on the controls. The flight control system did not allow the pilot to raise the aircraft's nose, as that would have required increasing the angle of attack, and the wing would have stalled. The only way out of the hole he dug was to get more thrust. The faster you go at a given AOA, the more lift the wing produces. The fact that lift is now greater than the weight means the flight path starts to curve upwards, and the nose rises, even at the same AOA. But, it takes about 7 seconds for a modern high-bypass ratio turbofan engine to accelerate from idle to full thrust (the regulations allow 8 seconds), and they hit the trees 5 seconds after he pushed the thrust levers forward.

The flight control system's AOA limiting function prevented a much more serious accident, as if the wing had stalled the aircraft would have went out of control. As it was, it hit the trees in controlled flight, and only three people died.

After that, an emergency pilot override was placed in AirBus jets.

There is no emergency override in the Airbus jets. The pilot can manually turn off enough flight control computers to put the flight controls in Direct Law, where there are no longer any artificial limits on what he can do, but this would not have prevented this accident. He would have crashed much earlier in the sequence if he had tried to do the same thing in Direct Law.

The Boeing 777 can takeoff and land automatically.

The Boeing 777 cannot takeoff automatically. It can land automatically, as can all the other modern large airliners, including Airbus A320, A330 and A340.

Re:austria

[moonbender]

IANAL, but I doubt it's as bad as the article makes it sound. I wouldn't be surprised if there are some serious misconceptions resulting from a false application of US terminology and system of law to a European one. Maybe some (Austrian) lawyer can shed some light on it.

Maybe I'm biased, but I found the article to be kind of terrible overall - the writing is very confused, it repeats itself all the time and there doesn't seem to be any internal logic or progression, just random bits of (mis-)information. For instance: Airbus is owned by British and Dutch companies; yes, well, EADS which holds an 80% share of Airbus (apparently) is legally a Dutch company but I'm sure the French and my some of my fellow Germans would disagree with the notion that it's Dutch.

Speaking as a Civilian FAA Representative

[StressGuy]

The FAA and European agencies are pretty close to each other on regulations...a good thing since we fly big commercial aircraft in each others airspace all the time. The rest of the Airbus fleet is type-certificated in the US, I can only assume they wish the same for the A380.

In this country, you're not going to put an "off the shelf" anything in a commercial aircraft unless it's gone through appropriate approval processes. You can't change the color of the fluid in the compass bowl without PMA approval.

Furthermore, if they want thier TCDS (Type Certificate Data Sheet), they will need to, among other things:

1) Fully ground test the operation of the depressurization valves

2) Ground pressurization test the aircraft

3) Test the pressurization systems in flight

[Reference: Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25, Subpart D, Paragraphs 841 and 843]

Bypassing the approval process for a component is a serious charge. However, given that a gigantic double-decker commercial aircraft has "new and novel" written all over it, something just doesn't quite compute here.

Smells like a propaganda war, but I'll keep my eye on it.

Re:Speaking as a Civilian FAA Representative

[StressGuy]

What you are not considering is that the A380 does not yet have a TCDS. They won't get type certification in the US unless and until they show outright compliance or ELOS (equivalent level of safety - yes, the aviation industry is full of acronyms). Trust me, there is not way that veritable armies of inspectors will not "be around" as it were. You just don't bypass these regs by just getting someone to "look the other way". As Douglas once put it, "when the weight of the paperwork equals the weight of the airplane, the airplane will fly" The A380 is a BIG airplane.

Don't just dismiss the regs as easily bypassed, it has happened, but it's the exception, not the rule. Once it does happen, it's not unusual to see an entire aircraft type grounded until the matter is resolved. Airbus went through this not long ago when it was discovered that certain empannage components came from what essentially turned out to be an Italian aircraft scrapyard. They falsified documentation to make the parts appear to be remanufactured and approved.

Pretty sure they are still in prison.

Par for this particular course

[nagora]

Given that in its early days the A320 would occasionally just dive into the ground or start doing loops and Airbus's response was to have the test crew certified insane, this isn't really new. This was even after they were caught on film switching black boxes after a crash. There's details here but it was covered by the channel 4 news at the time.

The problem is that so many European governments are involved in the project, and so many politicians are getting "benefits" from it that it simply isn't allowed to criticise Airbus.

TWW

My reactions

[erroneus]

My first reaction was the expected "Oh my god! This consciencious guy is getting royally screwed!" and I immediately felt for his situation and could only hope to be as honorable.

But after reading the article and the other Slashdot opinions, I too think there's a lot that needs to be revealed before we can form an opinion about this.

Ultimately, we should hope that all the facts are revealed in this case and quickly. If there's a problem, it should be fixed and let this thing move on. If there's not, then I hope the true motivations are revealed as well. But I don't want to see this problem disappear under secrecy and then read about some horrible terrorist attack that was actually a system malfunction in disguise.

Maybe he's got ethics.

[pallmall1]

Maybe he remembers the space shuttle Challenger disaster. Seven people died then, when an engineer followed company orders not to oppose the launch and to keep quiet.

Maybe Mangan, the former ITTech engineer, has a conscience and takes his ethical responsibilities as an engineer seriously. If he knows of a problem and knows the company has falsified test data, it is his duty to come forward. To remain quiet would make him partially responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people should a catastrophic failure occur in the Airbus pressure valves.

Also, how reliable are the systems that tell the forward landing gear to point sideways? (Remember the recent Airbus emergency landing?)

Re:Maybe he's got ethics.

[br00tus]

You seemed to have missed the point. He came forward, his story was public, a judge told him to quit talking while the case was ongoing and he didn't. You're spinning the story just like it seemed spun to me in this newspaper article. The point is what he did after he went public, after the matter went to court.

Re:ROFLMAO

[afaik_ianal]

It doesn't seem all that silly to me..

> > Doesn't the plane know it has lost cabin pressure?
> No. It's a plane.
We could replace the word "know" with "detect", and lose the patronising response altogether.

> > If it's on autopilot why can't it reduce altitude so the people can regain consciousness?
> Because it's on autopilot. The captain set the autopilot's target altitude, turned it on,
> and then keeled over. The autopilot held the altitude as long as it could.
So change the way autopilot works, which is what the OP was getting at. Clearly, something can be improved here: The fact that a plane will happily fly until it runs out of fuel, when it could probably have detected that the chances of the pilots being concious were remote at best is a part of the plane that could be designed much better.

> > Hell, why can't it just declare an emergency and automatically land at the
> > nearest airport after receiving an OK signal from the airport that it's safe to land[?]

> And if it has to crash land, it can go for a nice long trip to the plane hospital, and
> maybe the plane doctor will give it a nice lollipop! Yeah, that sounds good.
Why the sarcastic answer on this one? Auto-landing is used all the time - see http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=48 2344 for more info.

Now admittedly, the accident refered to in the article happened on a Leer Jet, so they are unlikely to have the same technology as a commercial liner, but I don't think the post was deserving of your somewhat harsh response.

One of the tough things about engineering

[SimJockey]

I've gone up against a client (big multi-national oil company) who disagreed with me on what was required for a refinery safety system I was designing. I wanted a pretty elaborate and redundant system to take care of what I will admit was a remote contingency. However it is my job to consider remote contingencies, it was what they hired my company for. But they really balked at what I was proposing.

As much as engineers like black and white solutions, there is a lot of grey out there. In my case, I saw the deficiencies one way, they saw them another. The scenario couldn't be practically tested and the academic research on the topic was spotty and a lot of it was unpublished internal data. I ended up putting together reports with experts from two continents to convince this client that there was a problem they weren't seeing.

Standing up on something like this is a lonely place to be. Like the article, I live with the thought of what I do can kill people if I am wrong. Makes me real cautious. But people who I report to are often non-experts, and occasionally they believe things irrationally (to me anyway) and it takes a lot of convincing to get them to see the my side. And hey, I am wrong sometimes too. But to stand up to a company that is paying your paycheque and say that you will not sign off on a design because you believe there is a problem, all the while they are screaming at you that we are behind schedule and over budget, makes for a truly shitty day at work. You get all sorts of pressure to let things go "good enough". Takes a lot of backbone and confidence for a technologist to stand up to economic pressures. We tend not to care as much for the dollars as we do for safety. I admire whistleblowers for this.

This is why being a whistle-blower sucks...

[MrPerfekt]

You're doing the morally right thing but you'll get the shaft every time...

Mangan said he was looking for a new job. He has contacted dozens of aerospace firms in the U.S. and Europe, but none have returned his calls. "Nobody wants to touch me," he said.

It's not really shocking that nobody wants to touch you after you've potentially cost your former employer, in the same field no less, millions of dollars. It's amazing to me though that the US has some of the best protection laws when it comes to this sort of thing.

Re:An Engineers First Duty

[digitalgimpus]

I'll take that one further.

A Persons first duty is always to the public.

It doesn't matter who you are. If your a cook, and know the meat your using was mishandeled, you have an obligation to prevent human consumption. Doctors have an obligation to preserve life. A cop's first duty is to the public (before his fellow officers or commanders).

in aerospace since '71 (9 of those yrs in Europe)

[scotty777]

I find this report very disturbing. The lack of protection for European whistle-blowers is terrible.

If the guy is wrong about his concerns, he should still be allowed to have them heard. I'd rather have 9 out of ten "squalks" amount to nothing, than suffer the consequenses of the tenth.

I'm shocked at the shortsightedness of Airbus response. Since Boeing is deploying the chips, in the American legal environment, there is no way an open process can be avoided. What in the world is the Airbus executive suite thinking? They have made a "no win" choice.

If Boeing confirms the problem, then Airbus looks like they were playing fast-and-loose with peoples lives. If Boeing, in an open process, confirms the safety of the part... Well then folks will ask why Airbus didn't open the process. And all the while Airbus looks like an ugly outfit to work for...

I just don't understand why they're playing it this way. This closed-process "deny, deny, deny" attitude destroyed Douglas Aircraft's business after the Chicago DC-10 crash. I hope the A-380 will prove safe in service, but I do wish they allowed whistle-blowers to live in peace, and addressed the claims with engineers, not lawyers.

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[SlayerDave]

A fault here could, in theory, make need for a complete analysis of every single part used. And in a plane this size, that's a massive amount of time and effort.

Not necessarily. It seems like the defect in question is only found in a particular chip made by this company TTTech. It seems to me that the worst case scenario would call for a reevaluation of all TTTech parts, especially if TTTech is engaged in some kind of cover-up about its chip defects. That wouldn't necessarily bring the Airbus project to a halt, as there is no reason to suspect that parts from other manufacturers are also dangerously defective (at least no reason given in TFA).

Career Over.

[Erris]

Reporting to authorities on your own employer - even if there was a serious wrongdoing - is certain to end your industry career.

If there was serious wrongdoing, your career is already over. Serious wrongdoing is defined as people dying because your company took a shortcut. Forging the engineer's signature is one such shortcut. After that, there's no real walking away. It's your signature on the approval. If things go wrong, it's your ass anyway. The mud from dissasters flies far and wide and many innocent people are often ruined as supply chains are changed in the wake of public perception.

This is why you should never work for people you don't trust. If you get a bad feeling about anything an employer does, get out. These kinds of things never end well.

I worked for 3 pharma companies. I would never openly challenge a company like this about their product. I would find a new employer first and then I would try to leak out what was going on - and I would be extra careful that my new and old employers would not find out it was me.

In US aviation, at least, there are anonymous hotlines to report violations. Calls can trigger an inspection to verify compliance.

Not Quite

[WindBourne]

1. Finding the problem is sporting.
2. From there, you then have the programmer(s) test it and make sure that there are no more issues.
3. Once that has passed, then you have the test group re-design a set of new tests and test them as well.
4. Once there, an internal auditor goes over your work.
5. From there, an Airbus auditor goes over said work.
6. Then an EU FAA-equivilence auditor.
7. Then an American FAA auditor.

Just that little bit of a fix, takes no less than 9 months (normally closer to 1.5 years). Delaying the A380 will cause serious issues right now. In fact, there are probably performance clauses penalties associated with this that would probably sink TTTech (hence the reason why they want to cheat).

BTW, if you wish to argue with me over this (and some idiot will ), I currently do the coding of the test for the data AND APIs of an american unit that be in the cockpit of the A-380 (and other aircrafts). I have found out that getting this level C cert. has been very sporting.

Re:Not Quite

[dspacemonkey]

I would be more interested in finding out what the alleged flaw is. It doesn't give details in the article; has anyone seen anything more detailed?

Mangan's blog

[jmichaelg]

Joseph Mangan's blog starts off being pretty inflamatory. However, down towards the bottom of his main page, he posts the minutes of a meeting that discusses how the employees should act if anyone asks about problems with the chip. The items he cites can be read two ways:

1. say as little as needed to avoid getting entangled in details or...
2. say as little as possible so Airbus is deceived into thinking the part is "simple."

Without more documents, it's not clear to me which interpretation is closer to the truth.

In this document he asserts that the OS that runs on the chip was hacked together and that the software being delivered to Airbus was not put together according to the software engineering standards Airbus requires of its sub-contractors. He also says:

In numerous official review findings by Honeywell International employees performing the role of external reviewers, led by Honeywell Engines and Systems Tucson, Software Quality Assurance Manager Jeff Young, TTTech consistently failed to deliver documentation, tests, and process compliance evidence at an acceptable level of quality.

Perhaps someone here knows Jeff Young and can ask him if Mangan's charge is true vis-a-vis the product delivered to Honeywell.

Re:Poor engineering journalism

[plasmacutter]

pardon me.. but above certain altitudes it may as well be instantly.. as in blood boiling, the bends.. sudden depressurization without warning would suck the air from your lungs.. you would have no way of knowing to hold your breath.

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[jcr]

I can prove that I am not a 20 foot nymphomaniac amazon woman.

No, you can't. You could be a 20-foot nymphomaniac Amazon in disguise. Go ahead, prove that you're not!

-jcr

Ethics & Technology - Mangan's blog is

[kupci]

There seems to be something more at work here. I'll read more about this, but both parties are acting unusual to the point where I am really on neither side, whereas normally I suppose I would be on his side.

Mangan's blog has significant details. It makes quite a bit of sense if this guy, has more integrity than your average person. He's a super smart guy apparently, and he's probably right, firing him was probably not a good idea. Who wouldn't be miffed, and want to restore their good name? For the Austrian company, I'm betting they don't have the time to improve the design, or fix it properly.

I've read the various articles in the LA Times and WSJ, and his blog, and my take is he is an engineer, and he's not going to let politics and bureaucrats cover this flawed design. Any whistleblower faces this - it's what sets them apart from the average person.

The articles are very interesting, he was testing the system and found flaws not only in the functionality but the system design (not redundant). Seems there's politics and big money involved.

I sat in on an ethics class, directed towards engineers, at Stanford once, forgot the name of the class, but the professor posed the question - if you, as an engineer on a major project (whether it be designing a new drug or a spaceship), and discovered an issue, what would you do? Now perhaps the dishonest person, rushing to finish the project and look good, would move on. The average person would write an e-mail perhaps, and then if nothing was done, perhaps at most quit their job. And if you're fired? Anyway, interesting class.

Scewed up?

[Savage-Rabbit]

It sure sounds like Austria has a screwed up legal system.

Screwed up as it is I don't think the Austrian system is any worse than the US, German, French. British one.... The basic truth is that every body is equal under the law in a Democracy and everybody can get justice. All you have to do is put up the money for a N-year long legal battle and we all know who is more likely to win that one don't we? Ciitizen John Q. Public or Corporation X? My money is on the corporation. The end result in cases like this usually is that however wrong they may be the corporations always win. They do it by dragging things out in court until they have bankrupted you broken up your marrage and genarally ruined yoru life causing you to give up. One is just left hoping that Boeing and Airbus both have the sense to test these chips exhaustively before one of their aircraft makes them regret their lethargy when several hundred people die. Of course it usually never sinks in until to late that the PR damage done by one of their new superliners crashing will cost them more than what they are saving by ignoring the problem but one can always hope for a miracle, like... say... an aerospace industry CEO growing a consience? I know it's a slim chance but I have't quite given up on the human race yet.

Re:NEWFLASH

[wasted]

I definitely agree that it is stupid to use a chip with such a flaw.

I agree it could be deadly.

US Federal Aviation Regulations, if followed, might prevent the deaths, though. At altitude, either the pilot or copilot is supposed to be on oxygen full time. In the event of a rapid decompression, that person would be able to descend the plane to an altitude where the pressure is great enough for all to regain consciousness.

Unfortunately, at the lower altitude, the fuel flow would be a lot greater for a given distance, and if the plane is on an extended overwater flight, the plane may not make it to a safe destination, especially since the four-engine design exempts it from ETOPS.

If anyone who has their ATP license sees anything incorrect, please correct me.

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[Zork the Almighty]

This is a question of a $500 vs $50 part in a plane that costs a couple hundred million. I would be quite amazed that any company in the modern litigious world would forge a signature to get a part as critical to safety as this one passed when knowing that the part was sketchy.

Airbus didn't forge his signature, that would be the company who makes the $50 part.

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[shobadobs]

It's impossible to prove a negative.

Oh? I'd like to see you prove this claim.

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[dfjghsk]

mod parent up.

we're not talking about Airbus forging someones signature so they don't have to spend a few extra bucks on a plane worth millions... we're talking about a manufacturer who forged someones signature so they wouldn't lose out on sales of their $50 part.

Not propaganda, or whatever...

[sonamchauhan]

This does not look like a Boeing PR move. This looks like a honest-to-goodness engineer sticking to his ethics.

From the article:

"Unlike U.S. laws that shield whistle-blowers from corporate retaliation, Austrian laws offer no such protection. Last year an Austrian judge imposed an unusual gag order on Mangan, seeking to stop him from talking about the case.

Mangan posted details about the case anyway in his own Internet blog. The Austrian court fined him $185,000 for violating the injunction. ...

To help pay living expenses and legal fees, Mangan sold his house in Kansas. With only about $300 left in his bank account, Mangan missed a Sept. 8 deadline to pay his $185,000 fine and faces up to a year in jail. Next month he's likely to be called before a judge on his criminal case.

The family expected to be evicted this month from their apartment, but their church in Vienna took up a collection to pay their rent. ...

TTTech has offered to drop its legal action against Mangan, court records show, and pay him three months of severance, if he retracts his statements. But Mangan has refused.

Mangan said he was looking for a new job. He has contacted dozens of aerospace firms in the U.S. and Europe, but none have returned his calls. "Nobody wants to touch me," he said."

Re:Not propaganda, or whatever...

[sonamchauhan]

I understand the legal system adequately. You need to understand that doing the right thing trumps European legalities when lives are at stake.

Take a read of this - this happened a couple of weeks ago - a Greek airliner lost cabin pressure - everyone died:

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2 005/08/16/MNGVAE8CRS1.DTL
Aviation experts puzzled by clues in Greek disaster
Crews well trained to handle cabin decompression

Or it can follow a malfunction in the pressurization equipment, although such systems have built-in redundancies to prevent such problems.

You see these "built-in redundancies" mentioned there? The new system this guy is working on won't have them.

Now he's chief engineer for the company designing that one crucial control, so he's the domain expert. If he thinks there is a problem, industry is ignoring it, and the judge is siding with them and issuing a gag order, he did the right thing by following his conscience.

As you darkly imply, he may have sacrified his career because of his troublemaker status. Worthwhile price to pay to follow your conscience.

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[autopr0n]

You can't. It's impossible to prove a negative.

Why do people think this? It's idiotic. When you prove a positive, you also disprove it's opposite. If I prove I am a man, I also prove I am not a woman.

I think what people mean is that they cannot prove an existentially qualified negative (i.e. there does not exist), or a universal positive (i.e. everything in the universe is blue).

But anyway, proving and disproving those types of statements is why we have second-order logic.

Still...

[autopr0n]

He's an American (as am I, just for the record) so people might think that he's a Boeing spy. If this guy can spread even a little doubt about the safety of the A380's safety, it could end up making hundreds of millions of dollars for Boeing. There is a lot of espionage in the Aerospace industry.

This isn't just a disagreement, someone is lying here, and with geopolitical stakes what they are, who knows...

Not the same for the Navigation Box

[kcb93x]

As my father's one of the lead software engineers designing those, and they're quad-redundant within each box, and I think he mentioned something about 2 or 3 in this specific one. Might be wrong, it's been awhile since I've talked to him about it though.

Re:Not the same for the Navigation Box

[Slashamatic]

For the A320, all critical systems used a minimum of two chip architectures and 3 independent software solutions working from the same closely controlled spec but otherwise not communicating. A friend worked on one of the computers there.

I can't see what would be different for the 380. the only point is whether the pressure control system was considered to be critical enough to be fully backed up.

Re:There are far worse problems with Scarebus...

[EvilNTUser]

The pilot made *excessive* alternating rudder inputs. The main problem with the aircraft seems to have been that it wasn't programmed to stop him. Try trusting the NTSB reports instead of the conspiracy theories.

Not to mention that turning this into a pissing contest will force someone else to bring up the problems with the Boeing 737 rudder. You wouldn't want that, would you?

Re:Right...

[Begs]

You may be correct. I did the same but came away with a little different instinct.

I recognize a pattern I have seen before. When a person gets under this kind of pressure and scrutiny, they have a tendency to over explain, giving ever extending details right on out into the minutia.

Here's why. They feel very vulnerable to fallacious but effective attack of "you got one thing wrong, so everything might be wrong" or the "you left one thing out, so what else are you hiding." They feel compelled to try and head off these attacks by being excessively expository and detailed, giving their writing that edge of paranoia.

You may be right. But remember, just because he comes across as paranoid, doesn't mean they aren't after him. It also doesn't mean that the conspiracy to cover up this supposed problem is only his imagination.

Some additional facts

[prefec2]

Sep. 29 I redd an article about the Mangan vs. TTTech thing on www.spiegel.de (in German sorry). According to this article Mangan worked for TTTech for 6 months in 2004. The company said that he never complained about the chip until he gots fired because they were unsatisfied with his performance.

Well that's what the company says. So the real facht is that he worked there for 6 months and that this chip development started years before 2004. Because they needed these chips for the ground tests. And before that these chips have to be tested. So Mangan was too much involved in this.

Also for me that looks like: He got that job, he scewed it up and was laid off in his probationary period.

From Joseph Mangan Whistleblower of A380 CPCS

[Joseph Mangan]

This message is from Joe Mangan jtrm jtrm 2 194 2005-10-02T09:37:00Z 2005-10-02T09:37:00Z 1 2660 15164 Home 126 30 18622 9.2720 0 0

This message is from Joe Mangan

www.eaawatch.net

www.joseph.mangan.name

www.joseph.mangan.com

The Commercial Aircraft Industry economic business model is seriously flawed, and is actively engaged in transferring financial risk from Corporations to threats to the lives of the passengers and crew without their informed consent.

This issue is not about AIRBUS vs BOEING, this is AIRBUS and Boeing, and FAA, and EASA, and the Aircraft system suppliers and their sub suppliers. This is about all of the elements of the system being under tremendous pressure to be overly aggressive in the use of untested, unproven, low cost technology containing high uncertainty. The use of technology of high uncertainty always results in projects taking far longer to complete and costing far more than originally planned. This is project risk, and risk is nearly always significantly underestimated in project planning of modern Aerospace Programs. In essence we have the worlds biggest game of ?Russian Roulette?. With Boeing and Airbus gambling that the other will

Pull the trigger on the chamber containing the live round, thus ending the game. I believe that what we are about to see if the combatants do not ?throttle back? is the ?story of the 3 Japanese fighting fish?, where the smart fish (China, India, Japan) allows the other 2 fish to fight to the death, leaving the survivor too weak to defend against the attach of the stronger smarter fish who wins unopposed.

I feel a great sympathy and compassion for those who failed the morality test, challenged with facing the agonizing decision over career and wealth, vs the cost to human lives of their choice. My Christian conscience would not allow me to look the other way, realizing that for my own comfort and security, I would have to knowingly rationalize my own selfish interest, and thereby place at risk the lives of innocent Men, Women, and Children.

I have waited an entire year (October 2004) in a tireless pursuit to work with AIRBUS, Nord Micro, TTTech, EASA, and FAA to correct these issues in private. These organizations refused to take any action. I was left with no other avenue than to pursue the issue in the public domain one year later. I had simply exhausted every opportunity available to me. I even visited the CEO of Nord Micro in his booth at the Paris Airshow, spending 40 minutes with him and his engineers in an attempt to convince them to act in the interest of public safety. Numerous failed attempts in good faith with TTTech are documented on my website. In each and every case, TTTech violated agreed to terms, and demanded in each case a retraction of my official statements to EASA and FAA, which has always been understood to be non-negotiable.

Are these people who failed the moral challenge evil? No, they must decide what is more important to them, the lives of people vs profit, comfort, and security for themselves. The laws currently favor those who choose profit over safety. Protections and safeguards, even in the United States are insufficient to motivate a whistleblower to put themselves and their families in ?harms way?. One only need to look at the Corporate Crime Spree of WORLDCOM, ENRON, TYCO, ADELPHIA, HEALTHSOUTH and others.

Conscience can only motivate a whistleblower to act first in the interest of others.

When confronted by Executive Management with data showing the program is significantly over schedule and over budget, direct pressure is applied to find a way to ?get back on schedule?. Just as with the WORLDCOM case of Ebbers, all that must be said, is that ?we have to make our numbers?, and th

Re:From Joseph Mangan Whistleblower of A380 CPCS

[Joseph Mangan]

CORRECTION, the addresses in the previous post contained a period separator between joseph and mangan
the correct links are to be found here.

Check www.josephmangan.com [josephmangan.com] and www.josephmangan.name [josephmangan.name] for the addresses of all related websites.

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[Vario]

Try to prove the this single atom is not chlorine.
Come up with some ideas and you will find problems everywhere. Quantum mechanics kill any attempt in getting a 100% answer.
You can't even locate the atom exactly, so how do you want to find out what type of atom it is exactly? You will even have a hard time proving that a chlorine atom is not as big as hour house. The probability will be very low, less than 1 in a trillion but it will never reach zero and so your prove will never work.

Re:a non issue

[Joseph Mangan]

This is a very dangerous issue, the system is not yet certified.

If I was trying to be an "ass" about this, do you really think I would sit here in Vienna and wait for the police to arrest me?

Go on my webpage, read the evidence, and then only respond when you are knowledgeable..

You are interfering in a legitimate effort to save the lives of the passengers and crew.

Your comments are not constructive to this process.

This is a topic too serious to tolerate your trollish behavior.

Joe Mangan

Re:a non issue

[Joseph Mangan]

Read below about the pilots union, which violated a US federal court gag order to disclose evidence that AIRBUS failed to disclose a known defect in the rudder control system of the A300 to the FAA and NTSB which would have prevented the American Airlines Flight 587 Airbus A300 crash.

A memo was written in June 1997 by Thomas Thurnagel, an Airbus engineer in Hamburg Germany.

From: Union: Airbus knew of crash risk

"People died because this memo wasn't disclosed, in my opinion," said John David, deputy safety chairman for the Allied Pilots Association.

http://www.slackanddavis.com/news_article.php/news _id/argval/924/argname/back_link/argval/index

Again, as an engineer, the highest duty is to public safety. When a gag order prevents the proper notification and disclosure to the government authorities, and when the government authoritiese fail to act, the public must be informed. My actions are completely justified. I suggest you go to the web site www.onlineethics.org and further educate yourself about the other case examples where engineers have performed their duty to the public safety.

I would rather do my duty now, than to later be blamed for the serious injuries or loss of life that can be prevented by informing the public.

Re:There are far worse problems with Scarebus...

[Alioth]

The aircraft COULD NOT be programmed to not allow those rudder deflections. The type of Airbus that crashed was an older, non-fly-by-wire (traditional hydraulic controls) type.

Re:Poor engineering journalism

[Hoser McMoose]

The plane in question was a on a (very) short-haul flight between two islands in Hawaii. As such, the plane never got very high up, the maximum cruising altitude was only 24,000 feet. The Airbus A380 is a BIG plane that will be used pretty much exclusively for long-haul flights where the cruising altitude will usually be a fair bit higher, typically around 35,000 feet.

The difference in how serious a decompression is a 24,000' vs. 35,000' is quite significant. You can find some data here (thanks to the person who linked the article earlier in this thread). Basically at 24,000' you've got at least a minute and a half before the lack of oxygen makes it impossible to function. At 35,000' that time could be cut down to only 15 seconds. In the article you listed it mentions that after the decompression they made an emergency descent at 4,100 feet per minute. This would bring them down to a relatively "safe" 10,000' within a few minutes. If they had been flying at 35,000' then anyone not wearing an oxygen mask would be unconscious before they made it down to 30,000'.

Re:There are far worse problems with Scarebus...

[DingerX]

*excessive* rudder inputs?

The A300-600 had a redesign on the rudder pedals, so that, the faster the aircraft was going, the less rudder input you needed to get full deflection. (To understand this, think of power-assist steering turned on its head: at low speeds, you need to crank the wheel all the way to turn full left. At 100 mph, touching the wheel will give you full left. smart design, huh?) At the speed they were going, the force required to achieve full rudder deflection was *less* than the "breakout" force -- i.e., the force required to deflect the rudders at all. Once the pilot elected to use the rudder, it was over.

It's not boeing vs. scarebus here, it's just dumb-ass design.

Undercarrage test

[MROD]

The test you saw was the emergency deployment when all hydraulic power has been lost and not normal deployment.

In the case of a complete hydraulics failure the crew can actuate a manual lever which unlocks the undercarrage and deploys it using only gravity to do so. This is what you saw.

Normally, the doors and the undercarrage itself are driven fully by the hydraulic system and the doors are never touched by the wheels or anything else.

The chip is the tip of the iceberg re Airbus

[Ancient_Hacker]

Now maybe Boeing is just as bad, but Airbus seems to be particularly ATROCIOUS at systems design. BAd chips are about the least of their problems. A few examples: Airbus runs off end of runway, investigation shows:

• Water in brake cylinder back end froze up. Cylinder lacked weep hole.
• Brake electronics had two identical systems running in parallel.
• If you pressed one of the brake system buttons for more than 10 msec, but less than 20 msec, one computer might see the keypress, the other might not. Never tested for.
• Brake system uber-boss hardware checks for differences between two computers.
• If it finds a difference, it turns off the secondary computer, WITHOUT SNOOPING AROUND to see if in fact it was the secondary computer that was getting off-track.
• Said turning off is not signaled to the pilots in any obvious way.
• Even if the pilot notices, by flipping to a obscure status-page, that the secondary braking system has been downed, pressing the RESET button doesnt actually reset much of anything.
• Airbus encourages pilots to use auto-braking mode, which supposedly gives a steady 0.3G's of decelleartion.
• If auto-braking doesnt seem to give 0.3G's, some TILT lights go on, but the braking system doesnt try using the suspect bad system, even after the other system is now known to be bad.

I could go on, but I think you see the basic drift here. Not a clue among the designers, testers, or managers.

Similar totally foobared design blew up the $400M Ariane rocket. Similarly foobared design for the Airbus flight control computer: lessee-- Pilot is pulling very hard on the stick, should we do what he says or drill a big hole in the ground? Hmmmmmm.....

Full report URL's I can find if anybody is interested.

Re:Somebody should take his pills here ...

[Joseph Mangan]

Have you ever heard about the McDonnel Douglas DC-10, known defects by Convair subcontractor for the cargo door were hidden by McDonnell Dougals and Convair from the FAA. Several fatal crashes occured before an AD was issued to finally correct the defects.

June 27, 1972 Daniel Applegate, Director of Product Engineering for Convair, the fuselage contractor, wrote a memo to his supervisors detailing potential problems of cargo door. The problem was first recognized in Aug 69. The same thing had also happened in a ground test in 1970.

Recognized design flaws - floor, latch

FAA director John Shaffer and McDonnel Douglas President Jackson McGowan reached a gentleman's agreement to voluntarily fix problem, but no further official action was taken.

In July 1972, Three inspectors at Long Beach plant certified that Ship 29 had been modified (but it was not). Two years later, after leaving Paris, its cargo door blew off at 13,000 feet, killing 346 people.

McDonnel Douglas was in precarious financial condition - trying to beat Lockheed L1011 to market

Convair did not push too hard, since by contract, they may have been held liable for the costs of all design changes

Engineers pressed the matter through normal channels to the highest levels within both companies, but did not take it any further action, Standard operating procedure at McDonnell Douglas and Convair was for engineers to defer to upper management, even though they were aware of serious design flaws

Re:But are the problems only limited to the one ch

[Anonymous Coward]

I would be quite amazed that any company in the modern litigious world would forge a signature to get a part as critical to safety as this one passed when knowing that the part was sketchy.

General Electric (GE Healthcare) does this all the time with medical devices. They've forged my signature on engineering approvals several times. And told me there's nothing I can do about it. Apparently, the FDA agrees with them. Of course, now they're busy trying to sniff out who reported them.

I don't know about the other GE divisions, but I'm suspicious of them by association.