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Internet Immunization

xav_jones writes "Nature.com reports on computer experts from Israel who are proposing a different strategy for combating fast-spreading worms and viruses -- one in which the fix can, theoretically, keep up with or stay ahead of the malicious code. They 'propose a system in which a few honeypot computers lie in wait for viruses. These computers run automated software that first identifies the virus, and then sends out its signature across the Internet. This enables a sentinel program on all the other computers in the network to identify the virus and bar it before it can attack them.' The honeypot computers would reside in a secure, dedicated network. For 'roughly 200 million computers ... [with] just 800,000 [(0.004%)] of them acting as honeypots [it] would restrict a viral outbreak to 2,000 machines.'"

2 of 229 comments (clear)

  1. Re:WOW by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    You're a teacher? It's not 0.004%, it's 0.004. 0.004% is actually 0.00004. Come back when you've had a little Excel training maybe.

  2. Not a load of dung, just expensive by Sangui5 · · Score: 4, Informative

    There are a lot of techniques to do automatic identification of viruses, the problem is that they are too expensive for everyday use--your programs run 40x slower or worse. Below is a selection (small and randomly generated) of related work.

    Mostly, you need to do extensive monitoring of what your program is doing, and look for out-of-bound writes (e.g. buffer overflows/stack smashing), or do taint analysis (that is, don't execute or make "important" decisions based on data "tainted" from an untrusted source). But this requires performing many anaysis operations for every "real" operation, so it isn't feasible to do everywhere.

    Just google the titles for electronic copies.

    Kreibich, C., and Crowcroft, J. Honeycomb - creating intrusion detection signatures using honeypots. In HotNets (Nov. 2003).

    Kim, H., and Karp, B. Autograph: Toward automated, distributed worm signature detection. In USENIX Security Symposium (Aug. 2004).

    Zou, C. C., Gao, L., Gong, W., and Towsley, D. Monitoring and early warning for internet worms. In ACM CCS (Oct. 2003).

    Wilander, J., and Kamkar, M. A comparison of publicly available tools for dynamic buffer overflow prevention. In NDSS (Feb. 2003).

    Newsome, J., and Song, D. Dynamic taint analysis: Automatic detection and generation of software exploit attacks. In NDSS (Feb. 2005).