The Semantics Differentiation of Minds and Machines

John David Funge writes "In Dr David Ellerman's book Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life there are a number of interesting essays. But there is one particular essay, entitled "The Semantics Differentiation of Minds and Machines," that caught my attention and which should be of interest to Slashdot readers. In that essay Dr Ellerman claims that "after several decades of debate, a definitive differentiation between minds and machines seems to be emerging into view." In particular, Dr Ellerman argues that the distinction between minds and machines is that while machines (i.e., computers) make excellent symbol manipulation devices, only minds have the additional capacity to ascribe semantics to symbols." Read the rest of John's review. Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life author David P. Ellerman pages 290 pages publisher Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. rating 7 reviewer John David Funge ISBN 0847679322 summary Dramatic changes or revolutions in a field of science are often made by outsiders or "trespassers".

However, Dr Ellerman's argument appears circular. In particular, Dr Ellerman seems to have decided that, by definition, the only possible semantic interpretation for any collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we would commonly refer to as a "computer" is as nothing more than a symbol manipulation device. While a computer is indeed (at the very least) a symbol manipulation device, what is there to prevent another mind ascribing additional semantic interpretations to the collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we commonly refer to as a "computer"? In particular, what if my mind were willing to make the semantic interpretation that a computer is a device that can both manipulate symbols and can also ascribe semantics to symbols.

Moreover, what if I one day met a collection of blood vessels, skin, bones, etc. called Dr Ellerman? What would prevent me from ascribing to him the semantic interpretation that he is nothing more than a symbolic manipulation device? After all, Dr Ellerman concedes that their may be no way of distinguishing minds from machines purely on the basis of behavior. That is he specifically acknowledges that computers may one day pass the Turing test. So why would my mind not then be able to legitimately ascribe any semantic interpretation (that fits the observed behavior) I see fit to either humans or machines?

It seems that Dr Ellerman's essay considers two different types of physical devices that are potentially indistinguishable on the basis of behavior. Then arbitrarily defines one type of device (computers) to correspond to nothing more than symbolic manipulation and the other (human brains) to have the additional ability to ascribe semantics. Upon adopting these two axioms, he is then (somewhat unsurprisingly) able to conclude there is a distinction! But the distinction simply arises from the fact that he has arbitrarily defined a distinction in the first place.

In another essay in the collection, entitled "Trespassing against the Happy Consciousness of Orthodox Economics," Dr Ellerman argues that modern Western societies are not as free from slavery as orthodox economics would have us believe. In particular, he concludes that work in non-democratic firms is nothing less than a form of "temporary voluntary slavery". It would be ironic therefore if his essay on minds and machines were one day used to justify the slavery of (non-human) machines. Indeed, Dr Ellerman's characterization of the supposed intrinsic differences between humans and machines is sadly reminiscent of the despicable and unscientific arguments about intrinsic racial differences that were once used to justify human slavery."
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Comments

Just like Organic vs. Inorganic chem.

[Vengeance]

While there was long believed to be some sort of mystical special quality to organic molecules, eventually we figured out that chemistry is chemistry, and that simply by using Carbon we get interesting possiblities.

I (so far) have not seen any reason to suppose that the difference between 'thought' and 'computing' is any different. Incorporate enough complexity in the right sort of organizational framework, and the two should be interchangable.

False presumption

[blair1q]

Semantics are associations between symbols.

So whatever this guy is on about, he's got it wrong.

Computers are perfectly capable of making fuzzy inferences from loose associations.

With a greater understanding of real connections, they will be better able to weed out the fuzzy associations and strengthen the remaining ones.

This is how intellectual learning works.

And there's no reason a computer can't simulate it better than a human can.

Symbolic vs semantic

[chriss]

Basically: a symbol is a variable and can hold any value. If a system knows that Dolly is a sheep and that sheeps are animals and that animals eat, it can guess that Dolly eats. But it cannot tell if Dolly is a plane, unless someone somewhere made that relation (planes are machines, machines are not living beings, animals are living beings, so Dolly can't be a plane). They would need an unlimited amount of rules.

A human "knows" about the meaning (semantic) of the symbol "sheep". Although this has never been discussed, he could answer that a sheep will not stand still if set on fire. The question is how the human is able to tell this. He does not need a sharp line of arguments.

But maybe he simply uses an enormous amount of small rules that seem to form something more complex called semantic in the sense of the article. The OpenCyc project assumes this and tries to teach a machine millions of small rules (assertions and concepts) to create sort of common sense based on a real world view (requiring to "know" about the world) in software.

11 year old book of crap reviewed here? Why?

[Dr. Spork]

Sorry, I teach philosophy in college and I read student essays like this every semester. This one seems reasonably insightful, probably B+ (though I haven't read the book myself, so I can't say whether it misrepresents the position).

But what's really on my mind is this: Read the table of contents - this book could not possibly be anything but crap. I mean, what sense does it make to have one chapter called "Chapter 3: The Libertarian Case for Slavery" and once you're done with musings on economic theory, you toss off a Chapter 7 where you casually present your solution to the question about the difference between minds and machines? How promising is that? Not very. So while the review author may have torn this chapter a new orifice (and the thesis surely has many other problems to boot), I must say that I do not toast his choice of reading. This is crap that was ignored in 1995, and just because it's a $2.95 special at the used book store doesn't mean we need to hear the following on Slashdot:

Newsflash: Some crank wrote a stupid book 11 years ago and I found there is a problem with one of the chapters!!!!! Read on!!!!!

I'd have more sympathy if the text were available online so we could RTFA and have a substantive discussion, but in the absence of that, our only option is to flame the responsible.

It's the "soul" fallacy

[pieterh]

"Humans are different from X because they can do Y", where X is variously "animals", "machines", and Y is variously, "make tools", "use language", "play chess", "murder", or whatever.

It's a silly exercise because there is nothing specific about humans except their ability to interbreed with other humans. That is all that technically defines us as a species, and even that definition is fuzzy, ignoring people who are sterile, too old or young to breed, or who never leave their keyboards long enough to look for a mate.

When it comes to the mind, emerging consensus is that it consists of a large number of well-designed tools, not some fuzzy blob of software. Most likely, each of these mental tools can be perfectly implemented as software. There are simply a huge number, and some are very, very subtle.

We will, eventually, be able to simulate the whole human mind in software, in the same way as we'll eventually be able to construct robotic bodies that work as well as human bodies, by re-implementing the structures that our genes build, one by one. The best way to construct a robotic hand that works like a human hand is to reimplement a human hand. The best way to construct a robotic mind that works like a human mind is to reimplement a human mind. This is perhaps self-evident but it's not always been accepted.

As for the arbitrary distinctions, this is just a belief system, an attempt to create a soul, however you phrase it.