The Semantics Differentiation of Minds and Machines

John David Funge writes "In Dr David Ellerman's book Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life there are a number of interesting essays. But there is one particular essay, entitled "The Semantics Differentiation of Minds and Machines," that caught my attention and which should be of interest to Slashdot readers. In that essay Dr Ellerman claims that "after several decades of debate, a definitive differentiation between minds and machines seems to be emerging into view." In particular, Dr Ellerman argues that the distinction between minds and machines is that while machines (i.e., computers) make excellent symbol manipulation devices, only minds have the additional capacity to ascribe semantics to symbols." Read the rest of John's review. Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life author David P. Ellerman pages 290 pages publisher Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. rating 7 reviewer John David Funge ISBN 0847679322 summary Dramatic changes or revolutions in a field of science are often made by outsiders or "trespassers".

However, Dr Ellerman's argument appears circular. In particular, Dr Ellerman seems to have decided that, by definition, the only possible semantic interpretation for any collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we would commonly refer to as a "computer" is as nothing more than a symbol manipulation device. While a computer is indeed (at the very least) a symbol manipulation device, what is there to prevent another mind ascribing additional semantic interpretations to the collection of wires, capacitors, transistors, etc. that we commonly refer to as a "computer"? In particular, what if my mind were willing to make the semantic interpretation that a computer is a device that can both manipulate symbols and can also ascribe semantics to symbols.

Moreover, what if I one day met a collection of blood vessels, skin, bones, etc. called Dr Ellerman? What would prevent me from ascribing to him the semantic interpretation that he is nothing more than a symbolic manipulation device? After all, Dr Ellerman concedes that their may be no way of distinguishing minds from machines purely on the basis of behavior. That is he specifically acknowledges that computers may one day pass the Turing test. So why would my mind not then be able to legitimately ascribe any semantic interpretation (that fits the observed behavior) I see fit to either humans or machines?

It seems that Dr Ellerman's essay considers two different types of physical devices that are potentially indistinguishable on the basis of behavior. Then arbitrarily defines one type of device (computers) to correspond to nothing more than symbolic manipulation and the other (human brains) to have the additional ability to ascribe semantics. Upon adopting these two axioms, he is then (somewhat unsurprisingly) able to conclude there is a distinction! But the distinction simply arises from the fact that he has arbitrarily defined a distinction in the first place.

In another essay in the collection, entitled "Trespassing against the Happy Consciousness of Orthodox Economics," Dr Ellerman argues that modern Western societies are not as free from slavery as orthodox economics would have us believe. In particular, he concludes that work in non-democratic firms is nothing less than a form of "temporary voluntary slavery". It would be ironic therefore if his essay on minds and machines were one day used to justify the slavery of (non-human) machines. Indeed, Dr Ellerman's characterization of the supposed intrinsic differences between humans and machines is sadly reminiscent of the despicable and unscientific arguments about intrinsic racial differences that were once used to justify human slavery."
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Comments

Machine Learning of Semantic Relations

[Baldrson]

Peter Turney's Learning Analogies and Semantic Relations falsifies the Ellerman's assertion that semantics is out of the reach of engineering. Turney's more recent Human-Level Performance on Word Analogy Questions by Latent Relational Analysis (Warning: PDF) shows an engine performing about as well as college-bound seniors taking the SAT verbal analogies test.

For a review of Peter Turney's group's accomplishment see "AI Breakthrough or the Mismeasure of Machine?"

Review seems poorly written

[nexarias]

I don't think the reviewer has demonstrated adequate mastery of the subject (artificial intelligence) and its present studies. For example, the problem of assigning meaning to symbols is a BIG one, and the defining of computers as symbol manipulators is NOT arbitrary. This problem first arose when Thomas Hobbes talked of the mind as a symbol manipulator and Descartes rubbished his argument, pointing out the problem of Original Meaning (how symbols come to indicate this or that in the first place).

Computers as symbol manipulators is also an idea that arose from John Searle's "Chinese Room argument". Perhaps one of the best contemporary discussions is by John Haugeland in his book "Ariticial Intelligence: The Very Idea".

Overall, a seemingly immature review of the book. Disappointing.

All in how you look at it....

[NiteShaed]

Talking about machine intelligence is tricky in that we generally only consider *human* intellegence (which makes sense considering that's what we are). In John Varley's "Steel Beach", he suggested The Invaders (a mysterious species of aliens) might not consider humans an intelligent species, but looked at us as just another engineering species like bees, meaning intelligence is really dependant on your point of view. What we're really talking about when most people say Artificial Intelligence is actually more an issue of Artificial Humanity.