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Security Flaw Discovered in GPG
WeLikeRoy writes "A serious problem in the use of GPG to verify digital signatures has been discovered, which also affects the use of gpg in email. It is possible for an attacker to take any signed message and inject extra arbitrary data without affecting the signed status of the message. Depending on how gpg is invoked, it may be possible to output just faked data as several variants of this attack have been discovered. All versions of gnupg prior to 1.4.2.2 are affected, and it is thus recommended to update GnuPG as soon as possible to version 1.4.2.2."
A serious security issue in GPG! We are all doomed!
;)
what is GPG?
Yeah, I will go RTFA. However, summaries that assume you are familiar with an acronym are rude, IMHO
See my journal for slashdot ID's by year. Mine created in 2005. http://slashdot.org/journal/289875/slashdot-ids-by-year
Its a good thing I don't use GPG to sign my emails. Oh wait.
The NSA secretly seeding Open Source with ingeniously crafted back doors? Never! Not our NSA...
"Who are in control, they are not in control of anything - they don't even control themselves!" - Glen Beck
So this is a simple mistake made by GPG, in an effort to coexist well with email and the like.
In other words, GPG looks at an email message and sees headers and the like. Of course, the headers were not signed (just the message), so GPG skips them and when it encounters the signed message, it begins to verify the signature.
So, if you are an attacker, you insert something before or after the signed message, and when GPG goes to verify it, the signed message passes, but GPG nicely prints out the whole message for you, instead of just the signed part. Oops, not a big deal, encryption isn't broken, in fact this is just an application bug.
Sound like a movie rating.
She thought she could get rid of me with that rejection via email. Now I've got reasonable doubt about her feelings. Until I get that court order, of course.
End transmission.
remember how many versions of OpenSSH we have? And why do you think new versions were released? And why should GPG be any different?
I realize this is a joke, but just so everyone knows, a little bit of scrutiny would expose a faked message.
If you RTF Mailing List, you will see that the "attack" only allows someone to append or prepend data to the signed message, and then the augmented message is only displayed the way it is because of an application bug in GPG.
No fundamental algorithm is broken, no one has discovered a way to cause collisions. In fact, if you tried to independently verify the signature of the message against the augmented message, it would fail.
What happens is that GPG skips text that is not part of the signed message, such as email headers and the like, then verifies what is signed. Unfortunately, once it's verified, it will output the whole message, leading the user to believe that the whole message was signed.
Again if you checked the signature against the whole message it wouldn't verify, GPG is just being a bit too helpful.
The parent AC is worng.
1.4.2-2 is not equal to 1.4.2.2, and it is older than 1.4.2.2
the -2 is the 2nd Debian modification of 1.4.2
Another good recommendation is to diversify your crypto. Sign/encrypt your data with multiple different crypto algorithms in the same message. It's like network redundancy: the odds of both methods failing at once are equal to the product of the low, but significant, probability of either failing. A single failure doesn't ever compromise your data, and buys time to get a new second method that works.
Of course, sent messages can't be recovered for reprotection with the new second method. And eventually the other original method will be compromised, so the attacker can use the appropriate methods for each. But at least you've improved your security. Probably more than the next guy. Next lesson: when the bear is chasing y'all, you don't have to be the fastest; just not the slowest.
--
make install -not war
Don't you think they're smart enough to think that you would think they weren't that stupid?
rewriting history since 2109
GPG stands for Gnu Privacy Guard. It's the Free(tm) replacement for PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) which was originally developed by RSA. Between them, they are one of the standards for encryption and verification of sensitive data (including email).
As opposed to X509/SSL which seems to be designed for centralized trusted certificate issuers, GPG/PGP depend on a (decentralized) web of trust -- You decide which signatures you wish to trust, and then those signatures can be used to signify who they trust... If you have enough trust in the signature web for a public key you have for someone, then it is presumed that the key is trustable.
GPG seems to be supported by people who include some serious heavyweights in the encryption community.
IANASE (I am not a security expert), so any corrections to this explanation would be much appreciated)
OS Software is like love: The best way to make it grow is to give it away.
I'm not even smart enough to understand what you just said.
As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
That information should never have been released! The negative press will impact sales. It would have been better to pretend the bug never existed.
Oh, it isn't corporate product, nevermind.
did anybody cross-check the authenticity of that warning? I wont accept that until I verify its GPG key :)
The bug allows someone to take a signed GPG message, stick in their own unsigned message in a certain way, and GPG will show you the combined message or even just the new message, but tell you that it is signed by the person who signed the original message.
If you read the message using the new GPG 1.4.2.2 it will correctly not accept the hacked message. So if you have any question about signed mail you received, you can check it again after upgrading GPG.
The bug only affects embedded signatures, such as in email messages using inline signatures or signed encrypted email. I think that excludes PGP/MIME signed unencrypted email, which is a common format for signed mail and would be a form of detached signature.
The bug does not affect "detached signatures", which are the kind that are used to verify software downloads, which means it could not have been used to hack yum, apt-get, etc.
All in all, not a big security flaw unless someone takes a signed email that you sent them, forges a GPG signed request to your domain registrar to transfer your million dollar domain name to them, and your registrar hasn't yet updated to GPG 1.4.2.2. Whoops -- if you upgrade GPG right now, it wouldn't help in that scenario.
I'm tired of their insecure crap! Oh wait, its GNU open source? In that case, you lazy bastard end users should have fixed it yourself!
Do you suppose the NSA is also responsible for the backdoor exploit on the Goatse guy?
Oh You POS
Better assign a security Czar!
"There is more worth loving than we have strength to love." - Brian Jay Stanley
I don't mean this to come across as flamebait, but that's one of the stupidest comments I've read on Slashdot today. You could just as well - and with the same justification - say that telephones shouldn't be used for conducting business (all business consists of commercially sensitive transactions, mind you), or that letters shouldn't be used, that the postal services can't be trusted, that pens and paper shouldn't be used for writing down contracts, and so on.
All these things, just like email and just like GPG, are tools. Tools, like everything, are fundamentally insecure, at least theoretically; there is no absolute security. But you can minimise risks by using tools the right way, by making sure that malfunctions don't lead to a cascade of further malfunctions, and - maybe most importantly - by *realising* and *keeping in mind* that nothing is ever perfectly secure. If you do that, you can use email for sensitive things just like you can use the phone network or the postal services or direct face-to-face communication; you merely have to be aware of the risks and how to manage/minimise them.
Panicking and crying "email is never secure!" isn't going to get you anywhere, really. You're just limiting yourself to other means of communication which are basically just as secure or insecure as email is, and given that statement, chances are you haven't really understood how security works, anyway, so you're probably less secure no matter what you do.
quidquid latine dictum sit altum videtur.
No that was a widely known and exploited crack.
I agree. But again, the way I read the alert, isn't this a "Man In the Middle" attack?
It's a replay attack. I take a very terse/vague signed message that you've written and append important evil data to the front or back and resend it. The signature checks out and the meat of the message (the stuff I've added on to the front or end) appears to come from you.
This sort of problem has come up before in other contexts. When you sign an email, for example, it's doesn't include the headers or date. If your signed message is general enough, I can copy it and send it to someone else (GPG signatures verify the sender, not the recipient.) One of the situations where this has come up is in the Debian voting process. If a DD mistakenly sends their ballot to the wrong person, then changes their vote, anyone who has a copy of the old ballot can send it again and change the vote back. Debian safeguards against this by allowing each DD to see how their vote was cast after the vote is complete.