Should We Be Afraid of TPM Chips?

AcidArrow asks: "I was looking to buy a new laptop and since I wanted to be on the bleeding edge, I thought one with the new core duo chips would be just what I need. Among the features on the laptops I was looking was 'Trusted Platform Module chip for the safety of your data'. Now, I don't know of any real uses for a TPM chip yet, but is this something that should worry me, or keep me from buying a laptop with said 'feature'? I don't intend to use it and I would like to disable it, if possible, but I don't want to make it easier for anyone to track down what I'm doing on my laptop."

Comments

People are so afraid....

[hubs99]

It seems slashdotters are so afraid of these chips they won't even comment on them.

Re:People are so afraid....

[MarkGriz]

"It seems slashdotters are so afraid of these chips they won't even comment on them."

Maybe they tried but the TPM chips in their computer blocked them.
I'm glad I don't hav#&DFGsj3lwkj.s9)
NO CARRIER

Uses

[TheRealMindChild]

TPM in itself isn't bad. It is when it is grossly abused is the concern.

I would imagine if you want to use future version of windows (and/or media player), this chip will be necessary. I can only speculate that it aids in the decryption of copywrited content

Re:Uses

[Anonymous Coward]

How is it NOT bad when your personal computer, to which you entrust essentially all your documents, can hide software and data from you?

It is Big Brother Inside. Invisible, omnipresent, and with an enhanced ability to hide backdoors that will even grab your encrypted communications when they go in the clear inside your PCs.

But, hey, you are probably a law-abiding person and should have nothing to hide.

Re:Uses

[nizo]

Plus if you cover your computer with tinfoil it keeps out the Bad Computer Control Rays. I wonder if it is safe to poke holes for the air vents?

Re:Uses

[Anonymous Coward]

"TPM in itself isn't bad. It is when it is grossly abused is the concern."

It just so happens that all you need to do to grossly abuse TPM is place it in someone else's computer. Yeah, if you personally controlled the keys and algorithms, it could conceivably be desirable for you to have -- but will this ever be the case?

Saying "TPM in itself isn't bad" is like saying "punching random people in the face isn't, in itself, bad." Sure, there may be some isolated situations where that's true, like when your fist is covered with a fluffy foam glove that gently dispenses cash to whomever it hits. However, in most actual, relevant interpretations of the behavior, it is in itself bad.

Re:Uses

[Trelane]

How is it NOT bad when your personal computer, to which you entrust essentially all your documents, can hide software and data from you?

The chip does nothing of this. The chip itself only encrypts and decrypts. The rest of the nightmare scenario requires a Treacherous Computing operating system and/or application software to do this.

Notably, a TPM has a great many advantages (provided you trust the vendor anyway)--but only when implemented on a trustable OS and application. For instance, you can use it to trusted bootstrap (using a previously signed Linux kernel (basically saying you or someone you trust created the kernel)) to avoid boot-time rootkits, and then once you've loaded a trusted kernel, it will help the kernel to check for trusted (signed) modules. It can also check that the ps you're running isn't trojaned (i.e. installed by someone who didn't have the key).

In short, go TPM, but boot Linux (or BSD, or whatever you can trust). The critical difference between Big Brother and Best Friend is whether you or someone else is doing (or able to do) the signing.

Re:Uses

[Anonymous Coward]

The chip does nothing of this. The chip itself only encrypts and decrypts. The rest of the nightmare scenario requires a Treacherous Computing operating system and/or application software to do this.

Oh bullshit. The Werner Von Braun defence. "I only make the rockets go up. Others decide where they land." As things stand at the moment, Trusted Computing hardware has only one use: to remove the control of the computer from its owner. The EFF has a proposal to mitigate the risks and keep the benefits... and yet the TCG will not even consider it. The reason why not should be obvious. As it stands, the TPM is not about security it is about control and there is not one single reason to trust any of the companies behind this.

Re:Uses

[Trelane]

The Werner Von Braun defence. "I only make the rockets go up. Others decide where they land."

Uhhm, no. It's actually the " Hey! There's a baby in that bathwater! " "defence".

As things stand at the moment, Trusted Computing hardware has only one use: to remove the control of the computer from its owner.

That may well be its intended use. That does not however, mean that there are not other uses for it. Indeed, I have outlined some. Additionally, the simple fact that you have a TPM doesn't immediately imply that you files are removed from your control. It takes the cooperation of the application and/or the OS.

Therefore, you can have the baby without the bathwater by using the BSD (or Linux or whatever) strainer.

Re:Uses

[Anonymous Coward]

Had you read the link you would have had answers to your questions, but you obviously didn't... instead you prefer to write in bold making statements that have already been answered and trying to play specious logic games.

When the TCG, and technology companies behind it (which includes Intel, IBM, Microsoft, AMD and many many others) come out and openly discuss this hardware and its potential for improving security, but also the very real (and currently being implemented by Microsoft) threat of massive privacy abuse, survellence and near-total control it allows, instead of just spouting meaningless "It's not evil. It's just hardware" platitudes then, perhaps things will improve.

It all comes down to one thing -- something people like you refuse to face: "If you don't have access to the keys, then this is not about security" -- Alan Cox. You don't have access to the keys, and TCG hardware (as it is currently implemented) is not about security.

Re:Uses

[Trelane]

but also the very real (and currently being implemented by Microsoft) threat of massive privacy abuse, survellence and near-total control it allows, instead of just spouting meaningless "It's not evil. It's just hardware" platitudes then, perhaps things will improve.

That's basically what I said, save for the gross misrepresentation, namely "just spouting meaningless 'It's not evil. It's just hardware' platitudes"

Your (apparently) blind hatred for all things TPM seems to have skipped the "currently being implemented by Microsoft" detail of the "threat of massive privacy abuse, survellence and near-total control it allows". You seem to acknowledge the fact that it requires additional OS and/or app support for the abuses part while totally ignoring this same fact anywhere else!

If you don't have access to the keys, then this is not about security" -- Alan Cox.

Quite true, but you have the keys, with the notable exception of the TPM's itself. Theoretically it never leaves the chip and isn't recorded anywhere, but again why I said you had to trust the chip vendor too....

The only additional piece of the puzzle we're missing is the BIOS bootloader verification. Here is likely one of your objections, particularly the keys objection. Never buy a TPM-enabled computer if you cannot sign your own bootloader, for what are likely (to us at least) obvious reasons.

Now why am I having a fight with an AC? Post from a real account or else thread over.

Re:Uses

[Sique]

There are issues with TPM vs. free software you didn't address. What if the kernel you want to boot doesn't have a signature the TPM module recognizes? If you or some friend or colleague of you modify a kernel, then its signature changes (that's the whole point of signed binaries). So what if you TPM module just refuses to boot from a signature it doesn't know?

What if the device is something like a digital video recorder or a wireless router, which in theory runs under Linux or other GPLed software, and you should be able to change the code according to your wishes, but because you don't have a key the TPM module trusts, you can't sign your changes, and the TPM module tells the BIOS not to boot your binary? It might be not with the general purpose computer for now, but on specialized hardware it's pretty possible. The hardware vendor will just tell you that he has to sign all changes, and what use is the GPL for the software to you, if you can't run your modifications without the vendor's agreement? You are back to square 1, this time not fiddling with copyright, but with the TPM module, and no clever licensing gets you out of the trouble.

So what about running for example other software than Mac OS X on new Apple-Intel hardware, if the BIOS just wants Apple's signature on the kernel binary? As the previous poster already said: If you don't have the keys to your computer, you are not in control of your computer. It doesn't need the malice of the OS designer, it can be already be in the BIOS.

Re:Uses

[TheRealMindChild]

Um... you know... why would you buy a TPM platform if you are going to fight it the whole way? In your case, you would buy a NON-TPM platform.

Re:Uses

[Trelane]

Much better. Thank you.

There are issues with TPM vs. free software you didn't address.

As you will see, I have addressed them. Let's go:

What if the kernel you want to boot doesn't have a signature the TPM module recognizes?

Then you sign it with your key. If you don't have the key, as I said, don't buy the TPM/laptop.

If you or some friend or colleague of you modify a kernel, then its signature changes (that's the whole point of signed binaries). So what if you TPM module just refuses to boot from a signature it doesn't know?

Yes. Not booting binaries that haven't been signed by you is the point. You can do most of this now (there was a Linux Journal about this by greg k-h, in fact), but the TPM affords extra protections.

And again, if you don't get the keys to the TPM, don't buy the box.

What if the device is something like a digital video recorder or a wireless router, which in theory runs under Linux or other GPLed software, and you should be able to change the code according to your wishes, but because you don't have a key the TPM module trusts, you can't sign your changes, and the TPM module tells the BIOS not to boot your binary?

Then, again, don't buy the hardware.

he hardware vendor will just tell you that he has to sign all changes, and what use is the GPL for the software to you, if you can't run your modifications without the vendor's agreement?

Very good point. If you don't get the keys, don't buy the box.

So what about running for example other software than Mac OS X on new Apple-Intel hardware, if the BIOS just wants Apple's signature on the kernel binary?

If you don't get the keys, don't buy the box.

As the previous poster already said: If you don't have the keys to your computer, you are not in control of your computer.

Quite right. I'd not buy such a computer either. But you're mistaken if you believe that this is inherently the case.

It doesn't need the malice of the OS designer, it can be already be in the BIOS.

For this bit of nonsense, yes. I've already addressed this, and my statement remains: if you don't get the keys, don't buy the box.

The problem in your argument is that you aren't necessarily denied the keys. If you get the keys, however, the TPM presents a way to shore up a bit more security (plus, it's a hardware encryption device, so you can offload more from the CPU :).

Re:Uses

[mrchaotica]

You are back to square 1, this time not fiddling with copyright, but with the TPM module, and no clever licensing gets you out of the trouble.

The GPL v3 would to some extent, by punishing the vendor of the closed hardware by not allowing him to use GPL v3 software at all.

It's just a shame Linus doesn't understand this.

Re:Uses

[mrchaotica]

Better buy it quick, then, because very, very soon you won't have a choice.

Re:Uses

[Jack Schitt]

While valid, the particular argument will die the day that NON-TPM platforms are no longer made available or the day that the os requires the TPM to be present and enabled to run at all.

I can already see the day when PCs will have mod chips you can get for $25 from ebay. As in other systems, it may even be illegal to use said mod chip.

I have no use for a chip in my computer that can say 'no' to me when I (gasp) WANT to test a virus. (It's happened before on a secondary system I had when I was trying to figure out how to recover from said virus to help several clients of mine.)

Re:Uses

[Anonymous Coward]

You seem to acknowledge the fact that it requires additional OS and/or app support for the abuses part while totally ignoring this same fact anywhere else!

I'm not ignoring it. It's just not relevant. The hardware is designed to work against the owner of the machine. The fact that you also need software isn't relevant. Your arguments are empty "guns don't kill people" platitudes.

Quite true, but you have the keys, with the notable exception of the TPM's itself.

In other words you don't have the keys, since the other keys are signed by the root key. The rest of your message is just more meaningless specious crap and filler based on this central lie of yours.

Now why am I having a fight with an AC? Post from a real account or else thread over.

Because you are desperately trying to spread misinformation and sell the idea of crippled PCs. Ignored the EFF link again, didn't you? Why are you so against the idea of owner override?

Re:Uses

[Anonymous Coward]

The whole point of the TPM is that you don't get the keys. Otherwise, you could just as well use software encryption.

Re:Uses

[Anonymous Coward]

Uhhm, no. It's actually the " Hey! There's a baby in that bathwater! " "defence".

You don't seem to understand, or (at least) you haven't read the link. The alternative is that you are just being dishonest.

A TPM could been a boon for security... but, as it is currently implemented, it is just a means for big brother levels of control and not security FOR the user as it should be. The link you so carefully ignore lays out a means to get the benefits of a TPM, without the huge damage it causes.

This would, naturally enough, undermine the control that could be exercised by technology companies -- and I'm guessing from your responses elsewhere, that's your (and the technology companies') problem with the proposal. Your claims that this hardware is somehow "neutral" and that software will make the decision are completely bogus. The TCG had already made a political and moral decision to cut the user out of the loop by ensuring that the root key is hidden even from the person who paid for the hardware. It doesn't have to be that way as the EFF, points out and you dodge around so desperately.

That decision and their attitude should serve as a big warning flag as to the real purposes of the hardware.

Re:Uses

[John Hasler]

> if you don't get the keys, don't buy the box.

Do you seriously believe that you are going to get the keys?

Re:Uses

[Anonymous Coward]

Your arguments are empty "guns don't kill people" platitudes.

Well, at the end of the day, they don't. Arguments in favor of gun control ultimately fail because they elevate an inanimate object to the status of a totem, with mystical power of its own to do evil independent of its wielder. Unless you're willing to remove all guns from society -- starting with the ones owned by the police, government, and military forces who do most of the actual killing -- it makes no sense to fret about the ones gathering dust in my closet.

Trusted Computing hardware can be viewed in the same light. If the functionality can be disabled by the owner of the hardware, then why should we be so concerned about a few individual applications that require it to be enabled? As long as it can be turned off at will, there doesn't seem to be anything mystically evil about an optional piece of hardware.

Re:Uses

[Fulcrum of Evil]

It's just a shame Linus doesn't understand this.

Or perhaps he just disagrees with this approach.

Re:Uses

[mrchaotica]

The thing Linus doesn't understand is that if Treacherous Computing had existed in 1990, he never would have had the chance to write Linux in the first place, because his PC wouldn't have let him do it!

That's why we need GPL v3 -- because it's the only hope I see of preventing EVERY computer from becoming like the TiVo, locked down to only use "vendor" approved software!

Yipeeeeee!!!! TPM has me scared.

[objekt]

I'm afraid of Jar Jar Binks and all the bad acting in The Phantom Menace.

Customize?

[DarkNemesis618]

Is it possible to get a model of said laptop without a TPM chip? It should be. If you go to Dell and buy a laptop, you're for the most part, able to customize nearly everything to suit your needs. Would the TPM chip be any different. I read about them and see no reason for most people to have any use of them. Nothing like shoving new or unwanted technology down everyone's throats.

Re:Customize?

[DaedalusLogic]

If you go to Dell and buy a laptop, you're for the most part, able to customize nearly everything to suit your needs.


Excellent! I'm off to order an Inspiron with the highly requested "Meat Thermometer" option.

I think that this will eventually end up being a lot like the Pentium III serial number fiasco. There will be some way to shut it off... People do eventually get frustrated and tired of technology that gets in their way. If this stuff is going to keep people from watching their movies at full resolution because they don't have a new and special monitor... They're going to complain until the software changes, find a way around it like DeCSS, or look for an alternative technology.

Think Dell can make me a laptop with backwards printed keys?

Re:Customize?

[j0nkatz]

Work bought me a Dell Latitude D610. It has the TPM chip and is is able to be turned off in BIOS.

Re:Customize?

[hcob$]

Is it possible to get a model of said laptop without a TPM chip? It should be. If you go to Dell and buy a laptop, you're for the most part, able to customize nearly everything to suit your needs. Would the TPM chip be any different. I read about them and see no reason for most people to have any use of them. Nothing like shoving new or unwanted technology down everyone's throats.

Oh, the TPM is SOLDERED TO THE MOTHERBOARD!

So, no. Why in the world would a low-cost manufacuter like Dell have a completely SEPARATE motherboard for the TPM/NO-TPM options?

Re:Customize?

[charlesnw]

But was it really turned off? Seriously think about it. Do you know for a fact that the chip was turned off? Is there a way to independently verify the chip isn't functioning?

Re:Customize?

[rincebrain]

Pry it off the board, see if the system boots. :)

Re:Customize?

[Verteiron]

Maybe someone with some EE knowledge could answer a more serious version of the same question... if the chip is really "disabled", could one install a short from input to output to bypass the chip entirely? Would this work? Would this do something horrible to the board?

Re:Customize?

[Anonymous Coward]

You may end up frying the board if you shorted input and output, it'll at least void your warranty. And, as far as I can tell, it's definitively not worth it, since the TPM, when turned off by the BIOS stays off and is undetectable and unusable by any software run afterwards until the next system reset, by which time the bios will turn it off again.

Re:Customize?

[horatio]

I've run into two situations recently where the "BIOS" did a really crappy job of hiding devices from the OS. Both boards are mid-range PC, not expensive servers or anything like that, but still. The first was my ABIT board with a SATA RAID controller. Apparently, the RAID BIOS did a lousy job of reporting that the two drives were RAIDed, because Linux saw two different drives. WinXP saw two drives, but seemed happy enough using them as a RAID - with drivers.

The second one was a buddy who was having trouble disabling the Intel graphics chip on his mobo. He had it disabled in the BIOS, but once again, Linux was able to see the chipset. But only enough to know that it was there, not enough to actually do anything with it. So until he ENabled the card in the BIOS, he couldn't properly use his AGP card.

My point being, that it seems like the BIOS in both these cases was able to "hide" something from Windoze because Windoze was willing to cooperate and aware of the BIOS. What if the BIOS only suggests that Win shouldn't use the TPM? I don't trust the MOBO to hide jack from the OS.

Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[torpor]

.. yourself, personally, for your own uses. If the TPM 'feature' is only something that a mfr, or software vendor, can exploit to protect data, then its something that you definitely don't want to use.

But if there were uses for TPM which directly translated into a user feature - like being able to save .DOC files to your USB stick, encrypted to your own TPM serial, for example - then I would say yeah, its something that can be used.

But frankly, TPM isn't there for you. Its there for software vendors and 'media suppliers' to use in branding content to your machine. Whether thats good or not, is entirely up to whether or not the end user wants less control over where the data can travel .. so far, the only use for it appears to be in keeping MP3 and other Media files, which you did not author, local to your own machine.

I'd be interested to hear cases where TPM-stamps can be used to actually protect user-author'ed data, though. Would be handy for studio-type people .. like, if I could get my Cubase/Protools session files stamped specifically to my machine, and they can't be used anywhere else, under certain circumstances that could be very handy ..

But that sort of protection is just as easily provided by tools like GPG and such, and still would depend on the software vendor exploiting that feature, so .. yeah .. it just goes round and round.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[HaloZero]

But if there were uses for TPM which directly translated into a user feature - like being able to save .DOC files to your USB stick, encrypted to your own TPM serial, for example - then I would say yeah, its something that can be used.

I can safely say that I do not want this. I use my jumpdrive to keep a backup of three directories; a script automagically copies fresh versions of a particular tree into a branch on my jumpdrive. This is done for portability and backup purposes. If, for example, my .doc and .mpp and *.* files were encrypted with my ThinkPad's TPM serial, then recovery from another machine (lets say that my laptop is stolen, or otherwise destroyed [with fire]) is pointless - there's no way to replicate that serial.

Long story short: TPM serialization == bad for backups.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[Anonymous Coward]

Allow me to summerise:

• TPM is ok if the user has a use for it
  
• User already has equivilent functionality to a TPM
  

That doesn't go round and round, it goes splat! There's no reason for a TPM unless you're planning on playing crap content distributed in silly formats.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[Anonymous Coward]

It seems the main capability of TPM is in the signing features. I see two cases for this.

First: The means for creating signed executables are openly accessible, but require strict authentication of the entity. This would be the difficult part - how to make it easy for legit developers, but difficult for nefarious parties. This could them become a safeguard against virii, etc., improving the security of your machine and your data.

Second: Content producers use the capability to limit their content to playing only on approved players. They are then able to enforce the use of their preferred application, at the expense of competitors. Interoperablity and usage rights would disappear.

Like most technologies, it can swing either way. The trick is in determining how we can make sure it is used for our benefit and not our detriment.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[EvilNTUser]

"like being able to save .DOC files to your USB stick"

Could we at least on slashdot use Free file formats in examples instead of promoting the MS Word "standard"? Please.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[Jordanis]

...the key phrase in the bit of parent post you quoted is 'being able to'. Your complaint is irrelevant and makes you look silly, because the proposed feature was specifically described as an option.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[Anonymous Coward]

A TPM could be very useful... if *you* (as the person who paid for the machine) have root access when you want it. But you don't, so it isn't. I can't summarise it any better than Alan Cox: "If you don't have access to the keys, then it isn't about security."

So there you are: TPMs aren't about security, they are about control. The Trusted Computing Group know this, but they refuse to give any ground on it because they know very well that this isn't about improving your security, it's about gaining root control over the computing infrastructure. Unfortunately, getting any of the tech companies to talk about this openly is next to impossible. They just want to slip it into the mainstream without any scrutiny and hope that the press doesn't notice until it's too late.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[HaloZero]

The key portion of my retort which you failed to acknowledge was the qualifying use of the word 'if'. 'If' is a conditional statement which is invoked when a particular requirement is met. The option (my emphasis, your word) is disregarded if the requirement is NOT met (read: TPM is not used in such a manner). The requirement in this case would be - obviously - implementation of such a TPM scheme. The fact that I used the term 'if' indicates that I may or may not have implemented such a scheme, even though the option is available to me.

A set of examples would be

• 'If I stick my hand in that fire, I'm going to be burned!'
• 'If I compile this code with the wrong library, it's not going to work!'
• 'If I'm an asshole to someone, they might not like me anymore!'
• 'If my data was encrypted with a key dependant on my processors serial number, and I needed to recover that data on a machine with a processor other than the aforementioned hardware, I would be sent up a proverbial astuary without an adequate means of propulsion.'

There's no reason to condescend to someone in the manner you have.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[Jordanis]

Yes, but I suppose that my point is that /your/ point was a rather obvious one with an equally obvious answer.

• If using the optional TPM USB-key encryption scheme will have negative effects, then I should uncheck the option!

Which has thereby led me to wonder, unless I have missed your point entirely, why the unsuitability for backups particularly counts against the scheme. Simply uncheck the option and you have no difference in functionality from before. Meanwhile,

• If you have a document that you only want accessable on one machine, then you now have that option.

To make the thing really useful, you'd have to be able to key the jumpdrive to perhaps two or three machines. That way you wouldn't risk machine failure, and you could use the drive as secure transport between, say, home and work.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[Anonymous Coward]

Don't feed the trolls, please. It only encourages them. Especially the noob trolls. Everyone here already understands that your comment was useful and he is an idiot.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[Pharmboy]

"Free as in speech" would also include having the choice to use proprietary file formats is one so chooses. Not my cup of tea, but neither is fanboyism.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[fm6]

Long story short: TPM serialization == bad for backups.

So basically, you have to decide whether it's more important for you to have your data or for others not to have it.

Laptop thefts have been in news in Silicon Valley lately, because people using them to transport data valuable to identity thieves. That caused the Mercury News to go to the local copies for the details of that crime wave. Laptop thieves mostly troll the main drag, looking for rental cars parked near fancy restaurants and hotels. So they don't know who owns the laptop. And the first thing they always do is wipe the hard disk, so the fenced system can't be traced back.

If the data on your laptop is important, keep an eye on it. If it's not, keep an eye on it anyway, 'cause the thieves just don't care.

Re:Be afraid only if you can't use it ..

[mrchaotica]

But that sort of protection is just as easily provided by tools like GPG and such, and still would depend on the software vendor exploiting that feature, so .. yeah .. it just goes round and round.

And that's the bottom line: the only thing that a TPM can do that stuff like GPG can't, is to keep your information secure against you.

Nothing to fear

[dotslash]

Firstly you can disable the chip from BIOS or driver software

Secondly there are some good uses for it: I use it to store web site passwords, keys and certificates. On my laptop (Thinkpad T43) it is connected to the fingerprint scanner so I can enforce two-factor auth. (finger swipe AND passphrase). I also store the keys for encrypted disk volumes in the TPM (also part of the software IBM/Lenovo offers for the TPM).

No software can access the TPM without my consent, because it requires finger and password.

Re:Nothing to fear

[Jherek Carnelian]

You might want to do a little research on the efficacy of finger-print identification systems - in short it is pretty much nil. The cheap ones can usually be fooled by simply retrying a bunch of times with the finger at different angles, the more expensive ones can be easily fooled with the equivalent of a jello mold of the valid fingerprint - which can often be lifted directly off the scanner itself via the skin-oil left by the most recent user. So your 2-factor authentication is really more of a 1.1-factor authentication.

Re:Nothing to fear

[Anonymous Coward]

Does such feature work in NetBSD? No? So it requires proprietary drivers. Do you trust them? I think I'll pass.

Re:Nothing to fear

[Zebra_X]

I too own a think pad t43. I haven't tried the jello trick, but the swipe is very good at only recognizing my finger print. Unlike other finger printer readers, the think pad version requires a swipe preventing thieves from "lifting" prints from the sensor. The sensor also responds only to live tissue from what i have tried and have read from the manual. The manual also recommends interning mutliple fingers so that in the event of limb loss, there is a backup.

I suspect that IBM's engineering on this front is up to snuff. They do afer all specialize in some pretty high end hardware such as tamperproof encryption modules. If it were any other manufacturer I'm not sure I'd "buy it".

Re:Nothing to fear

[charlesnw]

The sensor also responds only to live tissue from what i have tried

So are you saying that you have tried with dead fingers? *chuckles*

Re:Nothing to fear

[Jherek Carnelian]

They do afer all specialize in some pretty high end hardware such as tamperproof encryption modules. If it were any other manufacturer I'm not sure I'd "buy it".

Heh. I know the guys who do the IBM 4758 and PCIXCC cards and they aren't involved with the fingerprint scanner on the notebooks.
IBM is a big company.

Although not IBM specific, here's a few links about the falibility of fingerprint scanners, the last one is tragically funny.

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0205.html#5
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/22.37.html#subj4.1
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0205.html#5
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4396831.st m

Re:Nothing to fear

[Jherek Carnelian]

Duped one by accident:

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/05/11/identix_fa lse_id_suit/

Re:Nothing to fear

[Zebra_X]

Sure I know what you are saying, there certainly are bunk systems out there.

However, as far as i know, none of the links that you provided states an attack vector that is possible with the IBM fingerprint sensor.

The t43 fingerprint sensor requires the user to slide their finger over the sensor. An intelligent move by IBM as this elimitates the possibilty of retrieving the figerprint of the last user. Most of the commercial fingerprint scanners don't require the user to move the finger, and all of the sensors cited in your articles were of the no-slide variety.

Second, dead fingers don't work. So stealing appendages won't work either as in the case of the fellow driving the nice car in malaysia.

In addition the finger print reader is integrated into the shell, so snooping USB traffic is out as well.

Any security done poorly won't hold up. In the case of our particular laptop, it is done well - and would appear to be secure.

Fuck that shit

[Anonymous Coward]

Call every retailer in your area and ask specifically what stock they have without TPM's. Let's all do it... twice a week.

Just about every new laptop

[linguae]

...seems to have a TPM chip. Thinkpads, MacBook Pros, some Gateway machines, just about every major new laptop manufacturer that I know of has already installed TPM chips in their laptops.

The important thing to remember, though, is that a TPM chip means nothing if you don't use an OS or software that utilizes the chip for nefarious purposes. If you stick to Windows XP, current versions of OS X (they only use the TPM chip to see if it is a genuine Macintosh), or a free OS (like Linux or BSD), then they won't utilize the TPM chip to restrict your moves. However, you might want to check out any upgrades to the proprietary OSes or proprietary software before you upgrade. You might also want to avoid DRM'd media as well and find alternatives before it is too late.

Now, if you really don't want a TPM chip in your machine, just buy the last model of the machine that you want that doesn't have a TPM chip. Apple, for example, still sells their G4 line of PowerBooks and iBooks. You'll have to weigh the advantages/disadvantages; do you want to sacrifice performance over a trusted computing chip that has little control depending on your software choices?

Re:Just about every new laptop

[Anonymous Coward]

Now, if you really don't want a TPM chip in your machine, just buy the last model of the machine that you want that doesn't have a TPM chip.

Right, then when you next upgrade it will be impossible to buy a motherboard without a Treacherous Computing Module. The TPM is a hardware rootkit and widespread adoption is required before Treacherous Computing is made mandatory.

You'll have to weigh the advantages/disadvantages

What advantages? We're talking about a malicious device intended to remove the root users control of the machine.

Re:Just about every new laptop

[MarkGriz]

"Now, if you really don't want a TPM chip in your machine"

Just put your laptop in the microwave, along with your RFID tags.

Re:Just about every new laptop

[slavemowgli]

Linux at least *does* have support for a number of TPM chips (these reside in drivers/char/tpm . You don't have to enable the relevant drivers, of course, but chances are your mainstream distribution has done so.

Whether that actually *means* anything is another matter entirely, of course, and as long as you stick to free software, you shouldn't have to worry about anything really (one should hope). But it's not true that Linux doesn't support these things.

Re:Just about every new laptop

[John Hasler]

Do you get the keys to the TPM with these TPM-bearing laptops?

No Thanks.

[saden1]

No one knows right now? Till, I don't buy things with lots of secrets and a cloud of uncertainty surrounding it.

Re:Why should we be worried?

[Thundercleets]

You need a clue because your Apple bashing makes no sense since TPM was on x86/Wintel first and the 4C who came up with did not include Apple.

TPM is wrong, the way it is implimentented on PC and now MAC is a big kiss on the crack for the music and software industry.

Basically your PC was rooted when you bought it.
The thing is like the "Terminator", it can't be bargined with, disabled and in most cases is hidden from view from the OS. It also will not stop being a backdoor in hardware so that your use of that PC/MAC can be tracked and to make sure your soon to be leased OS/productivity packages are up to date.

It's a brave new world out there folks so be safe...

Afraid? Not really.

[smooth wombat]

But those damn TPS reports, that's something to be afraid of!

Too late now

[Anonymous Coward]

Looking at a TPM-equipped laptop causes no harmful effects, but the implant under your skin, triggered by a 'Post Slashdot question', has been activated and Project Big Brother is now underway. All your activities are being monitored, and your thought patterns are being recorded for future reference.

You might as well have the laptop. May I suggest the one with the built-in webcam so it'll be easier for all of us. Don't even bother asking about 'suspend' or 'hibernate'.

Redundant? WTF?

[objekt]

Stupid, perhaps. Off-topic, sure. But redundant? No way!

TPM is cool

[Anonymous Coward]

Now that Linux supports it, I'd get one in a heartbeat. It could be pretty useful for authentication and security. As for companies who would want to use the chip against me, I don't really give a shit, since I don't use their software anyway.

Re:TPM is cool

[Anonymous Coward]

TPM will become mandatory and we'll have people like you to thank for it! You're either a troll or someone who graduated moron school with honors.

Two questions

[mcc]

Firstly you can disable the chip from BIOS or driver software

1. Is this even the case with the new Intel macs?

2. If you disable the chip from bios, can the OS re-enable it without your consent?

Re:Two questions

[Richard_at_work]

90% of OSX Intel relies on having the TPM chip present and active, if you disable it you are going to have a very inoperative OS very quickly - unless you use one of the hacked versions. Personally, my problem is the abuse, not the technology - TPM has some great potential uses, but only the ones certain people have a problem with seem to get column inches on slashdot.

Re:Two questions

[mcc]

90% of OSX Intel relies on having the TPM chip present and active, if you disable it you are going to have a very inoperative OS very quickly - unless you use one of the hacked versions.

I was thinking along the exact lines of running a hacked version, yes. However, if the OS can override the BIOS settings without user input (say, perhaps there's something the people writing the hacked version missed) and turn the disabled TPM back on, there wouldn't be much benefit from this.

TPM has some great potential uses

I disagree entirely.

Re:Two questions

[Richard_at_work]

TPM has some great potential uses I disagree entirely.

Then I guess you also dont see any good uses for passwords, permission levels, memory management and various such security measures operative in most OS's these days. TPM would be a fantastic hardware assistance in securing your environment further, and would be a boon in this manner in the corporate environment (imagine a server only allowed to run one single service under one userid and nothing else, you wouldnt ever have to worry about overflow execution exploits or remote access exploits ever again). As I said, its the abuses, where the control is removed from you, that I dont agree with.

Re:Two questions

[bersl2]

But it's precisely the idea that this technology can be so readily abused, and was born seemingly for the very purpose of being so abused, that makes me believe that it must come to a halt now, so that the implications can be further and more widely understood. But that's the very thing most pushing for its adoption seem to want to hide.

If it were under better circumstances, I might agree with you that it's OK for them to procede, and that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages; but that is not the case.

Re:Two questions

[Anonymous Coward]

Read this. There are solutions to this that will allow the security benefits of trusted computing without the huge nastiness, but the TCG refuse to consider it... they just don't want to give up the potential control over the computing infrastructure.

As things stand at the moment, *NO-ONE* should be considering buying a machine with TCG hardware in it... you are basically paying for a PC that you do not own, do not control, and have no idea what it is really doing.

Re:Two questions

[mcc]

TPM would be a fantastic hardware assistance in securing your environment further

No. TPM doesn't provide any advantages in security over traditional (and now-mature) encryption and operating system permissions technologies. All TPM does is create the opportunity to take all of your security needs and place them behind a single point of failure.

TPM exists to take control of what happens on your computer out of your hands and put it into the hands of hardware and software vendors. Anything else that is claimed about it is just marketing.

imagine a server only allowed to run one single service under one userid and nothing else

I can imagine this being managed perfectly well at the software level without any need for TPM.

Re:Two questions

[Richard_at_work]

So you dont think a hardware MMU gave any benefits to computing today, because the same function can be done in software? Oh, and theres no way to circumvent software security, right? Get real. TPM is another tool in the box that can be used, sure it isnt the ultimate and it shouldnt be used alone, but dont think we shouldnt use it if its available.

Your assertion that TPM exists solely to remove control from us is also marketing, but from a different quarter. Dont think its any different, its one view or opinion, not reality.

Re:Two questions

[mcc]

So you dont think a hardware MMU gave any benefits to computing today

We are not talking about hardware MMUs.

Re:Two questions

[mrchaotica]

All that stuff can be done without a TPM!!

There is only one thing that a TPM can do that software cryptography cannot: secure the system against you by hiding the master key in the silicon itself.

Re:Two questions

[Fulcrum of Evil]

Your assertion that TPM exists solely to remove control from us is also marketing, but from a different quarter. Dont think its any different, its one view or opinion, not reality.

No, it's a considered judgement based on the history of the technology. TPM doesn't do anything that you can't already do in software with one exception: remove control from the user. MMUs unload a compute intensive task from the CPU - TPM isn't that intensive.

They're just silicon

[Anonymous Coward]

There's nothing to fear of the chips themselves. If you want to fear something, fear what could be done with the chips. But even so, it has been stated many times that you, the user, will have final say in what happens on your computer. If you want to disable the chip, go ahead. However, some 'features' will be disabled if the chip is not present (DRM'd media for example).

Personally, I'm all for the TPM chip, because it would make for stronger security for keychains, etc. It's just another hardware crypto module, as well as a few other things (trusted boot, as one).

Re:They're just silicon

[Anonymous Coward]

Personally, I'm all for the TPM chip, because it would make for stronger security for keychains, etc. It's just another hardware crypto module, as well as a few other things (trusted boot, as one).

Personally, I'm all for carrying a cellphone packed with C4 because people in close proximity will avoid trying to blow me up, etc. It's just another cellphone as well as a few other things (high powered explosives).

Re:They're just silicon

[Anonymous Coward]

Gentlemen, our long search is finally at an end. Behold - the dumbest analogy the world has ever seen! Let us be thankful he didn't manage to work "cars" into it somehow.

Re:They're just silicon

[Anonymous Coward]

Gentlemen, our long search is finally at an end. Behold - the dumbest analogy the world has ever seen! Let us be thankful he didn't manage to work "cars" into it somehow.

Gentlemen, our long search is finally at an end. Behold - someone unaware of the difference between an analogy and paraphrasing stupidity! Let us be thankful... no actually, let's not!

Re:They're just silicon

[charlesnw]

*giggles* oh wait. I am a boy.... ^H^H^H^H^ *chuckles*

Re:They're just silicon

[Anonymous Coward]

I see, so advocating the existence and use of the TPM is stupidity? Now I understand the slashdot mind, and the collective IQ, as well as understanding of and desire to understand basic technologies, appears to converge on log(1).

educate yourself?

[Anonymous Coward]

TPMs are neither good nor evil per default and there is
nothing magic in them, just some well known crypto cast into hardware.

If you want to know what they do or can do,
grab the specs from the TCG homepage and read em,
no one to stop you.

If you want to try them yourself, grab the TPM kernel emulator module,
or use a real chip, Linux ships drivers with every new kernel.
Use the freely available software lib from IBM (called Trousers),
hell, lately even first Java bindings appeared for those who
don't want to get much dirty.

Re:educate yourself?

[Anonymous Coward]

Hardware crypto was already availiable, the TPM was designed to undermine the end-users control of their computer. It's the first half of the puzzle, being legally forced to run a signed OS is the next.

Re:Afraid? Not really.

[rubycodez]

you're only supposed to be afraid of the cover sheet. didn't you get the memo?

be afraid...be very afraid

[Tumbleweed]

Keep in mind that TPM also stands for "The Phantom Menace," and that is NOT a good thing. (Okay, except for the light sabre battle at the end, which was the best thing in all three prequels.)

Re:Afraid? Not really.

[smooth wombat]

Yes, I got the memo. It's right here. I just forgot. It won't happen again.

I'd stay away from it...

[TemporalBeing]

As others have pointed out, there are a lot of factors. However, something to consider is what do you want to support? If you want to support DRM and such technologies, then go ahead and buy it. The media companies will eventually look and say "hey there's all the TPM chips out there. let's use them" and then the world is screwed over as they won't let their stuff play on something without it or with TPM disabled. So personally, I try to get something without it.

Now, I do have an AMD64 system that has on in it - but I run Linux on that system (for now, my fiance wants Windows so it might be Windows in the future...not sure) and I have the chip disabled. I bought the system from a friend, so didn't have much say. However, any system I do buy I will look at that very closely.

Also, if you are looking for one without, I helped my sister buy an AMD64-based HP laptop a few months ago. After we go it, I found out that it didn't have TPM at all. I think it was like a z6000 or something. Any how...it's a good laptop, and doesn't have it.

But to the point, consider what you want to support and where you want the industry to go. Because the only way to get them to listen is through your wallet - $$ is your voting power. I chose not to buy it. Others may chose to buy it, but most that get it probably don't know about it. And, as has been pointed out, TPM can really screw you over if its part of your backup authentication mechanisms or similar (encryption, authentication, DRM, etc.).

Re:I'd stay away from it...

[eclectro]

for now, my fiance wants Windows so it might be Windows in the future...not sure

Nope, it's not worth it. Stay with Linux, dump the girl.

Stallman's not afraid to speak out

[DrJimbo]

Take a look at this transcript of a recent speech he made.

Stallman: Digital Restrictions Management, and Treacherous Computing. Don't use the enemy's propaganda terms, every time you use those terms you are supporting the enemy.

[...]

Stallman: I think Treacherous Computing should be illegal. But I don't know how we're going to convince governments to actually do that because governments mostly are not very democratic anymore. They mostly are the pro-consuls of the mega corporations, their job is to keep us in line under the rule of the empire. That's why they run for office, they get into office, they do what the emperor -- the emperor being the mega corporations -- tells them to do, and their job is explaining to us why they can't do what we want them to do. It's very very sad and once in a while somebody has enough courage to refuse to obey, somebody like [sounds like Hugo Chavez].

Re:Stallman's not afraid to speak out

[tigersha]

Have you ever seen Dick Stallman in real life giving a speech? I have. That might make you see his words in another light, trust me.

Punching people in the face isn't bad? You sure?

[dusik]

>> "Saying "TPM in itself isn't bad" is like saying "punching random people in the face isn't, in itself, bad." Sure, there may be some isolated situations where that's true, like when your fist is covered with a fluffy foam glove that gently dispenses cash to whomever it hits. However, in most actual, relevant interpretations of the behavior, it is in itself bad."

Obviously, you need to be introduced to this. ;)

Re:Afraid? Not really.

[CamD]

Did you get the memo?

TPM

[KwKSilver]

After studying up on TPM & TC, I decided to buy a box last Dec, rather than risk having TPM/Treacherous Computing inflicted on me this year. Anybody care to guarantee that the TPM modulule & TC is impossible for HW & SW vendors to abuse? If not, I'm confident I made the right decision.

TCPA claims rebuttal, from IBM research

[Fry-kun]

Just found this article, it's an interesting read:
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/tcpa_rebutta l.pdf

In short it says, chip does nothing more than encrypt/decrypt data. It can't execute any code and is not made to be resistant to owner attack (e.g. timing cryptanalysis will work on it!). The only key(s) it controls are generated on-chip and never leave the chip [unencrypted]; there's no external "trusted authority" which manages the keys - so remote revokation is out of the question.
Ergo, you have nothing to be afraid of if you're running current version of WindeXP or any version of *nix

Re:TCPA claims rebuttal, from IBM research

[mrchaotica]

It can't execute any code and is not made to be resistant to owner attack (e.g. timing cryptanalysis will work on it!). The only key(s) it controls are generated on-chip and never leave the chip [unencrypted];

Wait, so which is it? Can you obtain the secret key or can't you?

If you can't get the secret key (or rather, aren't given it along with the computer), then yes, it is a bad thing because you should always have the right to decrypt your own data!

Ms. Turner, meet Mr. Hurt

[fm6]

Second, dead fingers don't work. So stealing appendages won't work either as in the case of the fellow driving the nice car in malaysia.

And how does the hardware know a finger is "alive"? Body heat would be my guess. Not that hard to heat something up.

FYI: Intel LaGrande, ARM TrustZone

[rur]

Intel LaGrande aims to 'protect' every IO path inside your computer, but this is still a work in progress - first TPM on every computer, the rest will be added piece by piece until the puzzle is complete.

Gigabit ethernet controller with built-in TPM (http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=7005 09/):

"Broadcom® Controllers Integrate TPM 1.2, Enabling OEMs to Offer Hardware-Based Security as a Standard Feature on All PCs
Platforms With TPM 1.2 Hardware Will Be Ready for Enhanced Security Functionality in the Next Microsoft OS (Code Name Longhorn) Expected to Ship in 2006 Breaking the Adoption Cost Barrier, Broadcom Has Integrated TPM 1.2 Functionality in Its Latest NetXtreme® Gigabit Ethernet Controller, Which Will Be Demonstrated This Week at the Windows Hardware Engineering Conference 2005"

You might already have it and not know it (the above link is almost one year old).

Your PDA/Mobile device/... will be next (http://www.arm.com/news/8308.html/):

"NDS Announces Availability Of Mobile DRM Application Based On ARM TrustZone Technology
NDS implements the first OMAv2 DRM solution leveraging the ARM TrustZone Software API which together delivers interoperable security and reduced porting costs"

See for yourself

[SuperKendall]

Do you seriously believe that you are going to get the keys?

The real question is, why dont you?

http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6633

To be cynical about it, Intel makes great heaping piles of money from Linux servers. Why would they want to put an end to that again? I missed that part where Intel would suddenly go bokers and dispose of huge piles of cash just to become a Tool of the Man (tm).

Re:See for yourself

[bloo9298]

From that article:

The TPM stores three important keys in non-volatile memory. The endorsement key is a 2,048-bit RSA public and private key pair, which is created randomly on the chip at manufacture time and cannot be changed. The private key never leaves the chip, while the public key is used for attestation and for encryption of sensitive data sent to the chip, as occurs during the TPM_TakeOwnership command.

The endorsement key pair is the interesting one. No, you don't get the private component of the endorsement key pair, because that would make the attestation capability have no global meaning.

Dumb as a stump

[SuperKendall]

The whole point of the TPM is that you don't get the keys. Otherwise, you could just as well use software encryption.

Didn't he just say in the very post you responded to how there was an article in Linux Journal about using your own keys?

Of course!!!!

[SuperKendall]

No, you don't get the private component of the endorsement key pair, because that would make the attestation capability have no global meaning.

Yes, exactly - the point is that you CAN sign it yourself, in other words making the chip do whatever you like. It only verifies that chip was used to sign it.

TPM is a tool like any other, capible of misuse to be sure but with the power in the hands of the user also capable of great good. It is only when TPM is used to lock a user out of doing something with the hardware they bought that I take issue with it.

If I can buy a TPM enabled computer, and install Linux on it then there simply is no problem. And there is FAR too much money in Linux not to provide computers where that is possible. Don't forget that IBM is going to all Linux desktops and they will need laptops too. There are plenty of huge companies with vested interests in making sure most TPM enabled computers are open for the user to install things on.

Re:Of course!!!!

[bloo9298]

I don't think we have the same view here. Whether you run Linux, Windows, or OS XI doesn't make a difference. You will not be able to fake attestations (that other people believe) unless you can extract the private endorsement key.

Bear in mind there are two things that you could dislike about TPM. The first is attestation which affects whether programs on other machines will trust you (based on the data in the attestation). The second is sealed storage, which could store data on your system that you can't recover if you run a program/OS that lets you create such ciphertext.

Of course, again?

[SuperKendall]

I don't think we have the same view here. Whether you run Linux, Windows, or OS XI doesn't make a difference. You will not be able to fake attestations (that other people believe) unless you can extract the private endorsement key.

Yes, and? That is kind of the point of the thing. That is good. That is what it does.

Bear in mind there are two things that you could dislike about TPM. The first is attestation which affects whether programs on other machines will trust you (based on the data in the attestation). The second is sealed storage, which could store data on your system that you can't recover if you run a program/OS that lets you create such ciphertext.

I disagree with that, as I am fine with both of those things since they are just byproducts of use.

The only use of TPM I disagree with is operating systems to disallow me to write something like a driver and add it to the system if I so choose. I want the ability to sign things myself in such a way the operating system trusts it. So I am in love with TPM so long as I have control.

I think you are confused about where I stand.

Re:Of course, again?

[bloo9298]

There's nothing to stop one from having an OS that allows you to add drivers. But whether anyone else chooses to trust attestations made by programs running on that OS is another matter entirely. I certainly wouldn't trust your OS with your drivers to obey a policy on data that I give to you, unless you can give me some proof that your OS and your drivers will not violate the policy that I ask you to enforce before handing you the data.

Great

[SuperKendall]

So everything is fine then. I just use my own OS with my own data ot data that allows me to do what I like with it.

Sure it can be used in a DRM scenario but they can also encase kittens in giant blocks of lucite to keep you from touching them. Wouldn't buy that either.