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What Happened to Blue Security

shadowknot writes "Blue Security has published a detailed account of the attack on their servers perpetrated by spammer "PharmaMaster". The attack included a DDoS attack on the Blue Security operational system and a Black Hole filtering attack on the Blue Security website. From the article: "The first attack was to block worldwide access to Blue Security's corporate website (www.bluesecurity.com) by tampering with the Internet backbone using a technique called "Blackhole Filtering". The Second attack was a DDoS attack on Blue Security's operational system."

13 of 293 comments (clear)

  1. For the lazy :) by Spy+der+Mann · · Score: 4, Informative
    Powered by Copy-Paste (TM).

    Timeline (all times in GMT)
    [May 2nd 13:42 GMT]
    PharmaMaster Works to Block Traffic to Blue's Corporate Web Site

    One of the world's largest spammer's, 'PharmaMaster', sends Blue Security an ICQ message stating that he will block traffic to Blue's corporate website, www.bluesecurity.com

    * ICQ Message: "Support [tier-1 ISP name withheld] says: Yes wont be a problem, i'll make sure to block all traffic to this domain very soon just get me reports mate"
    * "[tier-1 ISP name withheld] will block traffic to your websites god i love this war :)"

    [May 2nd 14:47 GMT]
    BlueSecurity.com Can't be Accessed Outside of Israel

    Blue Security receives another ICQ message from PharmaMaster stating that Blue's corporate Web site cannot be accessed from outside of Israel.

    * ICQ Message: "bluesecurity.com cant be open from outside of israel oh i feel sorry for the company really :)"

    [May 2nd 15:30 GMT]
    Blue Security's Dedicated Servers - NOT Corporate Website - Under Attack

    Blue Security's operational servers - NOT www.bluesecurity.com - suffers from DDoS attacks.
    [ May 2nd 16:30 GMT]
    Corporate Website Receives 2 Hits/Min

    Blue employees notice that there is no load on the corporate website, www.bluesecurity.com (2 hits per minute) and that most visitors originate from Israel.
    [May 2nd 17:07 GMT]
    PharmaMaster Sends Message: Website Can't be Accessed Around World

    Blue receives another ICQ message from PharmaMaster stating the company's corporate Web site can not be accessed around the world.
    [May 2nd 20:17 GMT]
    Blue Performs Technical Analysis: Confirms Website Cannot be Accessed Abroad

    Blue's technical analysis team determines that its corporate website can still be accessed from Israel, but cannot be accessed abroad.
    [May 2nd 21:17 GMT]
    Blue Reports More Symptoms: "Blackhole filtering" Confirmed

    Blue's operational team reports on more symptoms supporting PharmaMaster's claims that the backbone of the Internet was compromised (blackhole filtering at the backbone level). Still, there is no sign that there was a DDoS attack on Blue's website.
    [May 2nd 22:45 GMT]
    Blue Security Decides to Update Blue Community

    Blue Security decides to update the Blue community about the situation by reverting to Blue's pre-launch "Blue Zone" Blog, hosted on Typepad.
    [May 2nd 23:20 GMT]
    BlueSecurity.com Redirected to TypePad

    www.bluesecurity.com is redirected to Blue Security's blog. Many community members can receive real time information about the attack.
    [May 2nd 23:27 GMT]
    First Comment Posted on the Blue Blog

    Blog site at TypePad functional. The first comment is posted on the Blue blog by a user.
    [May 2nd 23:57 GMT]
    Last comment Posted on the Blue Blog Before DDoS Begins

    TypePad blog site still functional. The last comment is posted thirty minutes later on the Blue blog just before the new DDoS attack occurs. (If there had been an initial DDoS attack on Blue's corporate site, the blog site would have been hit)
    [May 3rd 00:00 GMT]
    PharmaMaster Starts Attacking Typepad

    A fierce and ruthless DDoS on Typepad begins. Blue is not aware of the DDoS due to the late hour in Israel (2 AM local time). Typepad continues to carry Blue Security's blog and help Blue keep our community aware of the situation.
    [May 3rd 16:43 GMT]
    PharmaMaster Strikes Again, Takes Down Tucows

    PharmaMaster starts another attack and takes down Tucows's DNS servers which were serving thousands of sites, including Blue Security's. Tucows terminates Blue Security's account in an attempt to stop the attack.
    [May 3rd 23:23 GMT]
    PharmaMaster Boasts Success

    Almost 24 hours later, PharmaMaster boasts success in another ICQ message

    * ICQ Message: "pharma master: you know i feel sorry for you a

    1. Re:For the lazy :) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      FFS, RTFA. They clearly say that they were blackholed (*NOT* under a DDoS attack) when they redirected their DNS record to point to their blog. It was only after 'PharmaMaster' realized that the record had changed that the DDoS was launched.

      PharmaMaster went forth with the DDoS with the full knowledge that he was going to hit Six Apart's servers. That was the entire point -- he wanted BlueSecurity off the net entirely and was willing to step on anyone to get it done.

      This was not malicious on BlueSecurity's part.

  2. DNS Vulnerabilities by Billosaur · · Score: 4, Informative

    [May 3rd 16:43 GMT]
    PharmaMaster Strikes Again, Takes Down Tucows

    PharmaMaster starts another attack and takes down Tucows's DNS servers which were serving thousands of sites, including Blue Security's. Tucows terminates Blue Security's account in an attempt to stop the attack.

    And it was't all that long ago that DNS vulnerabilities were under discussion. Attacking a DNS server not only takes out the site intended, it has the bonus of collateral damage. Imagine the chagrin of all the other sites served by Tucows when they all go down en masse and imagine the PR campaign that Blue Security is going to have to wage to get any credibility back.

    --
    GetOuttaMySpace - The Anti-Social Network
  3. Re:Yup, this sucks. by ZachPruckowski · · Score: 5, Informative

    Someone used their tool to clean a list, then compared the clean list to a "pre-scrub" list, which means they didn't gain any email addresses, they just learned something about the emails they already had been sending spam to.

    Don't quit Blue Security. My philosophy boils down to "millions for defense, not a penny for tribute" (Jefferson).

  4. Re:I want names and addresses! by ZachPruckowski · · Score: 4, Informative

    The forum that organized (or at least helped in) the attack is located here, but I think it's still down. It was nailed by a deliberate vigilante DDoS from about a hundred or so Digg members yesterday/last night. They hacked a university to host it after the first host got nailed. Not sure what happened after that.

  5. link to information week's article by DisplacedJoshua · · Score: 3, Informative

    shameless from digg, but an easy redirect for /.ers without having to read digg's stuff: information week's take on it makes it seem less, well, amazing on the part of the spammers. http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.j html?articleID=187200875

  6. Blackmail tactics by taupter · · Score: 3, Informative

    Those spammers will threat e-mails if you unsubscribe or not, so don't unsubscribe. They're doing this because it's hurting it in their pocket. Big deal. I don't give a damn if a spammer can't buy a new humvee limo, and I don't have to support those scumbags. So if they want to fill my mailbox with with their trash, so be it. I will not bend over to them. I will not unsubscribe. I will not let those fscking bastards tell me what I should do.

  7. Re:Pharma Master by ZachPruckowski · · Score: 3, Informative

    PharmaMaster is an IM and forum handle. He's a major spammer, and probably responsible for at least some of that junk in my google mailbox's junk folder right now. He is apparently working with a cartel of spammers to try to crush anti-spam attempts. Interesting reading about their planning on the specialham.com spammer's forum was mirrored online somewhere yesterday, but got taken down for some reason.

  8. Maybe UUNET, maybe not by JohnQPublic · · Score: 3, Informative

    An InfoWorld article from May 4th quoted Blue Security CEO Eran Reshef as saying:

    Among other things, Reshef said that pharmamaster claimed to have a contact at UUNET who would do his bidding. Rather than launch a denial of service attack against BlueSecurity.com, the spammer instructed the contact to alter the routing tables so that traffic from outside Israel would not reach the company's servers.
    Since Blue Security is now referring to "tier-1 ISP name withheld", that means one of several things:
    1. The spammer lied and it wasn't UUNET.
    2. UUNET threatened Blue Security and they caved.
    3. Blue Security doesn't want to be threatened.
    1. Re:Maybe UUNET, maybe not by gbjbaanb · · Score: 3, Informative

      Since Blue Security is now referring to "tier-1 ISP name withheld", that means one of several things:

      4. They're going to be named in a lawsuit, and they don't want to prejudice it with media attention, or counter-suits of defamation.
      5. They've contacted the ISP to resolve their issues and don't want to annoy them by publicising who they were.

  9. Re:"operational system" by Da_Weasel · · Score: 5, Informative
    During the DDoS and Blackhole filtering it was only operational in Isreal. The rest of the world was cut off. There were also threatening emails sent to registered users. According to Blue Security their database was not comprimised and the spammer was actually using his own email list to send these email out. Since then I have been receiving 2-3 messages a day from the spammer which contains nothing but the DNS WHOIS record for bluesecurity.com. Here is a copy of the first message I recieved:

    "Hey,You are recieving this email because you are a member of BlueSecurity (http://www.bluesecurity.com).

    You signed up because you were expecting to recieve a lesser amount of spam, unfortunately, due to the tactics used by BlueSecurity, you will end up recieving this message, or other nonsensical spams 20-40 times more than you would normally.

    How do you make it stop?

    Simple, in 48 hours, and every 48 hours thereafter, we will run our current list of BlueSecurity subscribers through BlueSecurity's database, if you arent there.. you wont get this again.

    We have devised a method to retrieve your address from their database, so by signing up and remaining a BlueSecurity user not only are you opening yourself up for this, you are also potentially verifying your email address through them to even more spammers, and will end up getting up even more spam as an end-result.

    By signing up for bluesecurity, you are doing the exact opposite of what you want, so delete your account, and you will stop recieving this.

    Why are we doing this?

    Its simple, we dont want to, but BlueSecurity is forcing us. We would much rather not waste our resources and send you these useless mails, but do not believe for one second that we will stop this tirade of emails if you choose to stay with BlueSecurity. Just remember one thing when you read this, we didnt do this to you, BlueSecurity did.

    If BlueSecurity decides to play fair, we will do the same.

    We are quite sure you will think this will not continue, that we will not continue wasting our resources doing this, feel free to wait out the first 48, or the second, and see whether these stop, you will be quite suprised.

    If you have another email under the protection of bluesecurity, and have not recieved this there, do not worry, you will soon enough.

    We mightve had your email addresses before in our lists, but now, we are targetting YOU, because YOU are a bluesecurity user.

    You might also notice, that the BlueSecurity site(http://www.bluesecurity.com) is down..

    Just remove yourself from BlueSecurity, and make it easier on you.

    Marta Tanner"

    --
    If you must!
  10. Why null routing is critical by macdaddy · · Score: 3, Informative
    There are dozens of uses for null routing on ISP networks. For example you can use simple static routes to match all private (RFC1918), reserved for special purposes (RFC3330), and unassigned (Google for "BOGON") netblocks and route them to Null0 (a logical interface that basically drops the packets, much like the data bursts are dropped when sent to /dev/null. This is basic ingress/egress filtering that should be deployed on all border routers. You don't want to accept packets destined for your network that claim to be from a RFC1918 address because they are almost certainly spoofed (or another upstream ISP has an idiot for a netadm and your common carrier also employs idiots for not doing ingress filtering on customer access circuits). This is actually less CPU intensive than an access-list. Most mid to upper-end routers today can offload routing decisions to ASICs, whereas access-list decisions still bounce off of the CPU in many cases. You lose much of your logging capabilities with this method however.

    A variation of this technique is to route packets to an internal "blackhole router" instead of to Null0. This consumes a little more resources than the Null0 option but still far less than an ACL. The blackhole router does nothing else other than null routing the traffic. It can also be used to route the traffic to a sniffing device to give the admin an opportunity to see what the malicious traffic really was. The blackhole router can also advertise internally the blackhole routes. This is useful when you network policy prohibits making changes to critical hardware such as a border router without sufficient peer review. Often when you must null route something you must do it in a hurry (ie, a customer is being attacked). Being able to make the changes on a non-critical box (the blackhole router) and having the routes changes propgate up to a critical piece of hardware (the border router(s)) is very useful.

    Another reason to use them is to prevent routing loops. Lets say for example you have an access server terminating dialin customers. You've loaded out your AS with 192 modems. A /24 has been allocated for this AS. Your AS advertises that /24 with OSPF back into the core of your ISP network. However the AS's routing table doesn't contain a route for all 253 of the useable IPs in that /24. Instead individual routes are added as individual users dial in. Lets say a packet comes in that's destined for an IP that isn't in use. The AS looks at its routing table and says to itself that it doesn't have a route to that IP. It falls back on its default route which is the router upstream of the AS that just routed the packet to the AS. Rinse and repeat. A routing loop ensues.

    Sometimes in BGP you have to have a static route to a given netblock to turn around and advertise it. You already have internal routes that would ultimately route the packet to the right destination. However to get BGP working you have to create a specific route. You can simply create a static route to that subnet via Null0 with a cost of 254 and make BGP happy.

    There are dozens of examples of why you need null routing. Does that help? You can search on Cisco's website for additional references.