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Windows Rootkit Wars Escalate

An anonymous reader writes "The rootkit wars have started to escalate with a rootkit named Rustock which is able to remain hidden from all the popular anti-rootkit tools. It uses some new techniques including not only putting itself in a ADS (NTFS alternate data stream) which isn't seen by normal file system enumeration tools, but even blocks ADS aware tools from seeing the stream. Works in Vista, too! Analysis in both Symantec and F-Secure blogs."

11 of 342 comments (clear)

  1. Re:Whats ADS for? by baywulf · · Score: 4, Informative

    It is like a generalized version of the resource and data fork on old MacOS files with similar uses.

  2. Here's a nice FAQ on that. by khasim · · Score: 4, Informative

    http://www.heysoft.de/nt/ntfs-ads.htm

    There's a lot that can be done with it.

  3. Symantech vs F-Secure by Bill,+Shooter+of+Bul · · Score: 4, Informative

    FSecure's posting says that they released a version of their antirootkit software that can defeat this. Date June 21

    Symantec says that FSecure's product can't remove this. Date June 29.

    Any reason for this discrepency? You'd think they'd continue to moniter what other companies are doing to combat the problem and 8 days would be enough for them to find out about the new release.

    --
    Well.. maybe. Or Maybe not. But Definitely not sort of.
  4. Re:Whats ADS for? by MrNougat · · Score: 4, Informative

    "In essence they were created to provide compatibility with HFS, or the old Macintosh Hierarchical File System. The way that the Macintosh's file system works is that they will use both data and resource forks to store their contents. The data fork is for the contents of the document while the resource fork is to identify file type and other pertinent details."

    http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1822

    --
    Web 2.0 == Giant Blogspam Circle Jerk
  5. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by djdavetrouble · · Score: 5, Informative

    A rootkit is a tool that script kiddies use to break into systems, as opposed to someone with actual skill finding and exploiting weaknesses using their own brain.

    No it isn't.
    A rootkit is what is installed to give the cracker unimpeded access (provides a backdoor, hides processes, replaces legitimate processes with trojaned ones, keep activity out of system logs) once they have gained entry to a system (usually throgh a known vulnerability.) THeir activity would be hidden from netstat ps, etc.

    At least look at Wikipedia.

    --
    music lover since 1969
  6. Useful tool link by RebornData · · Score: 4, Informative

    If you're (like me) one of the, umm, fortunate souls who get to clean up rootkit-infested machines regularly, there's a tool you should know about: LADS, for "list alternative data streams"

    It can be found buried in this FAQ about the NTFS ADS feature: http://www.heysoft.de/nt/ntfs-ads.htm

    I haven't tried it yet, but it looks like it should work from a win32 bootdisk (like BARTPE). So you should be able to boot from a clean win32 environment and scan the computer's hard disk to find any files with ADSs. Fortunately, use of this feature within NTFS is not widespread, so malware should stand out pretty obviously.

    Have fun!

    -R

  7. ADS was also an IIS backdoor by goat_roperdillo · · Score: 4, Informative
    Some of the first info on ADS was revealed when IIS users were notified by Microsoft that the full source code of any ASP URL, e.g.
    http://www.mycode.asp
    could be downloaded to a browser by appending ":$DATA" to the URL, e.g.,
    http://www.mycode.asp:$DATA
    Little explanation of ADS or the special ADS keyword "$DATA" was revealed in the Microsoft Security Bulletin MS98-003. At the time I could not fine a full list of ADS keywords or an explanation of ADS on Microsoft's site, merely references to making a filename "canonical" (whatever that meant - no explanation was provided).

    Microsoft has been less than forthcoming about ADS, it's function and it's mechanism. ADS has been used in the past to hack into web servers and now appears to be useful for rooting any system with NTFS.

    Is ADS a Microsoft backdoor?

  8. Re:number 1 reason to hate sony by mobby_6kl · · Score: 4, Informative
    I don't think I've heard anyone use the term to refer to automatic cracking tools, although it wouldn't be completely unreasonable (rootkit == a kit to get root). Actually, it looks like someone edited the entry and simply inserted "; an automated cracking tool" to completely change the definition ;)

    Even the ultimate authority on computer terminology, the Urban Dictionary, gets it right:

    A rootkit is a set of software tools frequently used by a third party (usually an intruder) after gaining access to a computer system. These tools are intended to conceal running processes, files or system data, which helps an intruder maintain access to a system without the user's knowledge. Rootkits are known to exist for a variety of operating systems such as Linux, Solaris and versions of Microsoft Windows.

    The rootkit concept is the dominant controversial aspect of the 2005 Sony CD copy protection controversy, which has made the previously obscure concept of a rootkit much more widely known in the technology community, and to the general public
  9. Re:Security doesn't start at rootkit detection by 99BottlesOfBeerInMyF · · Score: 4, Informative

    People, please, stay sensible. First of all, a rootkit has to GET into a system.

    True, but there are many modes of infection.

    Whatever a program may want to do, first of all it has to be started. Now, there are currently no unpatched remote exploits or program-runs-crap-by-itself bugs I'm aware of. In other words: You have to start it!

    So, just because you don't know of any unpatched, remote vulnerabilities being exploited, we should not worry about them? What about local escalations, there are plenty of those outstanding and some people admin multi-user boxes. Finally, it can come in as a trojan. No one has the time to exhaustively check every program they run, if the source is even available. That means you have to trust every program you install. This is asking users to sacrifice usability for security, and that is a classic security blunder.

    My prediction would be that you can eliminate about 95% of the most dangerous worms, trojans and spybots currently in the wild if we could just get people to abstain from running every single piece of junk they stumble upon.

    My prediction is we can stop 100% of worms, trojans, and spybots by no longer using computers... of course that kind of defeats the purpose.

    There is no technical solution for a social problem.

    Malware is mostly a technical problem and a computer/human interaction problem. It can be solved with education as a social problem, but only when the previous problems have been fixed. You can't expect users to learn a whole lot of really complex topics in order to perform simple tasks. It is not going to happen. When joe-sixpack runs their computer they expect it to conform to some basic, sensible characteristics and it is failing. This is not the user's fault. This is the fault of the people who designed the system first and then tried to teach the average person a long series of complex topics and ever changing rules. What they should have done was ask the users what the computer should do and then make the computer do that.

    It is unreasonable to expect that clicking on an icon that looks just like your picture files will install a program and let someone in Russia start using your computer to send spam. This is a failing of the computer, not the user. The computer should clearly indicate to the user what is a picture and what is a program. Then, it should not let the program do anything the user does not expect and want. If this rootkit arrives in a trojan, disguised as data or a beneficial program like a game, and the user runs it, they still should not have to worry about it because it should be running in a sandbox, by default. When it tries to do something unusual, like patch the core of the OS, the user should be warned in very strong language and given the option of letting the rootkit patch a VM's core OS instead, thereby stopping it from having any effect. It doesn't take a genius to do this, if only people would stop apologizing for how crappily most OS's, especially Windows, deal with this stuff. By blaming the users for this failing you're part of the problem. Stop it.

  10. My personnal experience... by DrYak · · Score: 4, Informative

    My personnal experience this far with Linux is that most of the time, you won't need full root access, if :
    - your access rights are correctly set (as in using the GUID "video" to grand access to devices used for graphic acceleration. Most modern distro have this done auto-magically by the setup or have the plug-n-play daemon assign correct rights to newly plugged devices)
    - there are small piece of code that are used to communicate between priviledged acces and un privilidged access (in other words : once upon a time, you needed to have SETUID on SVGALib to have nice graphics in games under Linux. Nowadays, SDL communicates with drivers and architectures like DRI, which take car to pass messages to a more priviledged part which, in turn, will take care of the sensitive steps. (In other words : Old applications - use special extension and map framebuffer themeselfs, if enough access rights. New (unpriviledged) applications - ask the X Server (with modern extension) which itselfs has the right to access hardware to map what is needed.

    That means that, with a correctly setup system, I never needed to SUDO before playing anything with mplayer, xine, vlc or whatever else.
    I almost never run application as something different as my user account.
    In fact, even installing update is being slowly replaced with a less priviledged process in recent distro (instead of asking the users to star a process as root and installing updates himself under this identity, newer distro have a separate demon that runs with the minimal necessary privileges and the user only has a small application that passes messages to the update daemon to make the system install patches).

    On the other hand, Windows, with its "admin-by-default" accounts hasn't done anything to prevent misbehavioured software. I can understand that Windows 3.x and Windows 9x, with all their DOS tradition behind them had to be "admin-by-default". But since Microsoft moved to a new architecture, why don't they change the default user profile behaviour ? Old APPs are run thrue an emulated API, newer application break if they can't run in a non-priviledged environnement.

    Old usage needed admin rights. That's normal. What's not normal is that Microsoft perpatuated the bad habbit in newer versions of Windows.

    --
    "Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
  11. Re:Forever War by Lumpy · · Score: 5, Informative

    Nope your saviour is called BartPE. no virus,worm,rootkit on the planet can disable it.

    In fact I dont even bother running any Host OS scans when I fix someone's PC anymore, I boot from a BartPE disc, scan it with the antivir and antispyware and clean it up easier and faster than anything else.

    Takes me far less time I get it on the first try and it's back to a clean machine for 35 seconds until the owner clicks on things again to reinstall every bit of spyware.

    --
    Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.