Cubesat Launch Ends in Failure
Change writes "The CalPoly Cubesat group's launch yesterday has been a failure. It seems the first stage did not separate from the Dnepr rocket properly, and the vehicle crashed about 25km south of the launch site. More will be known when the debris is recovered and analyzed. A second launch is still in the works, but the loss of the 14 satellites from this launch is an unfortunate end to quite a lot of hard work of many engineering students."
Anyone know what the Russian launch failure rate is over the last 5 years?
Its got to be pretty damned high.
Doesn't make me wonder. The Minuteman III and Polaris missiles have solid boosters with "end the world by" dates. Once a booster is expired, they either test fire it (sans warheads) or scrap it. The warheads can be reused on a fresh new booster.
Coding with assembly is like playing with Legos. Coding an application in assembly is like building a car with Legos.
It seems like every time a rocket blows up or fails to launch the payload is lost. Why? It keeps happening, and the payloads keep being destroyed. Failsafes to prevent this need to be in place. I envision a payload pod with tripple redundant explosive release mechanisms, and capable of re-entering the atmosphere from orbit. I'd love to just once hear: "rocket blows up, payload recovered, re-launch expected after payload is tested and re-certified."
-John Fenley
The solid booster ones should be in reasonable shape, but the Dnjepr is based on the SS-18--a liquid propelled rocket. And yes, given the usual quality of Soviet manufacturing, I do wonder how many of the SS-18 would actually go boom. After all, since they probably only flight tested a few percent of the total production, anyone who took a few shortcuts on the assembly line was probalby reasonably safe. That's unlike satellite launching systems where pretty much every rocket ever assembled will be fired at one point or another.
I don't know about the USSR first hand, but in Eastern Germany it was very common to assemble some percentage of the production very carefully (public demonstrations, testing, the one the party leaders get delivered) and do a very slipshot job on the rest.
Contrary to popular belief (and Hollywood movies) one doesn't just drop a nuclear warhead or "blow it up" and get a mushroom cloud. Thinking about these sorts of problems has been going on since at least 1960. Read up on the NIKE system (no, not the shoes) for a bit of history on air defense guided missile systems.
An exceprt on the guidance system:
There are numerous layers of logic like this that are designed just for the issue you bring up. Clearly an ICBM should have enough smarts to know that it hasn't left reached it's target if it is only 20 yards from the launch site and the onboard altimiter never reached a height of over 200 feet.
Take a look at those links. I think you'll find the history of these systems very interesting. Since some of the technology is rather old, it is somewhat easier to understand (think of modifying a transistor radio versus an iPod full of SMT parts).